The University of Southern Mississippi

The Aquila Digital Community
Dissertations
Spring 5-2010

The Italian Emigration of Modern Times: Relations Between Italy
and the United States Concerning Emigration Policy, Diplomacy,
and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, 1870-1927
Patrizia Fama Stahle
University of Southern Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations
Part of the Cultural History Commons, European History Commons, Political History Commons, Social
History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Stahle, Patrizia Fama, "The Italian Emigration of Modern Times: Relations Between Italy and the United
States Concerning Emigration Policy, Diplomacy, and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, 1870-1927" (2010).
Dissertations. 934.
https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations/934

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more
information, please contact Joshua.Cromwell@usm.edu.

The University of Southern Mississippi

THE ITALIAN EMIGRATION OF MODERN TIMES: RELATIONS
BETWEENITALY AND THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING
EMIGRATION POLICY,DIPLOMACY, AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT
SENTIMENT, 1870-1927

by
Patrizia Famá Stahle

Abstract of a Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate School
of The University of Southern Mississippi
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2010

ABSTRACT
THE ITALIAN EMIGRATION OF MODERN TIMES: RELATIONS BETWEEN
ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING EMIGRATION POLICY,
DIPLOMACY, AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT, 1870-1927

by Patrizia Famà Stahle
May 2010
In the late 1800s, the United States was the great destination of Italian
emigrants. In North America, employers considered Italians industrious
individuals, but held them in low esteem. Italian immigrants were seen as
dangerous subversives, anarchists, cheap laborers who were always ready to
accept jobs for lower wages. Indeed, numerous episodes of violence and even
lynching of Italians occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
in the United States. In most cases, the violence went unpunished by the local
authorities. Such episodes of violence provoked a diplomatic controversy
between Italy and the United States concerning treaty-guaranteed protection of
foreign-born nationals on U.S. soil. The contention focused on the lack of
jurisdiction by the federal government in the member states of the Union based
on the separation of powers. The federal government took the position that there
was no liability on its part for acts of mob violence, claiming that protection to
aliens must be under the control of state governments. However, the federal
government often found itself in an embarrassing position because of failure to
comply with existing treaty obligations.

ii

The contention between Italy and the United States was never resolved in
a satisfactory manner, except for payment of indemnities to the victims’ families.
However, long and patient diplomacy on the part of Italian representatives
prompted the beginning of a movement in Congress for passage of a federal
anti-lynching law aimed at protection of aliens who had treaty rights. Proposals
submitted to Congress for a federal anti-lynching law were not successful
because of constitutional issues, states’ rights, and sectional prejudice. Italian
diplomats protested vigorously the federal government’s failure to comply with
existing treaties. However, they adopted a realistic attitude of prudence and
moderation, and made efforts to maintain good relations with the United States-except for the case of New Orleans which provoked a serious diplomatic crisis
and national pride, culminating in Rome’s recall of its ambassador.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
By the late 1800s the United States was the greatest destination of Italian
emigrants. The United States represented for them not only the promise of a
brighter future but also the fragility of that dream. Italian immigrants were valued
as a source of cheap, unskilled labor always ready to accept a job for lower
wages than Americans. Thus, both American employers and workers looked
down on them as an inferior race. In addition, Italians were stereotyped as
dangerous subversives, anarchists, and troublemakers. Numerous episodes of
violence and even lynching of Italians occurred in the late 1800s and early 1900s
in the United States. In most cases the violence went unpunished by the local
authorities, regardless of the innocence or guilt of the victims. Italian diplomatic
representatives protested vigorously the federal government’s failure to protect
Italian nationals working on U.S. soil, who were supposed to be protected by
existing treaties. However, Italian diplomats usually adopted a realistic attitude of
prudence and moderation and made efforts to maintain good relations between
Washington and Rome--except for the New Orleans lynching of 1891, which
provoked a serious diplomatic crisis and national pride in the Italian Parliament
culminating in Rome’s recall of its ambassador.
One of the most striking features of Italy’s modern history is the great
migration of the Italian people shortly after completion of the country’s unification
in 1871. Between 1876 and the onset of World War II, roughly twenty million
emigrants left the Italian peninsula and the islands of Sicily and Sardinia,
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representing 10 percent of emigrants throughout the world during that period of
time. The majority of Italian emigrants were poor, unskilled, landless peasants or
owners of tiny parcels of land. The search for wages scattered them more than it
did any other European emigrants of that era. Almost half stayed in Europe, while
approximately one third went to North America, and smaller groups went to
Australia or Africa. The majority of Italian emigrants were men who found work in
several sectors--construction, mining, industry, and agriculture. 1
In the last two centuries of Italian history, there has not been a
phenomenon of such magnitude and persistence as the continuous migratory
movement. While the history of Italian emigration has often been absent from
books of modern Italian history, scholars of emigration have attempted to study
the migratory flux and the reasons why millions of Italians left their homeland to
start a new life elsewhere. They have pointed out that emigration is not
necessarily indicative of a state’s embarrassing illness, but is a normal social
phenomenon that has continuously occurred in history. Indeed, in an era of
globalization, Italy has recently become a receiving country, a land of immigrants
rather than a land of emigrants. 2
Prejudice, however, has often relegated the figure of the emigrant to the
fringe of society, destined to be removed, forgotten, and ignored in narratives of
national histories. Yet, scholars of Italian emigration history have made an

1

Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern History (1959; repr., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1969), 238.

2

Ferdinand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York:
Harper & Row, 1966), 2 volumes.

3
attempt to reintroduce the emigrant into mainstream history. 3 Undoubtedly,
emigration is a difficult topic, connected as it is to a vast array of questions
concerning geographical-territorial mobility, a great variety of jobs and trades,
different reasons for leaving the homeland, various patterns of adaptation in the
receiving countries, and the issue of mixed descent that spread Italians abroad
during a long migratory diaspora.

4

It has been estimated that approximately sixty million Italians or individuals
of Italian descent live abroad today, almost as many as are currently living in
Italy. It is interesting to note that a study conducted to celebrate the centennial of
the Italian unification revealed that, during that hundred years, as many as
twenty-six million Italians left (the first census taken after completion of
unification, in 1871, found that the population of the newly forged Kingdom of
Italy amounted to twenty-six million). Although emigration cannot be reduced to
one unique model for each region or each generation in modern Italian history,
such large figures indicate that mobility permeated modern Italian society and
that, beyond individual and regional differences, many children of the Italian
peninsula left to escape poverty and to better their lives. Moreover, such large
figures point out that the history of Italian emigration should be included in
mainstream national history as these “lost children” must have had an impact on
the development of Italian history and on the spread of Italian culture abroad.

3

Donna Gabaccia, “Italian History and gli Italiani nel Mondo, Part I,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies,
vol. 2, no. 1 (1997): 45-66.

4

Ibid., 47-49
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The elusive nature of emigration as a historical phenomenon, however, makes it
hard to restore the emigrant to his or her rightful place in Italian history.
Undoubtedly, several factors caused such a dramatic emigration
phenomenon, including poverty, scarcity of labor, and agrarian crises. There was
no region of the Italian peninsula where individual laborers were loath to go.
Emigrants went wherever work could be found, but found European and
American labor markets the most open and welcoming. 5
Although there were no significant differences between northern and
southern emigration from the Italian peninsula, the United States became a
promised land especially for southern Italians who had suffered greatly because
of heavy taxation, modest income, debts, evictions, and foreclosures. In North
America southern Italian immigrants found work at the very bottom of the labor
market: in the mines, railroads, and construction industry. However, the pay was
good, and they could send remittances back home to their wives to pay old
debts, buy a parcel of land, or provide for a daughter’s dowry. 6
The emigration phenomenon had a profound impact on Italian society.
Economically, such a tremendous movement brought a great deal of wealth to
the Italian peninsula. Not only did the emigrants send money to their families,
thus ameliorating their standard of living, but also the continuous influx of foreign
currency helped finance industrialization in Italy in the early twentieth century.

5

Robert Foerster, The Italian Emigration of Our Times (1919; repr., Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1924), 3.

6

Ercole Sori, L’emigrazione italiana dall’unità alla seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979),
83-84.

5
Also, the Italians abroad always desired products from their country of origin,
thus stimulating exports. Furthermore, the remittances sent by the emigrants to
Italy were in part deposited in post offices or invested in government bonds.
Hence, the availability of money allowed the Italian government to divert
emigrants’ savings to the development of the northern “industrial triangle.”

7

With men leaving to search for their livelihood elsewhere, society
underwent feminization. In some areas, entire towns were denuded of people.
The cycle of life changed. Young people tended to marry earlier and, after
marriage, men left, investing their wives’ dowries in their journey across the
ocean. In spite of the distance, husbands and wives could share successes and
failures, and wives could be entrusted with savings sent by their emigrant
husbands. Remittances represented the main support of the family itself but,
because of the distance and long periods of separation, the number of births
diminished. The family as an institution, however, managed to survive. 8
The emigration of millions of citizens engendered heated debates about
the phenomenon and what it meant for Italian society, economy, and politics.
The political debates concerning emigration and the subsequent laws and
policies implemented were expressions of every different political and economic
ideology present in Italy from the completion of unification to at least 1888.
The majority of politicians in parliament opposed free emigration while a
minority argued spiritedly in its favor. Defenders of emigration argued that it

7

8

Gino Arias, La Questione Meridionale (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1970), 420.

Giorgio Mortara, Le popolazioni delle grandi città italiane (Turin: Unione Tipografica Editrice Torinese,
1908).
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helped to maintain social order, eased the pressure of overpopulation, and
created foreign markets for national goods. Opponents feared that the loss of
manpower would cause labor shortages and would weaken the institution of the
family.
During the 1880s, official opposition to emigration subsided as colonial
fever gripped most European nations. The debate in Italy shifted from how
emigration could be most effectively limited to how it could be more profitably
utilized. Should emigration be spontaneous or state-directed? Should emigrants
be left free to emigrate wherever they wished, or should they be made a tool of
Italian imperial policy? In the 1880s and 1890s, the Italian government chose the
latter option and committed the nation to a series of fruitless wars that ended
ruinously and did little to alter the emigrants’ preference for the Americas. It was
during the tenure of Prime Minister Francesco Crispi (P.M. 1887-1891; 18931896), a strong proponent of state-directed emigration to Africa, that the first
important emigration law was passed on December 30, 1888. Although
restrictive, the law of 1888 represented an effort by the state to regulate the
activities of agents and navigation companies, to regulate the terms of
transportation contracts, and especially to recognize that emigrants must be
protected. The law, however, reflected the contradictions of the times and the
lack of consensus about whether emigration was good or bad for the country. 9
Following a humiliating defeat at Adowa, Ethiopia, on March 1, 1896,
Crispi fell from power, and the liberals in the Italian Parliament revived the
9

Ferdinando Manzotti, La polemica sull’emigrazione nell’Italia unita fino alla prima guerra mondiale
(1962; repr., Milan: Società Editrice Dante Alighieri,1969), 81-83; Gianfausto Rosoli, ed., Un secolo di
emigrazione italiana, 1876-1976 (Rome: Centro Studi Emigrazione, 1978), 254-255.
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argument for the Americas. Also, in the meantime, it became apparent that the
emigrants’ remittances from the Americas were crucial for the economy, whereas
Africa was a drain on the economy. The result was passage of the law of 1901, a
ground-breaking law whose main aim was to protect the emigrant. The most
important feature of the law was the creation of the new office of Commissioner
General of Emigration (CGE), located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather
than in the Ministry of the Interior, which traditionally had had jurisdiction over
emigration matters. The Commissioner General of Emigration was entrusted with
the responsibility for protecting emigrants from abuse and cruel exploitation
rather than policing their activities as the Ministry of the Interior had previously
done. The establishment of the CGE represented an important accomplishment
in dealing with the phenomenon of .emigration. Indeed, in spite of a few
limitations and shortcomings, the law of 1901 can be considered a true landmark
in the history of Italian emigration. 10
During the interwar period, however, nationalist, imperialist politicians
dominated Italian foreign policy and opened the way for the rise of Benito
Mussolini to power in 1922. Eventually, it was Mussolini, the Duce of Fascist
Italy, who decided to abolish the CGE and replace it with the General Bureau of
Italians Abroad (Direzione Generale Italiani all’ Estero) in 1927. Arguing that Italy
was a country of superabundant energy, Mussolini chose to call emigrants
“Italians abroad.” He also tried to emphasize the positive aspects of emigration,
to raise the general esteem of Italians abroad, to ameliorate the overall image of
10

Foester, The Italian Emigration of Our Times, 477; Rosoli, Un secolo di emigrazione italiana, 258;
Manzotti, La polemica sull’ emigrazione, 156.

8
Italy, and to spread Italian culture in the world. He emphasized the need to
regulate and control the emigration flux and especially to make it temporary and
not permanent. Nonetheless, what Mussolini and his associates did for the
emigrants was too little too late. 11
Over the course of several decades, liberal governments issued laws that
were increasingly supportive of emigration and that provided greater protection
for emigrants. These laws grew out of the gradual acceptance of the notion that
emigrants were citizens, that they were the responsibility of the state and must,
therefore, be protected at every phase of the migratory process. The fascist state
embraced this policy, but unlike liberal governments, sought to utilize its citizens
abroad to advance Italy’s prestige and interests and to fuel nationalistic fervor. To
achieve these goals, Mussolini convened an International Conference of
Emigration and Immigration in 1924 and established a financial Institute of Italian
Workers Abroad and also Fasci all’ Estero (Fascist clubs abroad). A whole
network of Fascist clubs outside Italy was established soon after Mussolini’s
march on Rome (October 28, 1922). The purpose for these clubs was to export
fascist doctrine, to implement a spiritual and cultural penetration of other
countries, and especially to stimulate a sense of national sentiment in Italian
emigrants. Mussolini did not want to allow Italians abroad to be assimilated into
alien cultures. Rather, he wanted to utilize the emigrants to enhance the prestige
of Italy abroad as well as to diffuse Italian culture and civilization. 12

11

Philip Cannistraro and Gianfausto Rosoli, “Fascist Emigration Policy in the 1920s: An Interpretative
Framework,” International Migration Review, vol. 13, no. 4 (1979): 673-692.
12

Alan Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 195.

9
The emigration policy conducted by the Fascist regime differed from the
policies enacted by the liberal governments that preceded it in that it attempted to
enhance the economic and political value of the emigrant. Fascist emigration
policy was consistent with a larger political centralization trend as well as with the
ideology of the Fascist regime. For example, the office of Commissioner General
of Emigration was abolished not because of the desire to eliminate an office that
had become pretty much autonomous, but as a result of a general policy of
political centralization, including pursuit of demographic growth and control and
regulation of the migratory flux. Political centralization, demographic exaltation,
and control of emigration were all components rooted in fascist ideology and the
pursuit of national prestige, the spread of Italianness, and preservation of
national sentiment abroad among Italian nationals. 13
Mussolini’s vision of emigration and emigrants clashed with the growing
protectionist and anti-immigration legislation being enacted in many countries.
Among them was the United States, which in 1921 and 1924 enacted laws that
effectively closed its borders to emigrants from southern and eastern Europe. In
fact, after passage of the 1921 law, Italian emigration to the United States was
reduced from 408,104 in 1920 to 114,912 in 1921 and to 120,501 in 1924. After
1924, the number of Italian emigrants coming to the United States continued to
fluctuate as follows: 96,435 in 1925; 117,422 in 1926; 125,423 in 1927. 14
The legislation of the 1920s was the culmination of decades long, deeplyfelt anti-Italian sentiment that portrayed Italians as generally hard-working and
13

Rosoli, Un secolo di emigrazione italiana, 259-260.

14

Ibid., 346.
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industrious and as a very dependable source of cheap labor, but also as
dangerous subversives prone to trouble making. This contradictory image of the
Italian immigrant, rooted both in deep xenophobia and economic conflict,
produced waves of violence and numerous cases of lynching in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In most cases, violence, harassment,
and lynchings went unpunished by the local authorities, regardless of the
innocence or guilt of the victims. Yet, Mussolini protested the reduced quotas,
even though neither he nor the liberals had succeeded in winning effective antilynching laws to protect the emigrants.
Italian emigration to the Americas, mostly to the United States, went
through three phases. From 1876 to 1890, the majority went to Argentina; then
until 1897 Argentina and Brazil were almost equally favored by emigrants; from
1898 to the outbreak of World War I and then the interwar period, the United
States became the chief outlet for Italian emigration. This emigration continued
until legislative restrictions checked that current and forced the emigrants to seek
South American countries again.
Why were Italians disliked or even hated to the point of provoking violence
and lynching that went unpunished? What provoked such episodes of violence in
the United States? What kind of reactions, if any, were there on the part of Italian
diplomats in the United States? This study will examine episodes of lynchings of
Italians in Eureka, Nevada (1879); Vicksburg, Mississippi (1886); Louisville,
Kentucky (1889); New Orleans, Louisiana (1891); Seattle, Washington (1892);
Denver, Colorado (1893); Walsenburg, Colorado (1895); Hahnville, Louisiana,
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(1896); Tallulah, Louisiana (1899); Erwin, Mississippi (1901); Ashdown, Arkansas
(1901); Davis, West Virginia (1903); and Tampa, Florida (1910). These episodes
were emblematic of the violence, racism, and xenophobia to which Italian
nationals were subjected in the United States during that period. These cases of
violence against individuals of Italian origin strained relations between Italy and
the United States and opened the way to various and complex diplomatic
incidents. In particular, the 1891 lynching of New Orleans so soured relations
between the two countries that there were rumors of war, culminating in Rome’s
recall of its ambassador.
The Italian government’s frustration with Washington was based on the
claim that the United States had failed to comply with the 26 February 1871
treaty between the two nations, which contained a reciprocity clause providing for
mutual protection of foreign-born citizens as well as equal treatment of foreignborn and native-born individuals residing in different states of the Union. Based
on the treaty, foreign-born and native-born were entitled to equal treatment.
However, Washington responded that the acts of violence against Italians were
outside its jurisdiction to investigate. It was the responsibility of the state, not the
national authorities, to conduct an investigation and bring the guilty parties--if any
were found--to justice. Federal constitutional delegation of powers to states, an
important feature of the U.S. Constitution, presented a dilemma to foreign-born
citizens in that it made it very difficult to find an acceptable solution to the
problems caused by ethnic hatred and violence. It was a contradiction in terms
that the President of the United States, who indeed represented all of the states

12
of the Union in relations with foreign countries, did not have the power to interfere
with the individual states beyond putting pressure on governors or the local
police force in cases of violence perpetrated against foreign-born nationals.
There was a fundamental conflict between the right of the single states to
manage their own affairs and the responsibility of the U.S. federal government to
comply with international treaties that guaranteed the right of foreign-born
citizens to receive mutual protection as provided by the reciprocity clause. 15
Resolving the diplomatic crisis between the Italian and the United States
governments depended upon compliance with existing treaties, protection of
citizens (both Italian nationals and naturalized citizens), and compensation of
victims’ families by awarding payment of an indemnity, the so-called “blood
price.”
The United States government took the position that there was no liability
on its part for acts of mob violence, that protection of aliens residing in the
United States must rest with the local authorities, and that criminal prosecution
for any acts of mob violence was also the responsibility of the state authorities.
Furthermore, in case of the government’s paying indemnities for acts of violence,
payment was made merely as an act of charity and liability was denied. This
attitude placed the United States in an embarrassing position because of the
failure of the federal government to comply with existing treaty obligations. In
fact, the contention between Washington and Rome provoked a movement in the
U.S. Congress advocating passage of an anti-lynching federal law to protect
15

ASDMAE, Trattati e Convenzioni fra il Regno d’Italia e i governi esteri, vol. IV (1 January 1870 to 1
January 1873) (Rome: Tipografia Nazionale di G. Bertero, 1874), 144-155; United States-Italy, Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation (February 26, 1871) in Malloy’s Treaties, 1:969.
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aliens from mob violence. No fewer than four presidents--Benjamin Harrison,
William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft--suggested a
federal law providing for punishment of crimes against aliens in violation of the
guarantees of the treaties. However, proponents of such laws found strong
opposition in Congress. The main objection to the enactment of such legislation
was that it would grant to an alien better rights than those of a citizen in the
United States. Italian representatives in the United States protested the failure of
the U.S. Congress to confer jurisdiction in cases of mob violence on the federal
courts and stated that, until such power was conferred, the Italian government
would have reason to complain of violation of the existing treaties and would
continue to hold the federal government responsible for mob violence. Proposals
submitted to the U.S. Congress for anti-lynching legislation calling for federal
jurisdiction over violence against either native-born or foreign-born victims never
became law. 16
In recent years, scholars have produced numerous studies about white
mob violence against African Americans, but the lynching of whites remains
relatively neglected. The purpose of this study is to shed light on episodes of
violence against individuals of Italian origin in the United States between 1879
and 1910; to analyze causes, motives, and characteristics of such mob attacks;
and to assess the role of Italian diplomats in asserting the right of aliens to
protection by the U.S. government according to existing treaties. Although the
16

Charles H. Watson, “Need of Federal Legislation in Respect to Mob Violence in Cases of Lynching of
Aliens,” The Yale Law Journal, vol. 25, no.7 (May 1916): 561-581; David O. Walter, “Legislative Notes
and Review Proposals for a Federal Anti-Lynching Law,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 28,
no. 3 (June 1934): 436-442.

14
contention between Rome and Washington was never resolved in a satisfactory
manner except for payment of indemnities to the victims’ families, long and
patient diplomacy on the part of Italian representatives in the United States
prompted the beginning of a movement in Congress in 1892, following the
lynching of eleven Italians in New Orleans (14 March 1891), for passage of a
much-needed federal anti-lynching law aimed at protection of aliens in
accordance with treaty rights. Bills for this purpose were introduced in the Senate
in 1893, 1899, and 1908, and in the House in 1900, 1902, 1903, 1905, and 1907.
In 1922, the Dyer bill included a clause for the protection of aliens, adopting the
form suggested in 1892. The Dyer bill failed, as did successive measures
introduced in the 1920s when restrictive immigration laws curtailed the immigrant
flux into the United States. As immigration to the United States subsided, so did
anti-immigrant sentiment, xenophobia, and violence against aliens.
Undoubtedly, constitutional issues, states’ rights, and racial prejudices
were serious obstacles to the enactment of a federal anti-lynching law. The
Italian government protested vigorously the failure of the U.S. government to
comply with existing treaties, to protect aliens on U.S. soil adequately, and to
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts in cases of mob violence. In general,
however, Italian diplomats in the United States adopted a realistic attitude of
prudence and moderation and, except for the case of New Orleans (which
provoked a serious diplomatic crisis and national pride, culminating in Rome’s
recall of its ambassador), they tried to maintain good relations between
Washington and Rome. In fact, continued emigration and its value to Italian

15
society as a “safety valve” and as a source of foreign currency and capital
accumulation took precedence over protecting emigrants from American
lawlessness. The Italian government was powerless to force protection through
U.S. legislation. Yet, it refrained from cutting off emigration to the United States-a place where emigrants were at considerable risk because of racism, economic
resentment, and the American habits of vigilantism and lynching.

16
CHAPTER II
THE GREAT MIGRATION FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE CLOSURE OF
THE AMERICAN GATES
By the late 1800s the United States was the favorite destination of Italian
emigrants. The United States represented for them the promise of a brighter
future but also the fragility of that dream. In fact, Italian immigrants were often
looked down upon and subjected to discrimination and even lynching. Thus,
violence, harassment, and discrimination that Italian emigrants suffered when
they settled in the United States challenged Italian legislators and diplomats at a
time when they had to deal with post-unification problems, economic issues,
agrarian crises, and lack of resources that prompted the children of Italy to leave
their country to make a living elsewhere. The economic impetus that drove
emigration also promoted a strong bent toward caution and pragmatism within
the Italian government in its diplomatic dealings with the United States over the
protection of Italian workers against abuse.
The first great migratory wave of contemporary Italy went on between
1880 and 1930. During those fifty years, more than 17 million men and women
left their homeland in order to make a living elsewhere. Some left and were able
to come back; most never returned. These individuals were workers, artisans,
and above all peasants. Mobility was not an unusual phenomenon; individuals
had moved frequently in the previous centuries. However, there were some new
elements in this modern “great migration”--magnitude of numbers, fast rate of
departures, and choice of new lands across the Atlantic.

17
Undoubtedly, poverty, misery, and the condition of Italian agriculture were
important factors in originating such a huge migratory wave, but there were also
other elements, most notably an international labor market that was becoming
increasingly complex. However, the transfer of labor from the agricultural to the
industrial sector was not continuous or even linear; hence, agriculture never
ceased to offer opportunities for a population that was in crisis.
Indeed, a look at the first decade of the nineteenth century can be most
enlightening for an understanding of emigration. Two major areas in Italy
attracted seasonal migrants--the western part of the Po River Valley (Piedmont
and Lombardy), where about 50,000 laborers went to work from Piedmont, the
Appennines, and the Alps (including 4,000 from Switzerland and Bavaria); and
the coastal areas of central Italy, including the Tuscan Maremma and the Roman
countryside, where laborers converged from the Appennines, Umbria, Abruzzi,
and Calabria. 1 In addition, Piedmont exported laborers to the Dolomites Alps,
Venetia, and Austria-Hungary. 2 There was no region of the peninsula from which
young laborers would not depart for seasonal work of various lengths, walking
hundreds of miles and sleeping under the sky. Such migratory phenomenon has
been called “the major system of temporary migration in western Europe.” 3
Was there a difference between internal migration and emigration abroad?
An inquiry conducted during the Napoleonic era suggests that there was no
1
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difference, that the usual division that scholars have been drawing between
domestic and external migration is an artificial one, for laborers were willing to go
wherever work could be found, be it Austria-Hungary or Switzerland or the
Roman countryside. While a line of division between domestic and foreign
migration could be artificially drawn, the motives for departure usually can be
ascribed to one common root--the crisis of the agrarian economy. In drawing a
map of labor mobility and migration, one should not consider political geography,
but the economic motive. Indeed, it was usually the individual laborer who chose
where to migrate: whether to stay in the peninsula, to go elsewhere in Europe, or
to go across the Atlantic to the Americas. The various destinations, then,
represent the most uncertain factor, as where to go depended upon the pushand-pull phenomenon, the individual’s choice, and the complex changes in the
international labor market. With time, such a complex labor system would reveal
a tremendous vitality and would generate more migratory labor. 4
During the thirty years between 1871 and 1900, Italian agriculture was
relatively stagnant in terms of productivity, investment, and mechanization. In
order to supplement meager profits, one could resort to seasonal work beyond
the Alps or near the Apennines, and to domestic industry. In many villages
women and children were employed in domestic industry. The family income thus

4

Enrico Pugliese, L’Italia tra migrazioni internazionali e migrazioni interne. Atti del Congresso
Internazionale per il XXI secolo. Dossier di ricerca, Volume II (Rome: Agenzia romana per la
preparazione del Giubileo, 2000), 42.

19
came from a combination of various sources, thus resulting in the formation of a
“hybrid society.” 5
The first wave of mass emigration of agricultural laborers was sparked by
an agricultural crisis that struck Europe between 1873 and 1896, when prices of
main crops produced in the Italian countryside dropped because of an influx of
grain coming from the rest of Europe and from the United States. Indeed, since
1873, American grains had invaded European markets, lowering prices. 6 Rice
prices also fell in competition with rice coming from Asia through the Suez Canal.
Even silk manufactured in almost every region of Italy entered into competition
with Indian silk. Wool production also suffered from miscalculations that
sacrificed natural pastures to grain production. This last calamity affected
shepherds from Abruzzi, who were the first group of emigrants to leave the
motherland. Pasture, sheep, and wool production had provided a livelihood for
entire provinces. For example, in Lombardy the province of Bergamo had
employed about 30,000 weavers annually for about eight centuries. 7
Hence a series of calamities--bad crops, low prices, natural disasters,
foreign competition, and the crisis of domestic industry--continually strained the
peasant population. As a result of all these factors, a huge mass emigration
occurred, which may be considered one of the most extraordinary movements in
history. As one historian writing just after World War I put it, “In its chief
5
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lineaments it has no like. Through the number of men it has involved and the
courses it has pursued, through its long continuance on a great scale and its role
in other lands, it stands alone.” 8
Though mass emigration movements began earlier, Italian official
statistics of emigration began in 1876 when the Italian Bureau of Statistics
started an important collection of figures that has been continued ever since. It
was Leone Carpi, an economist and journalist who had taken part in the
Risorgimento, who diligently compiled a set of figures from 1869 to 1876. Once
the office of the Commissioner General of Emigration was established in 1901,
the CGE integrated the available data with the diligent work conducted by Leone
Carpi. 9 The information and statistical data that Carpi had compiled shed light on
the social and moral conditions of the new united Italy. 10
A careful analysis of available data shows some constant features of
Italian emigration: emigrants responded both to internal adversities and to
external factors pertaining to the labor market. Hence, the migratory curve
unfolded in an uneven line, showing peaks and valleys, usually sparked by
economic factors such as lack of work. A more constant element was gender:
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those who emigrated tended to be men. In fact, it has been shown that the more
distant the destination, the higher was the percentage of male emigrants. 11
During the first phase of emigration (1869-1875), departures averaged
about 100,000 per year, peaking in 1872 and in 1873 when 140,680 and 139,860
individuals left. Of these, 70 to 80 percent were men aged twenty to forty,
originating from the countryside; women accounted for only 10 percent, as did
children under the age of fifteen. As for their origin, male emigrants were mostly
from the region of Venetia (Veneto), which at that time contributed 30,000 to
40,000 departures per year. Emigrants came also from other northern regions
such as Piedmont, Liguria, and Lombardy, as well as from central and southern
Italy (contributing about 5,000 individuals yearly). The reasons for the departures
were the continual disintegration and fragmentation of land holdings into smaller
and smaller parcels and the crisis of domestic industry. Laborers from Venetia
usually went to Austria-Hungary; Piedmontese tended to go to France and, in
smaller numbers, to Argentina; Lombards went to France, Switzerland, and
Austria; and more and more emigrants from Liguria left for Argentina and Brazil.
Beginning in 1864, steam ships left from Genoa for both South and North
America. 12
Mobility across the Alps was due to the agrarian crisis, to the weakening
of domestic industry, and also to the building craze that was going on in various
parts of Europe such as France, Switzerland, and Austria. Italian peasants and
11
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agrarian laborers were willing to leave the field and to migrate temporarily in
order to build railroads, bridges, tunnels, and other means of transportation. For
instance, between 1872 and 1881, Italian peasants built the St. Gottarde Rail
Tunnel, a tunnel through the Alps between Italy and Austria, thus ameliorating
communications between the two countries. 13
As migratory movements intensified both on a European and an
intercontinental scale, the new exchange circuits saw not only movements of
human beings, goods, and capital, but also an exchange of germs and parasites.
For instance, a formidable destructive agent of vineyards, the phylloxera, came
from New York to southern France, to move further down to Italy. Moreover,
Italian laborers coming back from Austria, France, and southern Germany
imported the cholera germ, which provoked two successive deadly epidemics in
Italy in 1893 and in 1910-11; however, it was seasonal laborers coming back
from Apulia and the Caserta area who contaminated the region of Abruzzo. 14
Between 1888 and 1897, Italian society faced its most critical years. A
series of factors, such as the decline in the price of grains, suspension of trade
with France because of a tariff war, and crises in the silk industry and domestic
industry prompted a growing number of Italian laborers to emigrate. Adding to
this labor outflow was the introduction of labor-saving agricultural machinery and
chemical fertilizers which hurt small farmers who could not afford them while
favoring the large landowners. For example, in 1888, the province of Mantua,
13
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already distressed because of continual floods of the Po River, contributed to an
unprecedented 6,146 departures out of a total of 25,000 individuals leaving the
region of Lombardy that year. 15
Most interestingly, emigration had now become a family affair. Indeed, the
region of Lombardy saw an exceptional number of family departures, as did
Piedmont, Emilia, Tuscany, and the Marches. 16 This remarkable change was a
significant indicator of the distress experienced in the countryside of those
regions as well as in the rest of Europe where the building craze had also ended.
While Europe was in a recession, new labor markets opened in the Americas.
Desperate for labor, Argentina and Brazil lured workers by promising free
housing, guaranteed employment, land at advantageous prices, and periods of
tax exemptions. Hundreds of thousands of Italian adult males started undertaking
the journey across the Atlantic. They spent the winter there, earning about 350400 lira, thus doubling their total annual income and avoiding falling into
poverty. 17 Opportunities in Argentina and in Brazil, however, were far from
similar. While Argentina offered some promise for social mobility, Brazil became
notorious as a place of harsh suffering and broken dreams. 18
The United States had been a magnet for Italian emigrants since the
Italian unification and, by the late nineteenth century, had become the greatest
destination of Italian emigrants. The United States represented for them both the
15
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promise of a brighter future and the fragility of that dream. By the 1890s, the
United States accounted for 20 percent of the entire migratory wave and 36
percent by the second decade of the twentieth century. Between 1906 and 1910,
when over 1,300,000 Italians entered the United States, the percentage rose to
41 percent. 19
Historians have long debated whether emigration from southern Italy was
relatively late to occur compared to emigration from the northern regions of the
country. The transatlantic migratory wave began in 1879, when the number of
departures from the Italian peninsula reached 24,000. At that date the southern
regions contributed relatively small numbers: Basilicata and Calabria sent 2,500
to Brazil and Argentina and Campania sent approximately 1,000 to the United
States. However, by the end of the 1880s, the numbers had greatly increased. Of
the 44,000 Italian emigrants who went to the Americas at that time, 24,000 came
from southern regions (10,000 from Lucania and Calabria, 9,000 from Campania,
and 5,000 from Abruzzi) went to the United States, while 20,000 northerners
(11,000 from Piedmont and 9,000 from Lombardy) went to Argentina. 20
Although emigration from southern Italy was not late, there were some
differences from that of the North. The transatlantic migratory wave from the
southern regions shot up between 1885 and 1888, whereas massive northern
departures began in 1888. The abolition of regional customs barriers after
19
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unification in 1861 worsened conditions in the southern regions. The North
adapted fairly well to the new legislation because prior to unification, it had
already adapted to liberal economic policies, whereas the Bourbons administered
the South, operating under strict protectionist rules. After unification, the new
rulers extended free trade policies to the South without considering southern
conditions. Severe losses were sustained when the new Italian government
eliminated marginally productive industries by allowing free competition from the
North. Some southern textile producers were accustomed to 100 percent
protection, whereas by 1860 in the North Piedmont had reduced its duties to
about 10 percent of value. Moreover, the South suffered from poor industrial
infrastructure, which tended to limit trade. It was also resistant to the introduction
of goods from the North, and its agrarian society was used to local consumption
and was much less open to external stimuli. 21 The abolition of the regional
customs barriers, therefore, severely disrupted the southern economy, prompting
the earlier migratory phenomenon.
The Italian government brought further ruin to the small landowners in the
South by imposing onerous taxes. The burdens on farmers in the form of land
ownership, public registry, and succession taxes tormented the Italian
countryside. The heavy fiscal burden as well as low wages and high fees could
be traced to endemic problems beginning over a hundred years earlier. Along
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with the ill-considered confiscatory fiscal policies of the central government after
political unification in 1871, these were the main causes of southern emigration. 22
The new taxation was a sort of modern version of ancient relationships of
servitude that had long been oppressing the peasantry in the Italian peninsula. It
is not accidental that, in the early phase of the great migration, landowners would
go after those emigrants who had left behind unpaid debts. Indeed, those
laborers had left because it was not worth their while to stay and continue
working, simply to be locked in a vicious circle of debts leading to sure eviction. 23
In spite of harsh conditions, however, southern laborers were the most
reluctant ones to undertake the journey across the ocean. Those from Apulia and
Sicily, in particular, resisted as long as possible after grain prices began to fall in
1873. 24 According to historian Gino Luzzatto, at first the fall of grain prices did
not prompt agrarian laborers to emigrate and abandon their small parcels of land.
In the 1880s, however, the crisis provoked by the phylloxera epidemic, 25 a
formidable parasite that had affected vineyards in France but spared southern
Italian regions for about twenty years, led Italian landowners to plow under grains
and plant vineyards in Apulia and Sicily. In these regions, vineyards sprang up
and southern producers continued to produce wine, even after the tariff war
broke out in the 1880s between Italy and France that limited wine exports to
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France. It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that southern
laborers abandoned the fields and emigrated to the United States. 26
The United States then became a sort of Mecca, a promised land for
southern Italians. The principal reason for this was the easy availability of jobs in
the mining, railroad, and construction industries. The pay was good enough to
allow them to pay off old debts and perhaps regain possession of their own
foreclosed land. There is plenty of evidence that such factors were good reasons
to prompt southern Italian peasants to emigrate, especially small landowners or
tenant farmers. 27
Many of the adult males left with the intention of returning and often went
back and forth several times between Italy and the United States. Their goal was
to earn enough money to protect their land holdings at home both from
foreclosures and from government policies. Hence, for a few decades, migration
was seasonal and temporary; there was no total departure, no radical break with
the emigrants’ roots. 28
Even permanent migration never excluded completely a possible return to
Italy. It is this attitude that explains in part the mushrooming of “Little Italies”
where immigrants replicated familiar patterns of social life, preserved their
language, and found refuge from the harsh realities they confronted daily outside
these “little Italies.” Immigrants had to undergo a mysterious process of
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unmaking and remaking. In the older person, the resistance was greater than in
the young. It was the children and the grandchildren, who made concessions
more easily because they had less of the Old World to discard, who would
become fully integrated into American society. 29
The exodus from the Italian peninsula continued to increase from the
beginning of the twentieth century to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. During
that period, the South took the lead while in other regions departures diminished.
From Piedmont, there were a total of 30,000 departures, and from Campania
80,000, while Sicily claimed 120,000 people crossing the Atlantic. Moreover,
interregional and transalpine migrations did not stop. Domestic migratory labor
continued to be attracted to the Po River Valley, the Roman countryside, and the
Sicilian fields. But the number of these domestic migrants diminished. According
to figures published by the Italian Labor Bureau, between 1901 and 1905, about
one million laborers were involved in interregional migration on the Italian
peninsula. 30
Such tremendous movement of emigrants brought considerable wealth to
the Italian peninsula and had an impact on Italian society. The standard of living
of those who were involved in the migratory wave improved considerably.
According to calculations by Giovanni Lorenzoni, those who came back for brief
periods brought with them 500-1,000 lira in gold, while those who returned for
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good brought 5,000- 20,000 lira in gold. 31 This capital and remittances improved
dramatically the standard of living for those who were involved with emigration.
As soon as the money sent by the emigrants arrived, the wives who had stayed
behind made sure to show off the success of their absentee husbands. They
would visit banks, post offices, and notaries; pay off their debts; buy land; and
make marriage contracts for their children. Thus the impact of emigration started
being felt in society and on those who had stayed. With their husbands away,
women started engaging in activities that traditionally had been the exclusive
sphere of men. Landlords were now appalled that the poor were no longer poor
and that women now seemed to be in command. It looked as if the world had
turned upside down. The money sent back home by the Italian emigrants played
an important role in the economic policy of the liberal governments and in the
behavior of the small industrial, financial, and political circles that implemented
it. 32
Demographic changes, too, were a direct consequence of emigration.
The Italian population got older and, of course, with men leaving to find their
livelihood elsewhere, society went through feminization. In some areas, entire
villages, entire towns, saw their population diminish. The cycle of life experienced
tremendous changes. Young people married earlier, and most young men left the
country at twenty, often investing their brides’ dowries in their journey across the
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ocean. In spite of the distance, a wife could share successes and failures, pains
and struggles, and could be entrusted with savings more than could fathers or
brothers. There were also those who left their towns and vanished in the big
metropolis overseas, formed a new family nucleus, and never again returned to
the point of origin. 33
The family, whether it was a complex network of elaborate kinship or a
small nuclear unit, did change. Those who were emigrating, while waiting on the
pier to board the ship, often entrusted their wives and children to their own
parents, even though usually not to live under the same roof. Rarely did young
men who had emigrated return to the paternal home after having emigrated.
Having experienced independence and autonomy, they found it hard to return to
the parents’ home. 34
The family as an institution, however, somehow survived the trials and
tribulations connected with the harsh conditions of emigration and separation.
Since young couples were separated for long periods of time, the number of
births diminished. The remittances, however, were the main support of the family
itself. 35
Besides influencing society, the continuous influx of foreign currency had
an impact on the Italian economy; it helped finance industrialization in Italy in the
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early twentieth century. Since the country had a scarcity of raw materials and had
to import them from abroad, the steady influx of dollars, francs, and German
marks brought in by Italian workers helped fuel the country’s industrial and
commercial expansion. From this perspective, then, there was a difference
between internal migration and emigration. The macroeconomic effect on the
Italian economy was remarkable. Moreover, the Italians abroad always
demanded products from their home country, thus stimulating exports. 36 As the
migratory phenomenon came to maturity and the influx of foreign currency
became more regular, the domestic market also benefited. The money sent by
emigrants purchased property, paid debts, or made investments that would
immediately yield profits. It was also deposited in post offices and invested in
government bonds. Such availability of money allowed the state to divert the
emigrants’ savings to the financing and development of the northern “industrial
triangle.” 37
In an analysis of the effect of emigration’s earnings on microeconomics as
well as macroeconomics, Antonio Gramsci observed that the Italian government
offered state bonds at a good interest rate to emigrants and their families, thus
making emigrants unwitting subsidizers of the industries of the North. 38 The
emigrants’ money thus had positive effects on the Italian economy--except for
some extreme cases of waste and abuse, such as the war in Libya in 1911-1912
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or the collapse of the Banca di Sconto on December 29, 1921, which swallowed
most of the emigrants’ savings. The Italian economy continued to operate by
allowing the subordination of the South, or Mezzogiorno, to the development of
industry and capitalism in the most advanced areas to the North. This trend was
consistently visible, even though it would be implemented through a sort of
underground financial channel, through the emigrants’ money. 39
Indeed, a favorable exchange rate, resting upon emigrants’ remittances,
stimulated Italian imports from foreign countries. Imports exceeded exports for a
value of 10,230 million lira in the ten years between 1902 and 1912, especially
because of the necessity of supplying raw materials for the infant Italian domestic
industry, a trend supported by the high tariffs of 1878 and 1887; about 61% of
such imports were purchased with moneys from immigrants’ deposits. 40
Emigration remittances together with earnings in the tourism and merchant
marine sectors contributed to an improvement in the balance of international
payments. Moreover, government bonds that had been purchased abroad had
positive effects on the exchange rate with foreign currencies. In this way, the
emigrants’ remittances became a way to transfer resources from agriculture to
industry, thus rendering the major Italian commodity--the labor force--the most
competitive one in the international market. 41 Hence, the emigrants’ remittances
became an essential factor in the particular model of national industrial
39
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development taking place in Italy, based as it was on the important action of the
state’s functioning as financial intermediary in order to compensate for the lack of
self-financing capabilities of domestic industry.
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The exodus of Italian laborers continued in increasing numbers until World
War I. When the Great War broke out, the Italian immigrants who lived in the
United States had to choose between returning to Italy and being sent to the front
to fight or enlisting in the United States Army. In spite of the late involvement of
the United States in the war, the atmosphere in America was one of hostility to
aliens and foreign-born immigrants. Moreover, the large German community
engendered exaggerated fears of spies, hysteria, and hatred of all things
German, and hostility to dissenters. In addition, the Russian Revolution and the
triumph of Bolshevism frightened many Americans, culminating in a Red Scare
and subsequent witch-hunting hysteria in 1919. Although the worst excesses of
the Red Scare abated rapidly, it continued to influence American society
throughout the 1920s. The foreign-born lived with an uneasy realization that they
were viewed with hostility and suspicion. A wave of xenophobia swept across the
country during the 1920s. 43
The nativism that came to the fore in 1920-1924 had its basic roots in the
pre-war years. It consisted of hatred toward Catholics, Jews, and southeastern
Europeans. The war had suspended that kind of animosity, shifting the focus to
patriotism. However, after the war ended and the immediate post-war period
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passed, the Red Scare and Bolshevik fears became catalysts in increasing
American intolerance of immigrants. The Anglo-Saxon and anti-Catholic tradition
of the pre-war era remained the distinctive character of the nativism of the 1920s.
Racial nativism continued to focus on the “new immigration” from southern and
eastern Europe, together with the Japanese; it was rooted primarily in racial
feelings and rationalized by the scientific determinism and the eugenics of the
Progressive era. 44 Anti-immigrant feelings culminated in the approval by the U.S.
Congress of legislation in 1921 and 1924, providing for a quota system
concerning coexistence in the United States of each ethnic group. The 1921 law
based the quota on the 1910 census, while the more restrictive 1924 law based
quota on the 1890 census. 45
The Law of 1921 was a very significant law for the development of
American immigration policy. It imposed the first significant numerical limits on
European immigration. It established a nationality quota system based on the
pre-existing composition of the American population--an idea that has persisted
in all subsequent laws. The law would not affect existing arrangements that
excluded most Asiatic immigration, nor would it interfere with unrestricted
immigration from Canada and Latin America. It would limit, however, European
immigration during the coming year to three percent of each nationality present in
the United States at the time of the last available census, that of 1910. This
percentage plan would limit the new immigration to an annual maximum of a
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quarter of a million people without reducing the flow from northwestern Europe. It
ensured especially that the so-called “new immigration” could not reach more
than a small fraction of its pre-war level. In the long run, the law of 1921 proved
to be the most important turning point in American immigration policy. In the
words of John Higham, “the immigration policy now adopted meant that in a
generation the foreign-born would cease to be a major factor in American
history.”
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The National Origin Act of 1924 limited quotas to 2 percent of the number
of foreign-born residents of each nationality based on the census of 1890.
Exemption from these quotas was permitted only for the wives and minor
children of American citizens, not for the wives and the children of aliens. The
law prohibited Japanese immigration, thus setting the stage for a diplomatic crisis
with Japan. As for Europeans, the law established a certain number of
inspections overseas and required the immigrant to obtain a special “immigration
visa” from an American consul abroad. Hence quotas were to be filled by
counting the number of visas issued rather than by counting the immigrants after
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As the Great War and its aftermath changed America, so they also
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except for small groups of women and children who were permitted to join
relatives abroad. The end of hostilities and of the economic disruption that the
war had caused produced a massive new wave that, in 1920, saw 357,000 Italian
immigrants amassed at the port of New York. By 1921, another 100,000 had
arrived at Ellis Island; the 1921 law reduced the number from May 1921 to July
1922 to 42,000. 48
The closing of the American gates forced Italian emigrants to find their
livelihood in South America and other regions, but almost everywhere, labor
markets were being closed to immigrants. The end of the liberal era marked by
the pre-World War I international system of free trade and exchange of goods
and labor was followed in Italy by the rise after the war of the fascist movement
whose policies on these matters departed dramatically from those of the liberal
era.
The establishment of the fascist state in 1922 by Benito Mussolini formally
ended the debate and placed the Italian government squarely against emigration.
It did not, however, resolve the issue of what were Rome’s responsibilities toward
its nationals abroad and what it should reasonably expect or demand from them.
These issues often strained relations between the Italian government and its
nationals abroad. More seriously, they proved to be severe points of contention
between Rome and several foreign governments.
Traditionally, Italian political and government officials had expressed
contrasting opinions concerning emigration. Some decried the draining of
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manpower from the country; others emphasized the opportunity for landless
laborers to become landowners by emigrating abroad, saving their earnings, and
then being able to buy land upon return. Indeed, the prospect of owning land was
a highly motivating factor for those who decided to leave the homeland.
However, whether optimistic toward emigration or opposed to it, the Italian ruling
class had not been able to forge a coherent and vigorous emigration policy that
would provide protection and assistance to the emigrants. 49 As a result, over a
long period and throughout the tenure of many governments practical
considerations prevailed and limited Italy in its dealings with the U. S.
government over the protection of Italian emigrants in America.
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CHAPTER III
EMIGRATION LAWS AND POLICY FROM THE LIBERAL STATE TO THE
FASCIST STATE
The political debate concerning emigration and the subsequent laws and
policies implemented reflected every different political and economic ideology
present in Italy from the completion of the country’s unification through the
following decades. However, whatever their political views, politicians
approached the migratory phenomenon looking mostly at its consequences and
effects on the mother country rather than trying to understand the roots of the
problem and its immediate causes. Moreover, as the migratory wave continued
to increase to record numbers, the domestic political debate was influenced by
the international context in which it occurred, first in Europe and then in the
Americas. In addition, as the United States became the Italian immigrants’
favorite destination, Italian politicians and policymakers had to deal with
diplomatic crises and the problem of protection of Italian nationals in the United
States according to their treaty rights. Despite the passion and indignation which
Italian politicians expressed when Italian nationals were victimized overseas,
pragmatism prevailed as the dominant theme in Italy’s approach.
From the very beginning of the debate in the 1860s, Italian politicians
tended to express negative feelings concerning emigration. The very first to
address the issue of emigration in the Italian Parliament was the deputy Ercole
Lualdi, at the end of January 1868. Lualdi emphasized the possible dramatic
consequences, together with humane and patriotic concerns, of the migratory
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phenomenon. A notorious protectionist, Lualdi opposed emigration on both
humane and national security grounds. He blamed the government’s policies of
heavy taxes on industrialists and low tariffs on imports for the failure of domestic
producers to create jobs for Italian workers. One of the remedies he proposed
was for the government to invest capital in job-creating remedies. 1 Responding
to Lualdi, Prime Minister Luigi Federico Menabrea (P.M. October 1867November 1869) argued that it was the responsibility of industrialists and
entrepreneurs in every sector to make sure that each Italian citizen could find
work at home.

2

It is interesting to note that only a few days earlier, the Minister

of the Interior, Luigi Cadorna, had issued a circular letter ordering prefects,
mayors, and police to forbid departures for Algeria or the Americas of emigrants
who did not have a job waiting for them at their new destination or who did not
have enough cash to survive while looking for a job. Sidney Sonnino, a politician
who investigated the depopulation of the South, in criticizing this absurd order,
observed that the emigrant was required to have capital, the lack of which was
the primary cause of his decision to leave the homeland. 3 The clear intent of the
Cadorna circular, however, was to give Parliament the power to control
emigration without issuing a specific law.
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A few years later, in January 1873, another circular issued by Giovanni
Lanza (Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, December 1869-July 1873),
issued the same orders to prefects and police and added a provision requiring
emigrants to provide a guarantor who would be responsible for paying the fees
for a return voyage in case the individual had to be repatriated via consular
ordinance. Moreover, emigrants were counseled not to emigrate in order to avoid
falling easy prey to speculators and labor exploitation. 4 To those who opposed
emigration, Lanza proposed approaching it with optimism and reflecting on the
advantages that emigration had brought to other countries such as Germany.
Moreover, as Lualdi had done a few years earlier, Lanza too emphasized the
need for greater efforts by landowners to ensure more work opportunities and
better conditions for Italian agrarian laborers so that they would not be forced to
leave the homeland. 5 As historian Fernando Manzotti points out, there was an
apparent contradiction in burdening landowners with more and more taxes while
expecting them to improve the conditions of agrarian laborers and to modernize
and industrialize agriculture. 6
Even members of the party in power during those years, the “Right” (the
heirs of Count Camillo Cavour, Piedmontese Prime Minister and architect of the
unification of Italy), deemed such regulation to be oppressive. Moreover, they
claimed that, besides violating personal liberties, it damaged the development of
4
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the merchant marine, thus increasing the exodus of Italians from the mother
country. Hence, the circulars of both 1868 and 1873, which had been issued
while the Right was in power, had a tendency to coerce rather than protect,
regulate rather than safeguard. Most of all, they had been framed based on fear
of the consequences of emigration on Italian society rather than on an effort to
understand the causes, origins, and sources of emigration itself. 7
By 1876, the “Left” (Mazzinians who had abandoned their republican
ideals and shifted to the Piedmontese camp to make unification possible) was in
power. Their leader was Agostino Depretis, a very able politician known as the
initiator of the practice of “Transformism” in the Italian Parliament. When a
member of the opposition had become too influential to be ignored, he would be
“transformed or included in the cabinet. 8 Arguing that the regulatory norms
initiated by the Right were repressive and coercive, the Left sought to tone them
down through another circular issued on April 28, 1876, named after Minister
Baron Giovanni Nicotera. It declared that emigration would be tolerated but that
emigrants would have to bear full responsibility for their own safety once they left
the homeland. The Nicotera circular acknowledged that the Lanza circular had
not achieved its purpose, i.e. to regulate emigration. In fact, in order to avoid
regulatory restrictions, emigrants who did not have legal passports tended to
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leave from foreign ports where no legal documentation was required. One major
consequence was the loss of business by the Italian merchant marine, which was
deprived of the opportunity to transport Italian emigrants across the Atlantic. 9
The Nicotera circular aimed at suppressing abuses by the agents who
were deemed to be responsible for all the evils endured by the emigrants. It was
one of the most noteworthy emigration acts passed by the Left. 10 However, a
few months later Nicotera issued another circular that urged prefects to grant
passports only to emigrants with sufficient funds to face a transatlantic journey.
He also urged them to do whatever possible to discourage so called “artificial”
emigration, the exodus encouraged by unscrupulous agents. This second circular
clearly contradicted the first one, for restriction concerning passports was a clear
violation of the freedom to expatriate, and the restrictions encouraged
clandestine emigration. 11
Until 1888, Parliament continued to debate emigration laws without much
success. Defenders of emigration continued to argue that it helped maintain
social order by easing the pressure of overpopulation and rural poverty and by
creating foreign markets for national goods. Opponents of emigration raised fears
of higher wages as a result of the loss of manpower and of the weakening of the
institution of the family with wives abandoned and children growing up without
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fathers. 12 One important consideration absent from the debate was that, for a
great number of Italians, the exodus meant finding una ragione di vita, a way of
life, a means of survival, and that laws were unlikely to deter them from pursuing
that dream. 13
During the 1880s, official opposition to emigration diminished as the
debate shifted from whether it should be permitted to how it should be managed.
Should it be spontaneous, or should it be regulated and controlled by the
government? Should Italians be permitted to establish free communities in the
Americas where most of them were choosing to settle, or should the government
promote settlement in Africa where Italy aspired to build a colonial empire? The
shift in focus stemmed from the changes that Italy was going through at the time.
In the 1870s, Italy was a poor agricultural country, a young nation recently
formed and still struggling with its own post-unification problems such as forging
a national identity, building social infrastructures, and strengthening the
economy. By the 1880s, Italy had launched a program of industrialization and
modernization at home, at the same time engaging in colonial adventures in
Africa and attempting to play a bigger role in European affairs. 14 Directing
emigrants to African colonies where they could become partners with the state in
promoting Italian economic, cultural, and international interests became the
logical alternative to spontaneous emigration. In Africa, proponents argued,
12

A detailed analysis of debates in the Italian Parliament in the 1870s can be found in Manzotti, La
polemica sull’emigrazione, 29-48.
13

Sonnino, “Problemi di metodo e risultati,” 267.

14

Denis Mack Smith, Italy: A Modern History (1959; repr., Ann Arbor: Michigan, 1969), 148-157.

44
Italian farmers could find “a place in the sun.” As Deputy Francesco De Renzis
put it, “the Mediterranean would be the cure for the social and economic
problems of Italy and the Italians.” 15
One of the features of Italian colonialism in Africa was that it was based
largely on aspirations for prestige rather than on a solid economic foundation.
Consequently, divisions ensued between those advocating the peaceful
establishment of communities in the Americas and those who advocated imperial
conquest in Africa. The debate was intense within the Societa’ geografica
italiana, one of the major agencies formed to promote colonial expansion.
Founded by Cristoforo Negri in 1869, the society’s members were divided on this
issue. A supporter of Italian settlement particularly in Argentina, Negri became
the greatest advocate of a “greater Italy” in the Americas rather than in Africa.
However, he too may be considered a symbol of the dilemma that divided
politicians, economists, and policymakers in Italy. In fact, with time his vision of a
greater Italy changed and, by 1870, he favored a greater Italy in Africa rather
than in America. He argued that it would be easier for emigrants to maintain their
cultural identity by staying closer to Italy and that emigration to America should
be discouraged and redirected to Africa. 16
The debate resulted in passage of the first important law regulating
emigration on December 30, 1888, n. 5866. The law was sponsored by Prime
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Minister Francesco Crispi (P.M. August 1887-February 1891), who succeeded
Agostino Depretis. A Sicilian politician, a former republican follower of Giuseppe
Garibaldi, Crispi had abandoned his republicanism and had embraced
monarchism as the best way to ensure national stability. At first he was an
opponent of emigration, but he had come to accept it as an inevitable
phenomenon, provided that it was state-directed. A committed nationalist, Crispi
recognized some of the positive aspects of emigration, including a means of
economic expansion for the country. He too, however, was not able to decide on
the key issue: was emigration good or bad? Should it be encouraged or should it
be limited? Moreover, he too continued to operate along the lines of coercion
and repression rather than protection of the emigrant from exploitation. Even
when measures were aimed at limiting agents’ abuses and curtailing the so
called “artificial emigration,” it seemed that the law was meant to ease the
pressure put on the government by the landowners rather than to pay attention to
the interests of the peasants and emigrants. Basically, since the very day he
introduced his law proposal, Crispi harbored some uncertainty concerning
emigration, and these would be reflected in the law he sponsored. 17
The 1888 law had all the characteristics of legislation intended to ensure
public order. It recognized the freedom of the individual to emigrate; it regulated
the activities of agents and subagents, who had to obtain a license from the
Ministry of the Interior in order to conduct their activities; it regulated the terms of
the transport contract; it protected the emigrant from being forced to pay the price
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for passage with indentured labor once abroad; and it created a special
arbitration commission in order to resolve controversies between emigrants and
transportation agencies. 18 Ultimately, the law aimed at giving Italian authorities
the ability to control emigration in order to suppress illegal activities. Hence,
although still restrictive, the law forced shipping companies to obtain necessary
licenses, and it protected emigrants from agents and recruiters who often
cheated them with labor contracts that reduced them to virtual servitude. Such
was the simple purpose of the law. However, how should the state protect
without direct control? It was still unclear whether the promoter of the law
deemed emigration good or evil. In spite of its internal contradiction, however, the
law represented the first important acknowledgement of the necessity for the
government to intervene. 19
Indeed, the important issue was the transport contract, which now had to
be in writing and had to offer the ignorant masses protection from the perils that
they might encounter on the journey to new destinations. The law, however, did
not address what could happen to the emigrant after landing in his new
destination. As Francesco Saverio Nitti pointed out, the emigrant who was taken
by the hand and accompanied to the ship could still be thrown overboard and
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completely abandoned at sea. 20 An example of how little the law considered the
physical safety of the emigrant can be seen in the provision that only a minimum
of only one cubic meter per passenger must be allocated aboard the ship. The
law also included a number of restrictions such as prohibiting married women
from emigrating without the husband’s consent. This limitation was based on the
premise that emigration was an extraordinary event, outside of the ordinary
administrative routine about which women could make their own decisions. It
would not be until the law of July 17, 1919, n. 1176, that such a restriction would
be eliminated. 21
Men, too, had restrictions. For example, they were all but forbidden to
depart before the age of thirty-two if they had not met their military obligations,
and those who did were considered virtual exiles. In the case of recall back home
in the event of war, no provision existed to facilitate the process. Children of
emigrants were also required to provide military service, unless they renounced
Italian citizenship. 22
Thus, even though the 1888 law had established that emigration would be
free, its overall aim was restrictive. “It was a law, like so many others, prompted
more by fear than by a subtle understanding of its theme.” 23 The parliamentary
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debate over the law was focused more on southern agrarian interests and on the
interests of the navigation companies than on the emigrants’ needs. In the South,
members of the middle class who had played a key role as agents in this
lucrative labor trade continued to make their handsome profits. The southern
middle class did not want the state to organize and regulate emigration, for such
actions deprive those who were involved in recruiting, shipping, and choosing
destinations of very lucrative profits. 24
It was religious institutions (such as the Congregation of the San Carlo
missionaries, founded by Giovanni Scalabrini in 1888, and the Humanitarian
Society), that, more than the government, attempted to shield emigrants from
ruthless exploitation. Their voices were heard during the debate preceding
passage of the law of 1901. 25
The law of 1901 was ground-breaking. It was introduced as a proposal in
the Chamber of Deputies by Luigi Luzzatti and Edoardo Pantano in November
1900. It became law on January 31, 1901 (n. 23). 26

The most important feature

of the legislation was the creation of the office of Commissioner General of
Emigration (CGE), reporting to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This important new
agency was meant to protect the emigrant as well as to connect the private
individual with public institutions. 27
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According to the law, no one could recruit emigrants or promise or sell
tickets without a license issued by competent authorities to the navigation
companies. Each shipping company could appoint representatives in the various
provinces of Italy, although in the Italian countryside the same old agents
continued to recruit emigrants as well as to organize and manage their futures.
Hence, the migratory phenomenon remained an autonomous event, as
intermediaries in the South had always wanted it, the only difference being that
the state now had appointed a Commissioner General of Emigration to safeguard
the emigrant. The role of the CGE was to regulate all activities before boarding
and during the journey, but he did not have the authority to intervene at the most
delicate and difficult time--the time of landing in new lands, when the emigrant
was left in the hands of local authorities. 28
These rules represented, however, considerable improvement over the
previous regulations. Not only did navigation companies have to obtain a license
to transport emigrants, but they had to do so at fixed rates and had to pay a tax
of eight lira for every ticket sold. Proceeds from the tax, as well as all license
fees, were paid to an Emigration Fund administered by a Parliamentary
Committee, with the money used exclusively for the benefit of the emigrant.
Moreover, through the publication Bollettino dell’Emigrazione, the CGE offered
emigrants a wealth of information on all matters of vital importance to them. The
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Bollettino remains a major source of information for the scholar of Italian
emigration history. 29
The Commissioner General also established numerous local
subcommittees, thousands of them, spread all over Italy in order to keep those
who aspired to emigrate informed. These committees, however, did not always
function efficiently because of conflicts with local officials such as mayors,
doctors, and priests, who feared a loss of prestige and power to the committees,
and because of mistrust on the part of emigrants, who suspected that the
committees might try to keep them at home. 30
Although the office of the CGE was not always efficient in coordinating the
activities of the numerous local subcommittees, it was considered generally
successful in advocacy for the emigrant. The law assigned numerous tasks to the
Commissioner General: approval of representatives’ appointments, supervision
of their activities, assistance to the emigrants before boarding and during the
journey, protection of women and children, suppression of clandestine
emigration, and dissemination of useful information for the emigrant. Two
auxiliary bodies were also created to assist the office of the CGE in carrying out
its responsibilities: the Emigration Council, a broadly representative body of
twelve persons who met at least twice a year to discuss the most pressing issues
that called for action by the CGE, and the Parliamentary Vigilance Committee,
tasked with guaranteeing the management of the Emigration Fund. To this
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Emigration Fund were credited all license fees and the tax of eight lira that the
law of 1901 required every carrier to pay for every ticket sold. According to the
law, no expenditure was allowed except for the exclusive advantage of the
emigrant. 31 The management of available funds, however, gave rise to
numerous attacks and severe criticism of the CGE activities from those who
wished to return some of its functions to the Ministry of the Interior, the Foreign
Ministry, and the Navy.
Agrarian interests and liberal politicians also opposed the CGE. The
former were always worried about the exodus of laborers and the consequent
rise in wages. The latter, who favored abolishing state taxes, ended up favoring
the interests of the navigation companies. Actually, a mere look at the growing
number of emigrants from Italy soon after the implementation of the 1901 law
indicates that the system of protection of the emigrants may very well have been
indicative of the merits of the law itself. It can be said that the positive effects of
the law were indeed one main cause of the increasing numbers of emigrants. 32
Criticism of the law, however, persisted and focused on the management
of the Emigration Fund. Attacks concerning financial issues were often political in
nature and were aimed at weakening the office of the CGE. For example, in
1907, Francesco Montagna, spokesperson for the Finance Committee of
Emigration, disagreed with other committee members while presenting a report
concerning the budget. He took the opportunity to put forward a critical analysis
31
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of the Commissioner General, recommending that the law be modified, that the
Office of the CGE be dismantled, and instead that Italian consulates abroad be
strengthened to protect the emigrant. 33
There were also defenders of the 1901 regulations such as Luzzatti, the
father of the law, who continued to stress in Parliament that before the law’s
passage in 1901, emigrants were the victims of police repression, an anarchical
legal system, and neglect by their own government.

34

Indeed, the law strengthened protection of the emigrant before departure
and during the journey, and its protection remained the object of liberal
governments for two decades in spite of continued attacks and criticism. 35 One
reason for the enduring support was acceptance of the premise that emigration
was a crucial contributor to internal social peace by serving as a “safety valve” for
internal social tension. Another reason was the visible contribution that
emigrants’ remittances made to national revenues and to the capitalist
development of the country. Yet, in the years between 1906 and 1908, while
many politicians acknowledged the advantages of emigration, the old debate
over the benefits of emigration to the nation was revived. 36
One important example of such polemic is the confrontation in the Italian
Senate between Pasquale Villari and Giustino Fortunato. The former tended to
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see the migratory phenomenon as a terrible illness, a serious “virus” that could
only worsen the condition of Italian society. He claimed that Italian emigrants
were cruelly exploited in America, where human exploitation was the only means
to climb up the social ladder. While working in America, Italian nationals became
accustomed to this system of human exploitation. Once they returned to the
mother country, they themselves tended to exploit their fellow citizens. Hence,
working abroad changed these Italian citizens, making them worse than they
were prior to their departure; one could not call it progress that, upon their return,
they began to exploit their fellow citizens. Rather than emphasizing the benefit
represented by the remittances in dollars, Villari pointed to the degeneration of
Italian society caused by the “virus” returning emigrants brought with them with
the dollars. Villari criticized policymakers for focusing merely on the economic
benefits of emigration rather than its more harmful social effects on Italian
society. 37
Giustino Fortunato rejected Villari’s argument. He conceded that
emigration brought changes to Italian society, but he pointed out that
demographic pressure rendered emigration inevitable. He argued that the
realities of the new Italy required the shaping of a new Italian national identity,
one more representative of the new social and economic forces and called on the
Italian government to take the lead in this undertaking. 38
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Most interestingly, the debate also revived the polemic over whether the
migratory flux should be allowed to flow where it would or whether the state
should intervene by directing it to colonies. Numerous parliamentary debates as
well as a vast literature on the subject reveal the intensity of the discourse. In the
Italian parliament, deputies favoring state-directed emigration proposed to
acquire colonies in order to secure “a place under the sun” for Italian farmers.
Proponents of Italian colonies in Africa argued passionately. The most effective
voice was that of Enrico Corradini, novelist, writer, and founder of modern Italian
nationalism. In an article that he published after a trip to South America, he wrote
that there was no protection of Italian emigrants in receiving countries, and that
Italian nationals were simply abandoned to their destiny. 39 Protection of the
emigrant, although well meaning, always ended as soon as the emigrant had
reached a foreign land. The Commissioner General of Emigration, Corradini
maintained, did not protect the emigrant as articles published on the Idea
Nazionale claimed. Such claim was only a smoke screen to hide the
government’s indifference concerning the migratory flux. 40 Rather than lose its
laborers and contribute to the wealth and power of other nations, Italy must
become less of an emigrant nation and more of a colonizing nation. 41
Social reformers opposed establishing colonies in Africa, claiming that
Italy must take care of its problems at home rather than depleting its limited
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resources in costly colonial expansion. In particular, members of the growing
Socialist movement favored emigration to countries within Europe because it was
easier for such emigrants to repatriate. Furthermore, in northern industrial
Europe, Italian emigrants would be exposed to socialist activism and would begin
to develop a sense of political activism and workers’ rights.
Economic liberals feared that forced colonization and protectionism would
hurt the Italian economy. They preferred spontaneous emigration to the Americas
as the best alternative to the problems of the Italian economy and emigration.
The development of spontaneous, free colonies, they argued, would lead to the
development of free markets for Italian manufactured goods and agricultural
products, thus avoiding costly and immoral imperialist adventures. 42
Idealist liberals favored the establishment of Italian communities in
Argentina as part of the process of creating a “greater Italy” or una piu’ grande
Italia, as the ideal setting where Italian culture, traditions, and values could be
transplanted and flourish. The majority of these liberals were intellectuals who
had become disheartened with the forces of monarchy and conservativism. They
saw their republican ideals vanish and deemed that Argentina represented a way
to realize those dreams. 43
In particular the mayor of Rome, Ernesto Nathan, in 1904 submitted to the
Council of Emigration a project for colonization in Argentina that included the
purchase of a large piece of real estate. Half would be cultivated by the
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colonization company and the other half worked by colonists who in time would
own the land after paying back a pre-established price. 44 A similar project,
designed by Luigi Scalabrini, provided for the establishment of a stock company
that would purchase real estate in the Americas and in Africa. The capital would
be raised through the sale of stock and would be guaranteed by the Emigration
Fund Committee. 45
Usually, those who presented plans for Italian colonies abroad demanded
the protection of the state. State-directed planning, however, always prompted
the suspicion of liberals, who feared that protectionism and colonization might
harm the economy and that subsidies to finance “protected” enterprises might
lead to speculation that would harm rather than help the emigrant. 46
In spite of polemics, criticism, and heated debates, the Office of the CGE
enthusiastically continued its activities to extend assistance to emigrants, to
prevent exploitation and abuse, and to provide information to those who wanted
to embark on overseas adventures. One of the distinctive features of the Law of
1901 was that it shifted responsibility for emigration from the Ministry of the
Interior to the Foreign Ministry. Ironically, however, it was the Foreign Ministry
that often attempted, at times successfully, to limit the powers of the CGE. The
Foreign Ministry objected to provisions in the law of 1901 transferring several
competencies, responsibilities, and activities (such as legal protection, drafting
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and interpretation of treaties, pensions, international conferences for the
protection of labor, and public health), from the Ministry to the CGE. In its early
years, however, the CGE for the most part performed the same role of
supervision and protection, especially in Italy, as the Ministry of Interior had
previously done. 47
In spite of good intentions with regard to its extensive responsibilities, the
CGE was not always able to provide adequate assistance to the emigrant abroad
because of an insufficient number of officials operating in foreign lands. By 1910,
for example, only a few officials worked in other countries, and their role of
protection of the emigrant was carried out mostly by consular authorities. As a
result, conflicts between consuls and emigration agents were common, for each
resented the other’s interference in matters they claimed fell under their
jurisdiction. 48
Another controversial issue was the provincial arbitration commissions
established by the law of 1901. These provincial arbitration commissions were
located in Italy’s main ports. At first, emigrants were suspicious of the
commissions but, thanks to the work of the CGE, they gradually came to accept
them.
The issue that these arbitration commissions were usually called to
address concerned Article 24 of the 1901 law, which made navigation companies
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responsible for the emigrant only in the event that the individual was rejected at
the landing port. One interpretation of Article 24 for many years was that
transport companies were deemed liable only if they knew in advance that the
emigrant would be rejected by the receiving country. This restriction favored the
shipping company rather than the emigrant. An interpretation of the law more
favorable to the emigrant, urged by the CGE, required transportation companies
to reimburse emigrants for indirect damages suffered even though the shipping
company was deemed not liable. 49
For the most part, the Commissioner dealt with grievances by emigrants
concerning lost luggage, delays in departure, and refusal of entry by United
States authorities. The number of complaints was not particularly large, and
many of them were not considered. In 1902, for example, of the 162 grievances
filed by emigrants, 100 were never considered; 34 were processed, and 28 were
rejected. In 1906, out of 623 grievances filed, 353 were pending, 130 were
accepted for processing, and 140 were rejected. 50
Nevertheless, in spite of some of its limitations and shortcomings, the law
of 1901 was ground-breaking, a true landmark in the history of Italian emigration.
In the words of historian Robert Foerster, it may be considered an epoch-making
law that signaled the beginning of a new, more dynamic phase in Italian
emigration policy. 51 Even though the law was amended and modified over the
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years, its fundamental structure remained essentially unaltered until the drafting
of the royal decree of November 13, 1919, n. 2205, usually known as Testo
Unico or “single law,” which included all previous legislation. 52
The first revision occurred on August 2, 1913, with a law that reformed the
role of the arbitration commissions (n.1075). The law gave emigration inspectors
the authority to deliberate about money controversies up to the value of 250 lira.
Later on, with the law of August 29, 1918 (n. 1379), it was established that only
emigration inspectors located in the various boarding ports were in charge of
legal grievances for loss or damage. The law also established that, in certain
specific cases, it was possible to appeal arbitration commissions’ decisions
through the normal code of law.
In general, available documents reveal that deliberations on the part of
the arbitration commissions tended to be favorable to the shipping companies
rather than to the emigrant. There was very little sensitivity on the part of the
judges in the application of social laws, as can be seen from contemporary
parliamentary documentation as well as from reports submitted to the Foreign
Ministry by the Commissioner General of Emigration. 53 However, because of the
inherent characteristics of Italian emigration, such as great numbers of
expatriations and lack of a direct link to government-sponsored colonies as in
other nations, such laws represented great legislative progress and originality. 54
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One final revision occurred after World War I with passage of the Testo
Unico of Emigration Law (13 November 1919, n. 2205), which aimed at
reorganizing in one comprehensive law all existing legislation concerning
emigration. The Testo Unico conferred more powers on the office of the CGE,
allowing it to intervene in foreign countries in a more decisive manner and to
guarantee the emigrant‘s right and freedom to find work abroad. 55
One of the reasons for passage of the Testo Unico was certainly the role
of the CGE during World War I. In fact, during the war, the office of the CGE
expanded its tasks. It became responsible for assisting emigrants who wanted to
return home to enlist in the army, for mobilization, for maintaining relations with
Italian consulates abroad, and for providing necessary documentation to the
police for the issuing of passports. 56
In the early phase of Fascist emigration policy, the leading figure was
Giuseppe De Michelis (1872-1951), who served as Commissioner General of
Emigration from 1919 until the suppression of his office in 1927. Although he
represented a link with the past and had not been part of the “Fascist revolution,”
the Fascists admired him for his many accomplishments. De Michelis had had a
distinguished career. During World War I, he organized civilian manpower at the
front and had served as administrator of the displaced persons program. 57
Moreover, as Commissioner General, De Michelis established the National
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Institute for Colonization and Labor Abroad (Istituto nazionale per la
colonizzazione e le imprese di lavoro all’estero, INCILE) in 1920. The purpose
was to direct Italian emigration toward agriculture. With its poor funding,
however, the institute did not work very well and was replaced with the Credit
Institute for Italian Labor Abroad (Istituto di credito per il lavoro italiano all’estero,
ICLE), an agency that included capital and investments by navigation companies,
banks, and insurance and finance institutions. A few projects sponsored by this
agency were quite successful in the following years. 58
In spite of its excellent performance during wartime, in the immediate
postwar period, the CGE came under criticism, especially by members of the
Partito Popolare (i.e., Catholic Party, the nucleus of the future Democrazia
Cristiana), which advocated changes in the Italian emigration policy that would
reclaim for the mother country its lost children. Among the main critics was
deputy Stefano Jacini, a strong supporter of the Opera Bonomelli, which for
several decades had been providing aid and comfort to Italian emigrants in
Europe. A fervent Catholic, Jacini claimed that the CGE had come under socialist
influence. Such criticism was not directly aimed at Giuseppe De Michelis, CGE’s
long- time leader, who had come to personify the CGE itself, but at its subagencies such as the Council of Emigration and the Parliamentary Vigilance
Committee, which had come under the influence of various interest groups,
including socialists. 59
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Eventually it was Benito Mussolini who curtailed the powers of the CGE.
Following the war, the migratory flux was greatly diminished, as the traditional
destination countries were introducing measures curtailing the entrance of
additional foreign workers. In particular, in the United States a defense of the
American labor market together with protectionism and social prejudice led to the
establishment of a quota system. This policy began with the Immigration Act of
1921, that curtailed immigration from southern and eastern Europe--the so-called
“new” immigration. In 1921 Italian emigration to the United States was reduced to
114,912 (compared to 408,104 in 1920), and, in 1925, to 96,435 because of
further restrictions imposed by the Johnson Act of 1924. 60
The dwindling number of departures gave the Fascist government the
opportunity to argue that Italy was doing well, and that Italians no longer needed
to emigrate to earn a living. Thus, Mussolini abolished the CGE on April 26,
1927, replacing it with the General Bureau of Italians Abroad (Direzione Generale
Italiani all’Estero), a more political organ that could more easily be linked with the
Fasci all’estero (Fascist clubs abroad), some of which had already been
established before the March on Rome (October 28, 1922). Like the CGE, the
Bureau of Italians Abroad was placed under the jurisdiction of the Foreign
Ministry. Also abolished were both the Council of Emigration and the Committee
for Funding Emigration. At the same time, the consular network was increased
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with the infusion of men faithful to the regime. 61 The decree that established the
Direzione Generale also included a provision to abolish the “red passport” that
had been introduced with the Testo Unico of 1919, a passport that automatically
defined the emigrant as such because of the different color passport. Another
decree of June 21 1928, n. 1710, declared that the passport was the only
document for all citizens who went abroad for whatever reason. Emigrants
should not be marked or labeled by a different color passport. The provision was
consistent with Fascist ideology and the Duce’s claim that Italy was a country of
superabundant energy rather than a country whose citizens were forced to
emigrate because of a lack of resources. 62
Although Fascist rhetoric claimed credit for the decline in emigration flow,
in reality Mussolini and his associates were not able to eradicate the original
causes of emigration, nor were they able to erase the injustices that usually
accompanied it. One could argue that the war, not fascist policy, had been
responsible for the decline in emigrants’ departures. 63
The regime did, however, gradually develop a new approach to emigration
that included a redefinition of what it meant to be an emigrant and what the
relationship between the emigrant and Italy should be. The Duce considered
emigration a fundamental necessity, but he wanted to regulate it and, especially,
to make it temporary and not permanent. He also emphasized that one positive
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aspect of emigration must be to use emigrants as instruments to raise the
general esteem of Italians abroad, who often were victims of prejudices that
reflected adversely on the overall image of Italy. 64
Until the suppression of the Commissioner General of Emigration, which
signaled a major change in Fascist emigration policy, Mussolini’s primary goal
had been to bring emigration under government regulation. One instrument he
employed to reach this goal was Fasci all’estero, a network of fascist clubs
outside Italy that provided assistance to Italian nationals abroad. Mussolini hoped
to spread Fascism abroad and improve the image of Italians in other lands
through a network of fascist clubs outside Italy. To coordinate their activities,
Mussolini established the Fasci Abroad Secretariat (Segreteria dei fasci
all’estero) and appointed Giuseppe Bastianini to lead an ideological fascist
crusade. 65 On the occasion of the first congress of the Fasci all’Estero, Giuseppe
De Michelis wrote in Gerarchia, the official fascist publication, that the resumption
of Italian emigration was a policy of the regime. He also emphasized the need to
improve the actual process of emigration. 66
Besides establishing Fasci in Europe, the fascist regime looked to North
America with its large Italian community as fertile soil for the preservation of
Italiannes and the spread of Italian culture as well as fascist ideology. Mussolini’s
appeal to the Italians residing in America to preserve italianitá also served the
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purpose of spreading Fascist ideas. Not only did fascist clubs spring up in
America, but older Italo-American societies were also transformed into Fasci in
the months following Mussolini’s rise to power in 1922. As Alan Cassels points
out, the United States was given prime attention as can be deduced from a file in
Mussolini’s propaganda ministry, Ministry of Popular Culture (Ministero della
cultura popolare), which the Allies found at the end of World War II. 67
From the start, the establishment of Fasci in the United States provoked
friction between Rome and the Italian ambassador to Washington, Gelasio
Caetani, an experienced diplomat of the pre-fascist era, who continuously
advised Mussolini to be cautious. He claimed that the American press usually
depicted Italians as dangerous subversives and criminals, and he advised that
any attempts to spread fascist ideology would hurt rather than help the Italian
image in America. However, in spite of Ambassador Caetani’s misgivings, there
were fascist enthusiasts on both sides of the Atlantic. A look at documents of the
Fasci Abroad Secretariat (Secreteria of the Fasci all’estero) reveals that the main
obstacle to the spread of fascist ideology in America was Italian diplomats,
especially the Italian ambassador to Washington, with their hostility and poor
attitude. 68
In Italy, the Fascists accused the liberal former governments of having
allowed emigration without taking into consideration the dignity of the nation or
the demographic and economic effects of emigration. The fascist regime,
67
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instead, welcomed the potential opportunities to raise the general esteem of
Italians living abroad, who were often looked down upon and subjected to
prejudice. That prejudice reflected negatively on the prestige of the nation as a
whole. Mussolini interpreted the 1920s immigration restrictions and quota
system of the United States as a “condition of tyrants” and sought to develop
alternative approaches, such as Italian colonization projects, international
cooperation, and emigration treaties. Indeed, emigration had to be protected and
regulated.
Alternative approaches were one of the main issues discussed at the
International Conference on Emigration and Immigration that took place in Rome
May 15-24, 1924. On that occasion, Mussolini announced, “It is time that the
agreements for international protection of workers be joined to economic
agreements settling the exchange of resources.” 69 He proposed the creation of
international mechanisms for the protection of workers as well as trade
agreements settling the exchange of resources. The conference approved
several resolutions that reflected the new tendencies of Fascist emigration policy.
They included assistance for the emigrant prior to departure, during the journey,
and after arrival, along with agreements for cooperation to regulate emigration
and immigration as well as labor contracts. 70
Three main themes were expressed at the 1924 conference in Rome: (1)
moral and material assistance to emigrants by private and state agencies before
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their departure, during the journey, and upon arrival; (2) the need for increasingly
intimate cooperation to regulate the flow of emigration and immigration; (3) the
formulation of general principles upon which to base emigration and labor
treaties. 71 The conference, however, did not succeed in diminishing and diffusing
the anti-immigrant trend so strong in the United States, nor did it succeed in
overcoming suspicion and protectionism. Ultimately Italian leadership was so
ineffective against quotas that the fascist regime was forced to hide its lack of
power behind rhetoric. 72
Official fascist rhetoric linked demographic vitality, expansionism, and
imperialism. Fertility, Mussolini maintained, distinguished the Italian people from
any other European peoples because “it would show their vitality and willingness
to transmit this vitality into the future undiminished.” 73 Fascist population theory
was based on the view that emigration could be an important channel of
demographic expansion and must not result in the loss of Italian nationality. This
concept was particularly important in the United States, where the government
always emphasized the “Americanization” of the immigrant and put pressure on
all ethnic groups to assimilate into American society. Contrary to American
customs and laws insisting that loyalties of naturalized citizens be directed to the
United States, the fascist government fought vigorously to maintain as many
legal and political ties as possible with Italian emigrants. The regime, for
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example, continually insisted on the emigrant’s obligation to do military service in
Italy. 74 Although Mussolini’s change of policy was in line with fascist doctrine, it
was also in part the result of changes by other countries aimed at immigration’s
restriction and protectionism.
Following the suppression of the Commissioner General of Emigration in
1927 and the establishment of the Bureau of Italians Abroad, the Foreign Ministry
shifted the responsibility for protection and assistance of Italians abroad to the
Fasci all’Estero. For the Fascist regime, the Fasci had become an integral part of
emigration policy. However, the problem of protecting Italian nationals persisted
and remained an issue with which Italian diplomatic representatives abroad and
politicians continued to struggle.
From the liberal government to the fascist government, in spite of passage
of laws to regulate emigration and to prevent abuse of the emigrant prior to
departure, Italian politicians and diplomats had to deal with the problem of
protecting Italian nationals abroad. By the late 1800s, the United States had
become the greatest destination of Italian emigrants. The United States
represented the promise of a brighter future, but also the fragility of that dream.
In the United States, Italian laborers were valued but disliked; they were
subjected to discrimination, harassment, violence, and even lynching. Numerous
episodes of violence and even lynching of Italians occurred in the late 1800s and
early 1900s. In most cases, the violence went unpunished by the local
authorities, regardless of the innocence or guilt of the victims. Representatives of
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the Italian government in the United States protested vigorously the federal
government’s failure to protect Italian nationals on U.S. soil according to existing
treaties. However, Italian diplomats usually pursued a course of prudence and
moderation and--except for the case of New Orleans, which provoked a serious
diplomatic crisis and national pride in the Italian Parliament, culminating in
Rome’s recall of its ambassador--they made efforts to maintain good relations
between Italy and the United States.
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CHAPTER IV
ANTI-ITALIAN SENTIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HARASSMENT,
VIOLENCE, AND LYNCHING IN THE LATE 1800s
By the late 1800s the United States was the greatest destination of Italian
emigrants. The United States represented for them not only the promise of a
brighter future but also the fragility of that dream. In fact, the image of Italians in
America was contradictory and complex. In North America, employers
considered Italians industrious individuals, but held them in low esteem. On the
other hand, American laborers resented Italian workers who were willing to
accept jobs for lower wages. Dislike turned into a sense of threat that swelled
into violence. Indeed, Italian immigrants were among the frequent victims of
ethnic hatred and lynch mobs throughout the United States. In most cases, the
violence went unpunished by the local authorities regardless of the innocence or
guilt of the victims. Italian diplomats protested vigorously the federal
government’s failure to protect Italian nationals working on U.S. soil in
accordance with existing treaties. However, Italian representatives and politicians
who dealt with these episodes of violence made efforts not to disrupt relations
between Italy and the United States and adopted an attitude of prudence and
moderation--except for the New Orleans lynching of 1891, which provoked a
serious diplomatic crisis and national pride in the Italian Parliament, culminating
in Rome’s recalling its ambassador.
In the climate of high xenophobia sparked by the “new immigration” of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Italian immigrants were seen as
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dangerous subversives, anarchists, and troublemakers; yet these immigrants
were also valued as a source of cheap, unskilled labor always ready to accept a
job for lower wages. Anti-Italian sentiment was rooted deeply in racism,
ignorance, and economic fears. Count Gerolamo Moroni, the Italian vice consul
in New Orleans, wrote that American employers considered Italians “working
animals,” much “desired but not loved.” 1 The American workers, on the other
hand, resented Italians because they would work for lower wages. Both
American employers and workers disparaged Italians and their culture,
considering them part of an inferior race. 2 Italians, in fact, were often compared
to blacks, especially in the South, as Italians tended to be quite friendly to blacks
and as Italian males often lived with black women as man and wife, a practice
that was particularly repugnant to white men in the South. 3
.Although not all episodes of lynching presented the same characteristics,
one can detect one common denominator. Usually the individual to be lynched
was taken from legal custody, that is, taken away from the responsibility of local
authorities; the individual then was executed, either outside or inside the prison,
by people generally deemed to be honest citizens aiming to defend traditional
values of the community from foreigners who were considered corruptors of
American society and culture. Other than a few exceptions of a political nature,
such as the lynching of Donato Carretta, director of Regina Coeli prison in Rome,
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Italy, during World War II, one cannot say that lynching is a part of Italian and
European history and tradition. It is no accident that, following the lynching of
Italians in Tampa, Florida, in 1910, Count Gerolamo Moroni, Italian emigration
representative at the Italian consulate in New Orleans, pointed out that lynching
was mostly unknown to Italians and that perhaps someday, Italian emigrants
would learn about it from American citizens. 4
Usually an episode of lynching involved pre-meditated planning and
organization. Lynchings that occurred in the United States were not spontaneous
acts of mob violence; they were planned. They were not uncontrolled explosions
of mass hysteria and rage. Lynchings were prompted by a perceived need to
make an example of an individual in order to protect and defend the community.
It would be incorrect to deem an episode of lynching as a private vendetta to right
wrongs. It was, indeed, an act purported to defend the community, an act
accomplished by the community itself in supposed self-defense, according to a
classical ritual of violence justified by the common good. 5
Although lynchings occurred in numerous states, they were vastly more
frequent in the South, where the black population was harassed and racial
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tensions were most intense. Lynchings occurred most frequently during the
summer, provoked usually by an increase in social-economic tensions between
landlords and black laborers rather than by mere hot weather. 6 But whenever the
lynching occurred, the act was not treated by public officials as a serious crime.
Lynchings usually provoked some futile and isolated protest, but not passage of
effective laws against them. 7
According to Italian Ambassador Edmondo Mayor de Planches, lynch
mobs were usually made up of simple, rude, ignorant--albeit honest--citizens.
However, it was not rare to encounter educated, cultured individuals of the upper
classes among the mobs. Like their less educated compatriots, these individuals
tended to justify the crime as a legitimate act of social justice committed against
disreputable individuals who had been a threat to the community, but who had
avoided punishment. 8
Lynching was not simply an expression of lack of confidence in the
institutions of justice. It was also a tool of social control against groups, both
native and foreign, that communities either feared or loathed. Hence, lynchers
could usually count on the connivance of the authorities—judges, sheriffs, police,
and jail guards—thus making legal an illegal act and turning it into a legitimate
practice of “popular justice” aimed at communities’ self-defense. 9
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It is not surprising that numerous episodes of violence and even lynching
of Italians occurred in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Usually violence, harassment, and murder went unpunished by the
local authorities. One of the first cases that attracted the attention of Rome
occurred in 1879 in Eureka, Nevada, a prosperous silver-mining town. Italian and
Italian-Swiss immigrants were brought to Eureka for their expertise in producing
charcoal from wood, a commodity necessary for milling silver ore. In spite of their
vital contribution to the mining operation, charcoal burners were paid only half the
wages of miners. Since they did not speak English very well, they were often
cheated in transactions by the teamsters and middlemen who transported the
finished charcoal to the smelting mills. 10
In 1879, with the price of charcoal at twenty-eight cents per bushel, a
group of Italians belonging to the Charcoal Burners Association called a strike,
demanding a two-cent increase in wages. In a detailed report written after the
episode, Count Diego Lorenzo Barillis, the Italian consul in San Francisco, wrote
that the worsening working conditions had provoked uneasiness and even
exasperation among workers and that hot-headed agitators had urged protesters
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to block the road running across the mountains in order to forestall charcoal
being transported to town. 11
Tension between strikers and the local authorities increased on August
18, 1879 when Sheriff Matt Kyle detained several individuals he deemed
dangerous and arrested suspected leaders of bands blocking charcoal
transportation to town. Several of the names appearing on the arrest warrant
were fictitious because the authorities did not know the real names. With
charcoal supplies to the mines cut off, tensions between strikers and the
authorities escalated. The sheriff’s deputies fired on workers without apparent
provocation, leaving five men dead, six injured, and several strikers jailed. 12
Shortly after the violence Barillis and consular agent Luigi Monaco
informed Ambassador Baron Albert Blanc in Washington that several Italians had
improperly participated in the violence, but that only three of the sixteen strikers
arrested were armed, implying that the local police might have overreacted and
exceeded their authority. 13
Of the five strikers killed, two were Italian, while none of the deputies were
killed or injured. All sworn testimonies gathered by Barillis reported that the
police started shooting without any warning, while the police report concluded
that the deputies fired only after hearing a shot. Barillis urged the ambassador to
demand an indemnity for the dead Italians’ families, based on his assumption
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that the deputies involved in the shooting would be exonerated in the upcoming
coroner’s report. 14
As expected, the coroner found that the deputies had killed the Italians
legally and in the performance of their duties. Also as Barillis had anticipated, the
district attorney refused to indict any of the law enforcement officers claiming
that, given the coroner’s report, the district attorney claimed a trial would merely
place an unnecessary financial burden on the town. Barillis also saw no
necessity for a trial, since the Italians could not afford to pay an attorney.
Besides, the mood of the local citizens was such that a fair trial could not be
guaranteed. Barillis was worried about the Italians but urged them not to do
anything irresponsible, while he continued to pursue the help and support from
the Italian government. 15 A few months after the shooting, the grand jury issued
a final report that exonerated the sheriff and his men, relieving them of any
responsibility related to the incident. 16
Another lynching episode occurred in Vicksburg, Mississippi, on March 25,
1886. According to available sources, an Italian man, Federico Villarosa of
Palermo, Sicily, owner of a fruit and vegetable store, was charged with raping a
ten-year-old American girl. Villarosa was taken to the county jail, where the
sheriff, fearing for the Italian’s life, requested and received protection for the
prisoner from state militia. In spite of that, fifty to seventy local citizens, probably
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with the connivance of the prison guards, broke into the jail, abducted the
unfortunate Villarosa, and hanged him from a tree.

17

Initially, The Vicksburg Evening Post praised the sheriff’s attempt to
prevent the lynching, but did not condemn Villarosa’s hanging, choosing to report
it simply as a fact. On the other hand, the Italian newspaper Il Progresso ItaloAmericano of New York protested the barbaric act vigorously, stating that the
hanging of an individual before trial in a court of law to ascertain his guilt or
innocence made Villarosa a martyr. 18 The newspaper set in motion an inquiry
based on the testimony of consular agent Natale Piazza, who had expressed
doubts about Villarosa’s guilt. In fact, the medical examination of the little girl had
revealed that she had not been raped, though she had been molested. Indeed,
Villanova had been drunk and had acted in a very improper manner, but he had
not raped the girl. Racism and a general dislike of Italians had condemned
Villarosa to hanging without a trial. As the Progresso Italo-Americano noted,
“ethnic discrimination wanted him dead at all cost more because of revenge than
for justice.” 19 In fact, the newspaper reported that the actual hanging had
occurred in darkness, whereas usually lynchings took place either in broad
daylight or, if at night, with light from torches and fires. 20 The newspaper urged
Rome to take action and proposed that the Italian ambassador, Baron Francesco
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Saverio Fava, lodge a formal protest with Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard
(1885-1889). 21 Nothing came of the protest, except perhaps a lingering
resentment of Italians in Vicksburg. In fact, one year after Villarosa’s lynching,
the Progresso Italo-Americano reported that, in the Mississippi town, Italians
continued to be victims of insults and “unconceivable provocations.” 22
It is likely that, besides ethnic hatred, the dislike of Italians in Vicksburg
stemmed from economic competition. In 1887, for example, the Progresso ItaloAmericano reported that when a group of Italian workers passed through the
town on their way to Alabama to work on railroad construction, local inhabitants
assumed that the Italians had come to steal their jobs.23 According to the
newspaper, the American press had contributed “to the rise of hatred and
despise of Italians, depicting them as thieves and usurpers of jobs, placing them
at a level lower than the Chinese in the social ladder.” The newspaper also
criticized Rome and its officials in the United States for failing to offer effective
protection to their nationals.

24

Still another act of violence against Italians occurred in Louisville,
Kentucky, in 1889 with the lynching of two brothers. The newspaper L’Italia of
San Francisco reported that in the valley of Cumberland Gap, in a camp of Italian
workers, two Italian bakers, Antonio Cravasso and his brother, had sold bread to
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the workers and had not been paid. The Cravasso brothers asked George W.
Norwood, a contractor from Birmingham, Alabama, to deduct the money owed to
them from the workers’ salaries, but Norwood refused. After a second attempt to
collect their money failed, Norwood and the two brothers had an altercation, and
Antonio Cravasso took out his gun and killed Norwood. The Cravassos were
arrested by the police and sent to the prison at Pineville, Kentucky, but while en
route, outraged local citizens took the brothers by force, hanged Antonio, and
shot and killed his brother. 25 A month later, the Italian chargé d’affairs at
Washington wrote to the Italian consul general in New York, Giovanni Paolo
Riva, thanking him for having provided through the Governor of Kentucky, Simon
B. Buckner (1887-1891), the report by the judge of Bell County concerning the
Cravasso’s lynching. He ended his note with the usual formula, saying that he
hoped that the request for information might turn into an inquiry by the local
authorities so that the lynchers would be brought to justice. 26
The most dramatic episode of lynching of Italians in the United States
occurred in New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1891. This episode was the most serious
not only because of the violence and ferocity of the lynching itself, but also
because, of the eleven dead Italians, eight were already naturalized American
citizens and the other three were Italian citizens. Scholars on both sides of the
Atlantic have studied this case not just because of its gravity and ferocity, but
because it led to an important change in U.S.-Italian diplomatic relations. In fact,
25
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after the lynching at New Orleans, the Italian government became more assertive
in demanding that lynchers be brought to justice, as well as in requesting better
protection for Italian citizens who resided and worked in the United States. The
episode engendered a one-year diplomatic controversy, culminating in the recall
of the Italian ambassador in Washington. 27
The immediate cause of the lynching was the assassination of the New
Orleans Chief of Police, David C. Hennessy, on 15 October 1890. The
investigation that ensued was conducted mostly within the New Orleans Italian
community, which included about 30,000 Italians. Hundreds of Italians were
arrested on suspicion of complicity in the murder. Writing to Baron Fava, the
Italian Ambassador to Washington, Pasquale Corte, the Italian Consul in New
Orleans, depicted the methods adopted by the local authorities in investigating
the murder as questionable. Corte reported that a vigilante committee had been
formed, with the connivance of the Mayor of New Orleans, Joseph A.
Shakspeare, in order to eradicate the Italian Mafia. Responding to the protest of
ambassador Fava, the Governor of Louisiana, Francis T. Nicholls, assured Fava
that the Italian community was not in any danger. In fact, the trial ended with the
acquittal of the accused, probably because the jury had been corrupted, thus
angering the New Orleans population. 28
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An examination of the correspondence between the Italian consulate in
New Orleans, the Italian embassy in Washington, the U.S. Department of State,
and the governor of Louisiana shows that the lynching of the Italians occurred
with the connivance of the New Orleans local authorities. 29 Corte followed the
case with zeal. He was very competent, passionate, and scrupulous, but at times
he could be “undiplomatic,” especially toward the local American authorities. His
own collaborators deemed him unfit for the delicate task facing him and at times
even “out of control.” 30 The day after the lynching, he wrote to Fava: “I have no
time now to describe the horrors of the genocide that the populace led by the
leaders of the vigilante committee has committed against eleven harmless
prisoners who had been acquitted.” 31
It is true that many Italians who lived in New Orleans did not have good
reputations, nor did they have clean records. Most of the lynching victims were
not exactly model citizens. The Italian Foreign Minister, Marquis Antonio di
Rudinì, sent the Italian ambassador in Washington a list of the Italians and a
description of their backgrounds. Antonio Marchese, whose real name was
Antonio Grimando, had been in trouble with the law in Italy; Emanuele Polizza
was a known member of the Italian Mafia, although never indicted for any crime;
Rocco Geraci had emigrated from Italy to escape the Italian authorities; and
Loreto Comitis had been indicted three times in Italy. However, some of the New
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Orleans victims had never been in trouble with the law and had clean records:
Antonio Abbagnato, Girolamo Caruso, Pietro Monastero, Antonio Scafidi, and
Vincenzo Traina. 32
Indeed, Corte was well aware that the Italian community in New Orleans
had a bad reputation, that during the trial the jury had been bribed, and that the
people of New Orleans were enraged. However, bad reputation alone, according
to Corte, did not justify such a brutal and violent reaction. Even though the consul
did not overlook the exasperation of New Orleans, he was concerned about the
activities of the vigilantes’ committee that had formed soon after the verdict, as
well as the role of the local authorities. As he wrote to the Italian ambassador, he
could not understand why members of the higher classes had engineered such a
cruel and violent murder. He could understand even less the connivance of local
authorities: they made no effort to stop the infamous episode of violence, but had
consented to it and might even have instigated it. 33
According to Corte, the possibility of bloody violence had been discussed
openly and could have been anticipated. The day after the verdict, local
newspapers such as the Daily States and the Delta published news of a meeting
of the “Committee of the Fifty,” the newly forged vigilantes’ committee to right
wrongs and to correct the verdict. The blood bath could have been prevented,
Consul Corte maintained, had the prisoners been moved during the night to
another jail. He tried in vain to confer with the mayor, Joseph A. Shakspeare,
32
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who was nowhere to be found. Corte also attempted to talk to Louisiana governor
Francis T. Nicholls, who claimed that he could not do anything without the
mayor’s requesting it. While waiting to meet the mayor, Corte was informed that
the mob had broken into the prison and had hanged three of the prisoners. Corte
went immediately to the jail and saw eleven dead bodies hanging from the trees.
He returned to the consulate, where he fought off three black men who attempted
to attack him by showing them his gun. The consular secretary, pale and scared,
told Corte that he had heard the crowd screaming, “Kill the Italians,” so he had
taken refuge in a storage room. 34
When ambassador Fava learned of the massacre, he appealed to U.S.
Secretary of State James G. Blaine, asking for serious action on the part of the
United States government. Also, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio di Rudinì
instructed Fava to file a formal protest with the U.S. government, demanding
protection of Italian subjects based on existing treaties and the immediate
punishment of those who had committed or instigated the murder. Fava wrote
the following to U.S. Secretary of State Blaine (Washington, 15 March 1891):
Mr. Secretary of State, I must protest in the most solemn manner
against the unjustifiable conduct of local authorities, who not only did not
prevent a meeting which was publicly announced the day before, and
which left no doubts as to its hostility to the Italians, but who maintained a
purely passive attitude, while the massacre of Italians was going on in the
prison. . . .
Reserving. . . . the right to demand. . . . any other reparation. . .
.deemed proper, allow me. . . . to rely upon the traditional friendship which
always existed between our two countries. . . .while I invoke the aid and

34

ASDMAE, Ibid. From the Italian Consulate at New Orleans to the Italian Embassy at Washington, 15
March 1891.

84
cooperation of the Federal administration to. . . .end this regrettable
incident. . . . 35

Fava appealed to Secretary of State Blaine to intervene with the Louisiana
state authorities so that Italians would be protected and so that perpetrators,
accomplices, or instigators of the massacre would be brought to justice.
However, in the days following the lynchings, martial law was never declared, no
troops were deployed, nor were the vigilante leaders arrested. Instead, in spite of
strong pressure from the State Department and from the Italian Foreign Ministry,
Governor Nicholls wrote Secretary Blaine that all was quiet in New Orleans. 36
Historically, the Italian government had always cooperated with the United
States in matters concerning emigration. Following the lynchings, Italy persisted
in appealing to the “protection principle” included in a treaty signed by the two
countries in 1871, which mandated equal protection for citizens of each country
under local law. Although Washington and Rome disagreed on the number of
Italian citizens who had been lynched (eight of them were naturalized American
citizens), the U.S. government accepted the “protection principle” and tried to
persuade the Louisiana authorities to take legal action. 37 However, it could be
difficult to fault Nicholls, since the Constitution of the United States mandates the
separation of powers, including the powers of federal and state governments,
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regardless of any foreign treaties negotiated by the federal government with
foreign countries.
Secretary of State Blaine responded to Governor Nicholls (Washington, 15
March 1891) with these words:
. . . . Among the victims of the deplorable massacre which took
place in the city of New Orleans yesterday were three or more subjects of
the King of Italy. Our treaty with that friendly government guarantees to
the Italian subjects domiciled in the United States the most constant
protection and security for their persons and property, making them
amenable, on the same basis as our own citizens, to the laws of the U.S.
and of several States, in their due and orderly administration. . . .
The Government of the United States must give to the subjects of
friendly powers that security which it demands of our own citizens when
temporarily under a foreign jurisdiction. 38
Fava was aware that Washington was embarrassed about the New
Orleans lynchings and that, based on the U.S. Constitution, was in a very
delicate position concerning the authority of a state trying to protect its own
powers, authority, and jurisdiction in a strong federal system. 39 Concerning
Blaine’s telegram to Nicholls, Fava appreciated Secretary’s Blaine’s words and
wrote to Foreign Minister Rudinì that the telegram should be interpreted as a sign
of deference toward His Majesty’s government. Fava also informed Rudinì that
Secretary Blaine had made it clear, during a conversation that his government
would be amenable to paying an indemnity to the families of the three slain
Italians and that such a request would be accepted by Congress. 40
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The New Orleans lynchings provoked humiliation, anger, and resentment
among the Italian community in the United States. Although Ambassador Fava
recommended caution, Italian newspapers in the United States published fiery
articles full of indignation. Hence Fava informed the Foreign Ministry in Rome
that he had sent a telegram to the royal consul general in New Orleans, urging
him to encourage the Italian colony there to stay calm and, as he put it, “to
observe legality strictly.” 41
Nevertheless, Ambassador Fava was very worried about the anger and
frustration of the Italian community. In fact, on March 18, 1891, he sent a
telegram to Minister Rudinì, asking him to prohibit Italian consuls from giving out
any information regarding the facts of New Orleans. In addition, in a confidential
report sent the following day, Fava expressed his own anxieties regarding
inflammatory articles about the New Orleans events, published especially in New
York, and telegrams sent to the Italian embassy, requesting protection for Italian
citizens in the United States. Fava knew that Italians generally did not enjoy a
good reputation in the United States, and that there was a risk that lynchings and
Italian reaction to them might spark further acts of violence against Italians. It
was therefore imperative, Fava maintained, in order to avoid very serious
repercussions and in the interest of a quick resolution of the tensions now
existing between the two countries, that Italian communities behave prudently. 42
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Consul Riva in New York had also urged prudence in a proclamation he
addressed to the Italian community in New York in which he assured its
members that Rome would protect its subjects. At the same time, he warned
them not to inflame the situation but to behave with prudence and moderation. 43
Moderation, however, was not what Consul Corte in New Orleans
practiced. Corte blamed the authorities of the State of Louisiana for the bloody
event. He defended the Italian community of New Orleans, calling it industrious,
frugal, and tranquil. 44 He did acknowledge that within it were delinquents who
had avoided Italian prisons, but they had long been naturalized as American
citizens and were deeply enmeshed in the often corrupt politics of Louisiana and
New Orleans, protected by politicians and often obtaining important political
appointments. 45
Corte suspected that the assassination of Chief Hennessy, himself a
player in the corrupt politics of the city, should be seen as part of a political
struggle for control between two political factions: the Provenzanos, supported by
Hennessy, and their enemies, the Matrangas. Corte suggested that, to cover up
such political corruption, city officials targeted the Italian community, arresting
hundreds of its members and harassing and even robbing many of them. It was
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the same city officials who, according to Corte, bribed some of the jurors and
declared the accused guilty long before the trial was held. 46
Moreover, Corte claimed that the trial was seen as an opportunity to free
the city of New Orleans of Italian delinquents and that some jurors had been
bribed for this reason. Other jurors, according to Corte, seemed interested in
finding the accused guilty, hoping to gain some economic advantage, while
others wished to vindicate the mayor’s claim that the Italians were guilty. The
jury, however, acquitted the Italians, and the authorities could not protect them
from a lynch mob. According to Corte, they could have been saved had they
been transferred somewhere else. 47
According to historian Richard Gambino, no evidence could be found of
the alleged bribery of the jury that tried the eleven Italians accused of the murder
of Hennessy. An examination of available documents failed to connect any of the
persons killed with that charge. Nor was there any direct evidence connecting
those eleven individuals with the mafia or any other similar association in the city
of New Orleans. 48 Gambino maintains that the New Orleans political and
commercial power saw the murder of Chief of Police Hennessy as an opportunity
to destroy the rising economic power and social threat of the Italian community.
Persecuting the entire Italian community would put wealthy Italians in their place
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and “responsible” native-born citizens could regain their influence and profitable
commerce. 49
The American press blamed the lynchings on the criminal activities of the
mafia in New Orleans. On the other hand, Italian newspapers, basing their
stories largely on Corte’s reports, denounced the horrors of the massacre and
the lack of justice in the way the New Orleans authorities had handled the case.
In particular, L’Eco d’Italia of New York charged that the Italians had been victims
of racism, portraying them as sheep killed by wolves. It called on Italians
throughout the country to react vigorously and urged them to seek revenge. 50
The same article emphasized the need for the Italians to be united and urged
other newspapers such as the Progresso Italo-Americano and the Colombo to
join in a mass demonstration against the events in New Orleans. 51
The demonstration did not take place, but the lynching at New Orleans
inflamed passions and left deep suspicion among Italians and Americans alike.
Italian authorities continued to receive reports of abuse and violence against their
nationals. Some of the reported acts of violence were false but, whether true or
not, they were indicative of the climate of tension, fear, suspicion, ethnic hatred,
and exasperation fueled by the New Orleans lynching.
One example of a fictitious lynching was reported on 17 June 1892 by the
Seattle Press Times. It wrote that four Italians had been lynched on June 13 and
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that it was likely that four more would be executed for reportedly having killed
their boss, a Norwegian named Nelson, at the site of the building of the Monte
Cristo Railroad in Skagit County. The newspaper ascribed the episode to the
discrimination to which Italian workers were subjected because of an existing
ethnic hierarchy in the work place. It reported that Italians were forced to accept
the heaviest jobs, such as digging all day, while “white” workers were allowed to
work the stone, and that the 175 Italians were made to live separately from the
fifty “white” workers. The article also claimed that the Italians were stereotyped
as “bloodthirsty individuals” even though they were armed only with knives while
whites carried guns. 52
On 18 June 1892, news of the lynching prompted La Tribuna of Rome to
urge the Italian government to lodge a formal protest with the U.S. government.
Ambassador Fava, on his own initiative, had already unofficially done so with a
request that President Benjamin Harrison urge the governor of Washington State
to investigate the lynching. 53
Two days later, on June 20, the Seattle Press Times announced that the
story of the hanging was fake and that it had been concocted by individuals who
wished to discredit the Italians and to foment racial antagonism.
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Fava confirmed the newspaper’s report, 55 as did the Italian consul in San
Francisco who had initially doubted the veracity of the newspaper report. 56
One year later, an Italian individual was lynched. Daniele Arata was a
naturalized American citizen originally from the Italian region of Liguria; he owned
a saloon and the hotel Italia in Denver, Colorado. In1893, Arata, a notorious
alcoholic, got drunk and killed a customer for no apparent reason. Arrested, he
was taken from the prison by an enraged mob and was hanged from a tree, his
body mutilated in what the local Italian newspaper, Roma, described as “a
macabre dance and a cayman feast.” 57 The newspaper suggested that the
authorities had not been able to stop the mob while another local paper, the
Rocky Mountain News, denounced the inefficiency and connivance of the police
and other public officials, claiming that they had known about the town’s strong
resentment against the Italian and should have taken appropriate measures in
order to avoid the tragedy. 58 In a report to Ambassador Fava, the Italian Consul
at Denver, Bruno Grimaldi, expressed his great anxiety for the safety of the
Italian community, urging its members not to go en masse to the cemetery but to
limit visits to the victim’s closest relatives. 59
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Writing to the Foreign Ministry in Rome, Ambassador Fava reported that
he had taken no direct action in the Arata matter because the victim was a
naturalized American citizen and was no longer under the protection of the Italian
government. He attributed the episode to an economic downturn that had
provoked competition among different ethnic groups. He maintained that Daniele
Arata probably would not have met such a tragic end had the closing of the silver
mines and other important factories not caused such high unemployment and
hardships throughout the community. These conditions may also have been the
reason that the four individuals arrested for the crime were never tried. 60
Two years later, in 1895, three more Italians were lynched in Walsenburg,
Colorado. On 11 March 1895, the dead body of a local beer producer, Aber J.
Hixon, was found. An Italian named Lorenzo Andinino confessed to the murder
and was taken to the local jail. While a police investigation was conducted, nine
Italian miners were also arrested. Four of them were released when it became
apparent that they had not been involved in the crime. The other five--Lorenzo
Andinino, Pietro Giacobini, Stanislao Vittone, Antonio Gobbetto, and Francesco
Ronchietto-- were taken to the prison of Walsenburg, escorted by two deputy
sheriffs. While en route to the prison, men on horseback halted the group; they
shot and killed Vittone and wounded Ronchietto, who was taken to prison,
together with Andinino. During the night, intruders killed both Ronchietto and
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Andinino. The other Italians, Giacobini and Gobbetto, had managed to escape
during the attack, but were later found and re-arrested. 61
Italian Ambassador Fava sent a request immediately to Secretary of State
Richard Olney (1895-1897), urging him to prompt the Governor of Colorado,
Albert W. McIntire, to ensure the protection and safety of Italian citizens residing
in Walsenburg. He cautioned Rome, however, not to expect satisfactory results,
given the serious difficulties Washington encountered whenever it attempted to
force states to comply with foreign treaties. Fava pointed to the recent New
Orleans lynching where, in spite of Washington’s good intentions, no legal action
had been taken by local and state authorities seemingly determined to exert the
autonomy granted them by the U.S. Constitution. 62
The Italian newspaper La Voce del Popolo, of San Francisco, also
addressed this feature of the U.S. Constitution concerning the relationship
between federal and states governments in diplomatic disputes such as the one
provoked by the New Orleans lynching. According to the newspaper, “the
President of the American Union represented the whole nation with foreign
countries; however, he did not have any jurisdiction over the single States that
together made such Union. Therefore, while he had the right to request that any
foreign country be accountable for offense against American citizens, he cannot
demand that same accountability by the single States of the Union which are
61
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autonomous.”

63

The article argued that this feature of the Constitution nullified

de facto one important clause contained in foreign treaties negotiated between
the United States and other countries, the “reciprocity clause.” The newspaper
defined as “simply grotesque” the condition of the president of a nation who
“represented the whole, but not the single parts,” thus making his representation
no more than an illusion. Moreover, according to La Voce del Popolo, it was not
likely that the lynchers would be brought to justice because if the assassins were
arrested and tried in a court of law, no jury in Colorado would be so impartial as
to hand down a guilty verdict. 64
The same article also addressed the issue of indemnity for the families of
the lynching victims in Colorado, indicating that Washington had stated, although
unofficially, that the indemnity granted to the families of the New Orleans victims
did not constitute a precedent. That indemnity, granted by President Benjamin
Harrison was presented as an act of courtesy toward Italy and an act of
charitable compassion for the survivors of the massacred victims. Moreover, in
granting the indemnity, the federal government had not admitted any
responsibility for the lynching. Therefore, according to the article, the granting of
indemnity in New Orleans could not be interpreted as an acquired right for
families of lynched individuals; on the contrary, the U.S. government at several
junctures had declined any responsibility. Finally, the article urged the
government of Italy to put pressure on the U.S. government to comply with
international treaties and asked whether the Italian government of Francesco
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Crispi, who always claimed to be the defender of national dignity abroad, would
accept once more an ambiguous solution that would weaken U.S.-Italian
relations. 65
One urgent question that arose from the Walsenburg incident was the
issue of citizenship: whether two of the victims, Ronchetto and Vittone, who had
submitted applications to become naturalized American citizens, were still under
the protection of the Italian government. According to Ambassador Fava,
submitting an application for citizenship did not make one a citizen, as the
American authorities usually claimed in cases of lynchings. Fava insisted that the
Italian government continue to view such individuals as loyal subjects of the king
of Italy for five years after submitting a naturalization application. Until citizenship
was fully completed, Fava maintained, Italian citizens would not lose their
Italianness. 66
Even American authorities suspected that, at Walsenburg, the two deputy
sheriffs and prison guard had either cooperated in or at least failed to obstruct
the lynching of the Italians. In fact, the state government had promised to
anyone who would contribute to finding the guilty assassins a sum of $ 1,000-the highest amount allowed by the Fundamental Statute of the State of Colorado.
According to Consul Giuseppe Cuneo, the high reward was clearly a sign that
local authorities were involved with the murder of the Italians. After the murders,
Consul Cuneo interviewed under oath one of the survivors, Giacobini, after he
65
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was found exhausted but alive. Giacobini testified that only one man had
attacked the group at the Bear Bridge Creek and that the two deputy sheriffs had
done nothing to stop him. 67 Hence, the governor’s zeal in promising an award
could be interpreted as acknowledgement of connivance on the part of local
authorities.
Ambassador Fava had similar suspicions. In fact, he emphasized the
culpability of the local authorities for not having stopped the Walsenburg lynching
in his correspondence not only with the Italian Foreign Ministry, but also with the
State Department and, through the latter, with the Governor of Colorado, Albert
McIntire. Fava informed the Ministry that he had started the necessary paperwork
to request an indemnity for the victims’ families. 68
The Walsenburg Italian community really appreciated the efforts of
Colorado Governor McIntire to try to find those who had committed the crime. In
fact, the Italians who lived in Walsenburg offered the governor a gift as a sign of
their gratitude. 69 One year after the episode, however, the guilty party still had
not been found, and those who had committed the lynching remained unknown.
On 12 February 1896, the grand jury appointed to investigate the Walsenburg
incident released its findings and concluded that legal proceedings would be
terminated because of lack of sufficient evidence. 70 Disappointed by the grand
jury’s verdict, Fava contacted Secretary of State Richard Olney, asking him to
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pressure the U.S. Congress to grant an indemnity to the victims’ families. A few
months later, Congress voted in favor of compensation of $10,000 to be divided
equally among the families of the three killed and two injured Italians. 71
What might have led to the lynching of Italians at Walsenburg? A study by
Conrad Woodall interprets this case of violence as an isolated episode of simple
frontier justice. Woodall denies any explanation based on mere xenophobia or
community self-defense from foreign intruders competing for jobs. Indeed,
Woodall argues that what happened to the Italians could have happened to any
other ethnic group in the town. The Italian community in Walsenburg was very
small, only 163 according to the census of 1900, too small to cause fear. There
was, he concludes, a communication problem in language and culture, but
Woodall rejects the theory that local authorities connived to obstruct justice. He
blames the shortcomings on the local authorities’ inefficiency, incompetence, and
lack of sensitivity rather than connivance. Woodall also dismisses the notion that
political or union issues played a role in the killing of the Italians. That they were
foreigners was the only motive. It did not matter to which ethnic group they
belonged; being estranged was the principal motive for the massacre. 72 Indeed,
Consul Cuneo’s reports suggest that ethnic hatred, job competition, or union
activities were not factors in the incident.
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The next lynching of an Italian citizen occurred in Hahnville, Louisiana,
one year later. On 5 August 1896, an American named Gueynard was killed and
a friend of his injured not far from New Orleans. The alleged murderer, an Italian
named Lorenzo Salardino, was arrested. Immediately The Daily Picayune
announced rumors of a lynching. 73 The following day, an article in the same
newspaper described the alleged killer as pursuing “innate brutality,” fueling
growing popular anger. In fact, the following day, on August 8, a mob invaded the
Hahnville prison, and took the alleged murderer as well as two other imprisoned
Italians, Salvatore Arena and Giuseppe Venturella. The two Italians were
accused of a murder that subsequent events showed they had not committed.
The mob hanged all three individuals. The next day, the Daily Picayune
described the event as a protest against “mafia methods,” but said nothing of the
mob or of the failure of the authorities to protect individuals waiting to be tried in a
court of law. 74
With this case, Italian officials in the United States found themselves
enmeshed in all sorts of problems. They found Italian residents in Hahnville living
in fear for their lives and thus unwilling to testify, making their collection of
information more difficult. The consular agent at New Orleans, Carlo Papini,
apologized to Ambassador Fava for the lateness of his report, but informed him
that many of the Italians who knew the lynched individuals and who could have
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provided information did not want to talk, most of them out of fear of retribution,
but some for not receiving proper compensation. 75
The incident sparked an intensive exchange of correspondence between
the Italian embassy and the U.S. State Department about existing laws
concerning the treatment of foreigners residing in the United States. Following
the Hahnville incident, with the number of lynchings of Italians rising,
Ambassador Fava reported to the Italian Foreign Ministry in Rome the procedure
to be followed on the part of the Italian government as well as the provisions of
the U.S. Constitution. Fava informed the Ministry that usually state authorities
were required to report the simple facts to the federal government and then to
ascertain whether the victims had obtained U.S. citizenship. If the individuals had
already become naturalized American citizens, then the U.S. government did not
recognize the authority of any foreign government for a crime committed against
an American citizen. If the lynched individual had kept his original nationality,
then the federal government urged the state authorities to comply with existing
treaties concerning protection of foreign citizens from friendly countries and to
take all necessary measures to find the guilty parties and bring them to justice.
Moreover, the State Department would start all necessary paperwork concerning
the granting of indemnity to the victims’ families and forward it to the U.S.
Congress. However, such a provision could not be finalized by the State
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Department until the state authorities had confirmed the nationality of the
victims. 76
The most problematic issue remained the relationship between the
federal and state governments. Until the U.S. Constitution could be modified so
that foreign citizens could be placed under federal protection and responsibility,
Ambassador Fava maintained, the federal government could do nothing but
make suggestions to state authorities without really being able to intervene
directly in conducting inquiries and bringing lynchers to justice. 77 Ultimately, it
seemed that the only role of the federal government would be the granting of an
indemnity, as voted by the U.S. Congress, to the victims’ families.
In the Hahnville case, the Louisiana Governor, Murphy J. Foster, had
delayed sending the report about the lynching, thus slowing any proceedings by
Washington. When the report finally reached the State Department, it was
forwarded to Ambassador Fava with the acknowledgement that the State
Department found the report “very unsatisfactory.” 78 The report contained the
grand jury’s vote against pursuing the case because there was not enough
evidence and it was not possible to proceed against unknown persons. The
report also concluded that the lynching was not specifically aimed against
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Italians, giving as evidence the fact that other Italians held in the jail were not
lynched.

79

In the more complete report Fava compiled for Rome, which was based
on the magistrate’s investigation and on the coroner’s report, he highlighted four
points: (1) that the lynching had been carried out by unknown individuals; (2) that
the bloody affair had resulted from indignation concerning the assassination of
Gueymard; (3) that the community deemed Salardino guilty along with the other
two Italians, and (4) that the murder was a further expression of the violence
that so shamed American civilization. 80
Although Secretary of State Richard Olney sent a special envoy to
Louisiana four months after the event, the guilt of the three victims had not yet
been ascertained. Ambassador Fava in a report expressed his disappointment
concerning the mission of the special agent. Fava complained that everyone
seemed to agree the three Italians were guilty even though, according to U.S.
law, any person is deemed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. 81 Fava
charged that the envoy, instead of uncovering the truth, had covered up the
shortcomings and negligence of the local authorities who, as the special envoy
acknowledged, knew that there were people speaking openly about lynching the
accused, but had not taken any measures to prevent it.82
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Fava also criticized the behavior of the sheriff who had taken the alleged
assassin, Salardino, to the woods and then had decided to take him back to the
Hahnville jail. A few hours before the murder, the sheriff withdrew the guards
from the jail and he himself left, thus abandoning the Italians to certain death. It
was not possible, Ambassador Fava maintained, to make it any easier for the
lynchers to carry out their plan. 83 A confidential report by the Italian consul Carlo
Magenta of New Orleans to the Italian embassy at Washington revealed
horrifying details of how the three Italians had been tortured as they were being
hanged in the woods by the savage mob even though the three victims
proclaimed their innocence. 84
Fava also denounced the way the investigation of the lynching had been
conducted. It is true that the grand jury had assembled, but because no detective
had been assigned to the investigation and no witnesses had been were called
by the district attorney, no one appeared to testify, and the grand jury adjourned.
According to Fava, even the special envoy sent by Washington had been inclined
to cover up the shortcomings of the civil and judiciary authorities in Louisiana
rather than uncover any evidence. 85
Ambassador Fava was also indignant that Secretary of State Olney had
chosen to treat the three Italians as if they were already naturalized American
citizens, thus making it difficult for the Italian government to protect their rights.
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Washington claimed that they were outside Italy’s jurisdiction because they had
applied for citizenship, had received part of the documentation, could legally vote
in the State of Louisiana, worked and resided in Louisiana, did not show any
intention of returning to Italy, and did not contribute to the Italian economy.
Furthermore, having left Italy, they had avoided military service and voting
obligations. Thus, according to both the U.S. Constitution and Louisiana law as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, they were now American citizens. Fava’s
position was that the federal government, not the state, could originate the
process of naturalization. He also maintained that a simple “declaration of
intention” to become a citizen could not automatically make an individual a
naturalized U.S. citizen. 86
On 8 July 1897, the Hahnville case ended when the U.S. Senate approved
the standard amount of $2,000 to the families of each of the three victims. 87 A
month and a half after the “blood price” had been paid, an article published in the
New York Herald announced that a black man from Hahnville, Louisiana, had
confessed to murdering Gueymard, the crime for which Salardino, Arena, and
Venturella had lost their lives. The news was confirmed by Italian Consul Papini
in New Orleans. The black man, nicknamed “Creole,” had been accused of and
indicted on several counts of homicide, but not that of Gueymard. The authorities
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did not release Creole’s confession, and he was found guilty of other crimes and
hanged in January 1898. 88
The Hahnville incident was the last attempt by the U.S. government to
argue that a foreign-born individual who had submitted all necessary paperwork
to become naturalized could be considered a citizen. With a lynching in Tallulah,
Louisiana, the last one to occur in the United States in the late 1890s, the U.S.
government finally acknowledged that a foreign-born individual could not be
considered a U.S. citizen until all necessary paperwork had been finalized and
citizenship had been fully granted. 89
The lynching at Tallulah, Louisiana, in 1899 involved five Italians accused
of murder. The incident began with a sheep belonging to an Italian named
Francesco Difatta. The sheep often trespassed onto the property of a neighbor,
Dr. J. Ford Hodges, a medical doctor and coroner. On 20 July 1899, the two
individuals had an argument about the sheep. Francesco’s brother Giuseppe
rushed out of the house in his brother’s defense and shot and wounded the
doctor. Several people appeared on the scene, and the two Difatta brothers
went back into the house where there was a third brother, Carlo. Two other
Italian men, Rosario Fiducia and Giovanni Cerami, were also in the house. The
sheriff arrived and arrested Fiducia, Cerami, and Francesco Difatta, but not the
latter’s brothers, Carlo and Giuseppe, who were in hiding. The three men did not
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resist arrest, even though they were armed “as anyone else in the area.” 90
During the night, a savage mob stormed the prison, took the three prisoners out
of jail, and hanged them from the trees in the prison courtyard. The mob started
looking for the other two Difatta brothers, found them, and hanged them near the
slaughterhouse. The five men were all Sicilian, four from Cefalù, and one from
Cerami, in the province of Messina. They all worked in fruit and vegetables
commerce and were doing quite well. 91
Once again, the grand jury seemed to be influenced by the usual
stereotypes about Italians. It declared that the five men had plotted to murder the
doctor and that, “after a diligent inquiry,” the identity of the people who had
committed the lynching could not be ascertained. Such a statement, however,
was not very credible in a small town such as Tallulah with barely four hundred
inhabitants, all of whom knew one another, as the newspaper L’Italo-Americano
pointed out. 92 This was the repetition of a now well-established pattern of grand
juries failing to indict anyone in a lynching investigation. In fact, as L’ItaloAmericano reminded its readers in 1899, in no lynching case had the guilty party
ever been arrested and punished. 93
The next day, the same newspaper called Louisiana the classic land of
lynchings “within the superior American civilization.” It noted that the minority
that took part in a lynching always acted with the connivance of the silent
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majority. Grand juries, by failing to indict lynchers, were the symbol of the silent
majority’s granting license to the lynching minorities to continue to carry out their
barbarous acts. 94
In response to the Tallulah case, the Italian chargé d’affairs in
Washington, Count Vinci, contacted Secretary of State John Hay who, to his
credit, showed concern and offered to help to solve the case as quickly as
possible. 95 The Italian embassy also charged the Italian Consul at New Orleans,
Natale Piazza, with the task of conducting an inquiry, and the embassy appealed
to the editor of the Italo-Americano in New Orleans, prompting him to cooperate
fully with the consular agent. The main goal of Ambassador Fava was to
ascertain whether the five men lynched still held Italian citizenship or whether
they had applied to be naturalized American citizens. It proved to be very difficult
to conduct an inquiry because it was not possible to obtain affidavits at the site of
the crime as Italians could no longer be found there, nor was it advisable, consul
Piazza maintained, for Italians to trust any Americans.96
Piazza, however, managed to put together a thorough report concerning
the facts, the role of Dr. Hodges in the confrontation, the reluctance of witnesses
to testify, and the pervasive anti-Italian climate in Tallulah. Piazza was skeptical
about the role of the sheriff, who had made no attempt to stop the violence and
refused to share any names of witnesses who might facilitate the investigation.
94

“ Il linciaggio di cinque Italiani a Tallulah,” L’Italo-Americano, 23 July 1899.

95

The correspondence between the Italian ambassador and Secretary of State John Hay is contained in
FRUS 1899, 440-446 and 715-736.
96

ASDMAE, Serie Politica “P” (1891-1916), pacco 656. From the Italian Consulate at New Orleans to
MAE, 26 July 1899.

107
The lynching, according to Piazza, had been carried out by “a mob of assassins
who savored the pleasure of a vendetta and who enjoyed the open approval of
the savage townspeople of Tallulah.” 97 The Italians were killed, he concluded,
because of racial hatred, economic competition, jealousy, and opposition to the
right to vote. He hoped that Louisiana Governor Foster might exercise his power
and put pressure on the local authorities to bring the guilty parties to justice. 98
This, of course, was not likely to happen. As the Italo-Americano had charged,
very little hope existed that the American system of justice could be trusted in
any case involving the lynching of foreigners. The administration of justice, the
newspaper maintained, was in the hands of the lynchers’ friends, who were
perfectly secure in their impunity. 99
Although no individuals were punished for the lynching at Tallulah, the
controversy ended with payment of the “blood price” to the families of two
victims. In fact, the investigation by the agent of the Department of Justice into
the Tallulah lynching revealed that two of the lynched men had not been
naturalized. Consequently, by the act of March 3, 1901, Congress appropriated
the sum of $4,000 to be paid “out of humane consideration, without reference to
the liability thereof, to the Italian Government as full indemnity to the heirs of
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Joseph (Giuseppe) Difatta and John (Giovanni) Cirano, Italian citizens lynched at
Tallulah, on July 20, 1899.” 100
In his assessment of the crime, Count Vinci, in a letter to Rome,
concluded that “No lynching had been more unjust and atrocious than the vulgar
murder that occurred at Tallulah to get rid of foreign-born individuals in the
town.” 101 In fact, in Italy, the Tallulah massacre created such an echo that a song
was composed by an itinerant entertainer who, while dancing in the streets of
Italy, sang the following lyrics:
I sing for those lynched ones
How industrious and honest they were
Because they were Italian
There was no pity for them
Oh youth of Italy
The flag was obscured
Of the vile mob
Have revenge. 102

The Tallulah event was the last lynching of the 1890s, but the
phenomenon continued into the new century. Strong anti-Italian sentiment
persisted in the United States in the early 1900s. Hence, Italian diplomats and
politicians continued to deal with the problem of protection of Italian nationals
who worked in the United States. In general, in spite of several episodes of
lynching, they adopted an attitude of prudence and moderation--except for the
New Orleans case, which provoked a serious diplomatic incident and nationalistic
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fervor in the Italian Parliament, culminating in Rome’s recall of its ambassador,
Baron Fava. This cautious attitude indicates that Italy depended on emigration
as a safety valve for its domestic social peace as well as its economic growth.
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CHAPTER V
MORE LYNCHINGS, VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT
IN THE EARLY 1900s
Italian diplomats found themselves dealing with an ongoing series of
provocations that challenged their commitment to caution and pragmatism in
dealing with the United States in matters of immigration. Strong anti-foreign
feelings characterized American society in the 1890s and in the early 1900s.
Americans looked at southeastern Europeans, in particular, with a growing sense
of dislike, mistrust, and hostility. Dislike swelled into a widespread sense of
menace that often turned into violence. Southern and eastern Europeans
became a significant factor in the growth and strengthening of nativism in
America. The development of general anti-foreign feelings led most American
nativists to look at different southeastern European groups as insidious
representatives of the whole foreign menace. In the early 1900s, more
exclusively than had previous immigrant groups, the “new immigrants” swarmed
into the slums, factories, mines, and agricultural areas of the South. In the eyes
of Americans who felt threatened by these newcomers, the new immigrants
symbolized all social and economic evils with which nativists generally identified
immigrants. 1
However, the new immigrants were not a single identifiable group.
Although in general all newcomers were considered uncivilized, each group was
stereotyped differently. For instance, the Slavs were seen as dangerous, furious
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“Huns”; the Jews were unscrupulous, greedy, stingy Shylocks; and the Italians
were all dangerous subversives, hot-heads, violent members of the Mafia always
ready to reveal their knives or their hidden guns. It was believed that a general
disposition to assassinate was embedded in the character of this violent race;
these people were always impulsive, inexorable, and prone to murder. The
stereotype influenced all major outbursts of anti-Italian sentiment in the 1890s
and the early 1900s. 2
Again and again, lynching parties struck at Italians charged with murder or
suspected of having murdered a native-born American citizen. Such was the
case of a lynching that occurred in Erwin, Mississippi, on July 10, 1901, at
midnight. Three Italians--Giovanni Serio, his son Vincenzo, and Salvatore
Liberto, all Italian citizens--were shot by an armed mob while they were sleeping
outdoors on the porch of the house of a friend, Francesco Cascio. Having been
shot several times, Vincenzo died within minutes. Giovanni, too, was badly
injured, his left hand horribly mutilated with some fingers missing, and he died
early the next morning. He called for help several times during the night.
Salvatore Liberto miraculously survived the attack, but his legs were badly
injured. 3
The delegate to the Italian consul in New Orleans, N.L. Tirelli,
reconstructed the sequence of events that led to the shooting in a report to
consular agent Natale Piazza. The report was based on the testimony of
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Salvatore Liberto, who had survived the attack; his brother, Rosario Liberto;
Francesco Cascio, owner of the house; his nephew, Salvatore Cascio; and other
Italians in the community such as Vincenzo Giglio and Salvatore Butero. 4
According to Tirelli, the Serios, who operated a fruit and vegetable
business in Glen Allen, about six miles from Erwin, owned property adjacent to
“Greenfield” plantation. The Serios’ horse frequently wandered onto the
neighbor’s property, whereupon the overseer, G.B. Allen, each time would refuse
to return it until the Serios paid one dollar for damages caused by the horse.
Because Allen threatened Vincenzo Serio with a gun during another trespassing
incident, Vincenzo armed himself the next time he went to retrieve the peripatetic
horse. No shooting occurred, but that same night, G. B. Allen and a group of
armed men went to the Serios’ home, apparently intending to kill them. The
Serios escaped and found refuge in the home of their friend, Francesco Cascio,
who invited them to remain at his home in Erwin. On the night of July 10,
Francesco and Salvatore Cascio were sleeping in the house while, as we have
seen, the victims Giovanni and Vincenzo Serio and Salvatore Liberto were
sleeping outdoors on the porch. 5
While conducting his investigation, Tirelli learned that at Glen Allen, no
secret was made of the preparations for the lynching of the Serrios, father and
son. In fact, Vincenzo Giglio and Giuseppe Butero, two Italians who got wind of
it, attempted to telephone the Serios and warn them of the imminent danger.
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However, the telephone operator told them that the telephone was out of order.
Knowing that it was not true, three times they asked to use the telephone, but
they were not able to make a phone call. Tirelli reported that the Italians he
interrogated were reluctant to talk because they feared for their own lives.
Salvatore Liberto, who had miraculously survived the attack, was nineteen and
visibly scared. He said that on the night of the lynching it was dark, that he could
not see anything but smoke and shadows and did not see how many men were
there. 6
Francesco Cascio, too, was terrified and reluctant to talk. He still lived in
the same house with a black woman, his common law wife. According to Cascio,
Giovanni Serio was a good man, harmless and tranquil. His son Vincenzo at
times could be perceived as an aggressive troublemaker; however, his
aggressiveness was verbal, and he was not likely to kill anybody. On the night of
the attack, Cascio heard the shots and the Serios calling for help and asking for
water, but he did not dare go outside and did not see how many men were out
there. 7 According to Tirelli’s report, however, several bullets were found in
Cascio’s house, thus proving that G.B. Allen had assembled a network of
vigilantes to lynch the unfortunate men who had ignored his repeated warnings to
leave the area together with their peripatetic horse.
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The Italian press in the United States denounced the incident, blaming the
racism present in American society, accusing the federal government of
dereliction of duty and demanding that it take bold action. The Progresso ItaloAmericano of New York expressed pain and sorrow concerning the violence at
Erwin, Mississippi. According to the newspaper, again American hands were red
with Italian blood; again the crowd had acted according to a barbaric custom. The
savage fury of ferocious violence against free individuals had triumphed; the
spilled blood was a further testimony of the flaws of the laws and the shame of
old customs. Lynch law, indeed, was the real name of the criminal act originated
by a ferocious crowd indulging in atrocious violence, thus spreading fear and
horror. 8
By contrast, newspapers published for American-born audiences
commented on the episode at Erwin, Mississippi, with different nuances of
disdain. The Herald of New York, for example, emphasized fate and destiny; it
defined lynching as an incurable illness that was typical of the United States.
Moreover, it commented that Italians, too, once integrated and acquainted with
typical local customs, might be at risk to contract yellow fever in Brazil or lynching
fever in the United States. 9
Meanwhile, the Italian chargé d’affairs in Washington, Francesco
Carignani, wrote to the State Department, denouncing the ferocious lynching
episode. Secretary of State John Hay replied by expressing his sympathy and
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ensuring that the case had been referred to the Governor of Mississippi, Andrew
H. Longino, for appropriate action. The Secretary of State expressed the
disappointment of the federal government over what had occurred at Erwin,
Mississippi, and promised that anything humanly possible would be done to bring
the guilty parties to justice. 10 The American press interpreted the protest by the
Italian government as a way of obtaining an easy compensation for the loss of
life as had happened in similar episodes. 11 For example, the Daily Progress
maintained that the Italian protest undoubtedly derived from the desire to obtain
an indemnity as in the cases of New Orleans and Tallulah. 12
The inquiry ordered by Mississippi Governor Longino showed how difficult
it was to find the guilty parties and bring them to justice, as could be seen by the
offer of $100 compensation to anyone who would volunteer any information in
order to identify the lynchers. 13 Chargé d’affairs Francesco Carignani wrote
angrily that days after the lynching had occurred, not even a preliminary
investigation had been started in Erwin, Mississippi, to find the murderers of the
Serios. According to Carignani, it was obvious that a network of cooperation had
contributed to the unfolding of the violence. One important proof was that Giglio
and Butero had been denied telephone access to warn the Serios of the
dangerous plot to kill them. A request from the Italian embassy for protection of
10
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the witnesses derived from awareness of a climate of fear and intimidation that
surrounded the Italian community in Erwin. As Carignani wrote, it was imperative
to allow the witnesses to testify freely and to provide for their safety as well. “The
existence of fear, pressure and intimidation could be easily proved by the fact
that even the injured Italian, Salvatore Liberto, claimed that he did not know
anything nor did he have anything to declare.” 14
It must be noted that, since the facts of Erwin did not follow the usual
pattern, abducting individuals from jail and lynching them, the American press
tried to portray the killing of the Serios as a common episode of bloody murder.
However, the Italian consular agent at New Orleans, Carlo Papini, maintained
exactly the opposite: he affirmed that it was a lynching rather than a common
murder. To support his opinion, Papini noted three important elements: 1) that
Dr. Hanna, medical doctor of Glen Allen, had warned Rosario Liberto, brother of
the injured individual, Salvatore Liberto, of the immediate danger to the Serios; 2)
that the clerk at the telephone company had not allowed Giglio and Butero to
make a phone call; and 3) that on the morning of July 9, the overseer of
Greenfield plantation, G.B. Allen, had received a phone call, informing him that
Vincenzo Serio was on the train going to Erwin. Undoubtedly, this last factor,
although reported in an anonymous letter, could be the reason why the clerk at
the phone company did not want to allow Giglio and Butero to make a phone call.
The episode of Erwin revealed that, once more, the local authorities did not want
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to act promptly, but had a tendency to delay any legal action in hopes that things
would quiet down and everything would be forgotten. 15
Whether the incident at Erwin would be considered a lynching or a
common murder was extremely important as it involved the opportunity to
request an indemnity for the families of the victims. It is not accidental that, since
the beginning, the American press called what happened at Erwin, a common
murder. Also, David J. Hill, Acting Secretary of State, insisted that it was not a
lynching, but a simple shooting. Carignani, however, was adamant that what had
happened at Erwin was an obviously planned lynching. As he wrote to Foreign
Minister Giulio Prinetti, “the same expression commonly used by the Jury
summoned by the Sheriff that the victims had died ‘by the will of God’ was the
statement used in all cases of lynching in America.” 16 It is interesting to note that
Carignani attached to the same report sent to Prinetti a definition of lynching that
had been developed in Ohio, stating that lynching was any illegal act
accomplished by a mob. The Ohio law read as follows:
That any collection of individuals, assembled for any unlawful
purposes, intending to do damage or pretending to exercise
correctional power over persons by violence, and without authority
of law, shall be for the purposes of this act regarded as a mob, and
any act of violence exercised by them, upon the body of any
person, shall constitute a lynching. 17
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Responding to Carignani’s report, Minister Prinetti urged him to hire
private detectives in order to discover who had lynched the Italian citizens at
Erwin. However, Carignani informed the Foreign Minister that, according to
Southern customs and tradition, lynching was quite common, and anyone who
either provided information or investigated the facts would be in danger of being
lynched himself. Carignani also implied that, in general, Southern investigators
did not enjoy a good reputation, and that American authorities usually did not rely
on them. Instead, Carignani proposed obtaining from the federal government
permission to mobilize secret police at the expense of the Italian government,
thus showing the genuine interest of Italy concerning its own citizens. 18
However, the federal government refused, the rationale being that local
authorities were finally conducting an investigation and were looking for the guilty
parties in an effective manner. Hence Carignani was led to believe, for the time
being at least, that the Mississippi authorities were acting with “greater zeal.” 19
Minister Prinetti, however, was much less optimistic and quite critical of
Carignani’s faith in the governor of Mississippi and the federal government. He
wrote, “Unfortunately, nothing shows that your sentiments might develop into
concrete and effective action.” 20 Prinetti’s opinion was based on several factors:
the grand jury’s statement that the authors of the crime were unknown; the
18
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ineptitude of the Mississippi governor; and the constitutional refusal on the part of
the federal government to act. Furthermore, the federal government had even
refused the request by the Italian government to utilize federal agents who
supposedly would not be subjected to “local pressures.” The Italian government
had offered to do so at its own expense. Prinetti was convinced that such lack of
action was a strategy chosen on purpose as the way to slow down any
investigation. The foreign minister was convinced that Washington was buying
time so that the episode would be forgotten and Italian officials would eventually
quiet down. 21
Moreover, Minister Prinetti pointed out that the case was rather serious in
that the Italians killed at Erwin had not been accused of any crime. Hence, there
was no apparent cause for the assassination. The episode was anomalous in
that it did not follow the usual pattern of a lynching, where popular justice
replaced the role of a magistrate in the face of firm conviction that certain
individuals had committed or confessed to a crime without being punished for it.
The pattern of the Erwin event was unusual, and it did not matter how the
episode should be defined, whether a lynching or a common murder; it was not a
matter of playing with words and definitions. The case involved the deaths of
human beings who had not been indicted for any crimes and had been killed for
no apparent reason. It was hard to believe, Prinetti maintained, that “citizens of a
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glorious republic such as the United States could have acted according to the
denial of any form of civil justice.” 22
Prinetti’s pessimism was certainly justified, not only because of the
attitudes of both state and federal governments concerning the lynching episode,
but also based on evidence that witnesses had been subjected to pressure,
harassment, and intimidation. Tirelli’s report indicated that Italians in Erwin,
Greenville, and Glen Allen were scared to talk; some even regretted having
revealed anything that they knew. In particular, the principal witness, the injured
Salvatore Liberto, was convinced that if he testified, he would certainly be killed.
At first, Liberto had said that he was willing to testify in a court of law; later,
however, he refused to testify, as Tirelli wrote, because “he would have been
assassinated like a dog in Washington County where he worked to earn a living.”
Other witnesses, indeed, were also convinced that if they dared to testify, they
would end up dead. 23
Furthermore, the proceedings of the grand jury, convened on September
13, 1901, did not lead to any results, as the case was dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence. In his report, Consul Carlo Papini of New Orleans indicated
two plausible causes for such a disappointing outcome: either the testimonies
that had been received during the consular investigation had not been repeated
in the same manner, or the magistrates had interpreted the testimonies in a way
that would safeguard the dignity of the country. Either way, it was not likely that
22
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any future attempt to bring the guilty party to justice was going to succeed.
Hence, Papini proposed once again to request an indemnity for the victims’
families, based on the fact that the telephone company had refused to call the
victims to alert them of the imminent danger. According to Papini, there was
sufficient evidence to indict the clerk, a brother of one of the alleged lynchers,
who had refused to allow Giglio and Butero to make the phone call. 24
Undoubtedly, Minister Prinetti was bitter and disillusioned; he was also
very worried that there was little possibility that, in the future, Italian citizens
residing and working in the United States could be protected. As he put it, “the
carelessness and negligence on the part of American authorities could only
ensure impunity and lack of punishment for lynchers and could only encourage
more violence against Italians in the future.”25
Prinetti was also aware that the contention was no longer between the
Italian government and the State of Mississippi. The issue now would need to be
brought to the attention of the federal government by submitting to the State
Department a formal protest against denial of justice. Hence, Prinetti asked
chargé d’affaires Carignani to write a draft, reserving the right to review it himself
before submitting the document to the State Department. 26 Carignani then
proposed that Minister Prinetti include in the document a protest of the violation
of the solemn treaty negotiated by the United States and the Italian government,
24
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pledging mutual protection of their citizens. Carignani even suggested
threatening that the Italian government would declare the treaty null and void.
Carignani referred to Article III of the Treaty of February 26, 1871, which granted
a foreign-born citizen full protection, as the most important one to be included in
the protest document. 27
However, as any hope to bring the lynchers to justice diminished, Italian
authorities were forced to admit their failure. Minister Prinetti acknowledged that
his initial optimistic expectations had failed miserably. In writing to Carignani, he
stated that he had made a mistake when, right after the incident in Erwin, he had
hoped that American authorities would not ignore this particular episode of
violence. Ultimately, he could only send a statement of protest to Washington,
saying that the Italian government had lost any hope that local authorities and
magistrates would bring to justice those who had committed the crime in Erwin,
Mississippi.

28

The government of Italy could do nothing but formally protest the violation
of existing treaties as well as American denial of justice. There was still hope,
however, that in the future Congress would ratify a law conferring jurisdiction on
the federal courts in cases of mob violence involving aliens. Prinetti concluded by
expressing hope that such a statement of protest might hasten a reform project
that so far had been mentioned in presidential messages, but had not yet been
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carried out. 29 The new Italian Ambassador, Edmondo Mayor de Planches,
immediately sent a report to Foreign Minister Prinetti concerning the response by
Acting Secretary Hill, who was very sorry about the events in Erwin and was also
aware of the need for reparations. 30
Meanwhile in the Senate of the kingdom of Italy, a heated debate ensued
about the humiliation the Italian government had suffered in the aftermath of the
Erwin lynching. In particular, former ambassador to Washington Baron Fava, who
had become senator in 1901, submitted to Foreign Minister Prinetti a harsh
appeal concerning treatment of Italian immigrants in the United States. Fava
criticized the verdict issued by the grand jury on September 13, 1901, which
contained the usual formula that insufficient evidence had been found to indict
anyone; therefore, the men killed at Erwin had died “by the will of God.” 31 Fava
further commented on a ritual that was getting more and more ironic if not
grotesque. He emphasized that the verdict by the grand jury was identical to all
the other ones issued in previous lynchings of Italians in America. In particular,
Fava noted that the attitude of the federal government had also been the same
as for other lynchings. 32
According to Fava, the main reason for this attitude could be explained by
the U.S. Constitution’s separation of powers. Hence, the federal government
could only appeal to state governors to abide by existing treaties containing
29
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clauses regarding protection of foreign-born citizens; the government had no real
authority or jurisdiction to force state governments to punish individuals who had
committed crimes violating such treaties. As for the possibility of an indemnity
that the federal government might offer to the families of the lynched Italians,
Fava proposed to refuse it. Fava reminded his audience that the U.S. Congress
usually offered an indemnity to the survivors so that the American people could
feel that they had paid their debt. It would be better to refuse the “blood price,”
Fava maintained. A refusal of monetary compensation would make a profound
impression on the American public. In addition, the Italian public needed to be
informed and should understand that refusal of an indemnity would be more
honorable than accepting it. Instead of being compensated for loss of lives
through humiliating indemnities, Fava proposed putting pressure on the federal
government to change the laws so that foreign-born citizens could be protected
and existing treaties be respected. 33
Fava also mentioned that even in the case of Tallulah in 1899, when for
the very first time the federal Department of Justice had sent its own envoy to
conduct a separate inquiry, the results had been unsuccessful because of the
lack of will to bring the lynchers to justice. In fact the authorities at all levels-federal, state, civilian, and military--did not favor the inquiry. Moreover, Fava
implied that former Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta had taken a firm stand
against the impunity conceded to the assassins of Italians at Tallulah. With a
great sense of honor and dignity, Fava maintained, Visconti Venosta had insisted
that the federal government accept responsibility for lynchings of foreign-born
33
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individuals in the United States. In reminding his audience of the dignity and valor
of Minister Visconti Venosta, former ambassador Fava obviously implied that the
present-day Foreign Minister, Giulio Prinetti, was spineless and acquiescent to
the U.S. government’s unwillingness to bring lynchers of Italians to justice.
Indeed, Fava and Visconti Venosta had coordinated their efforts in trying to
pressure the federal government to abide by existing treaties and to protect
foreign-born individuals on U.S. soil. Fava explained to his distinguished
audience that U.S. President William McKinley had shown sensibility to Italian
demands in this area. President McKinley, in two messages to Congress in 1899
and 1900, had urged conferring upon federal courts full jurisdiction in
international cases of such nature, stating that, in cases of violence against
foreign-born individuals and violation of existing treaties among nations, the
ultimate responsibility rested upon the federal, not the state, government.
Therefore, it was the responsibility of the federal government to remedy the
constitutional flaws that may have led to such deplorable consequences. 34
Responding to Fava’s fiery oratory, Foreign Minister Prinetti said that the
Italian government had always acted according to the rules and that it would
continue to do its best to protect its citizens working and residing abroad. He did
not agree, however, with Fava’s aggressive approach because the American
people accepted Italians in their own country with “benevolent hospitality.” As for
the Erwin killing, Prinetti maintained that the Italian government, as well as Italian
diplomats in the United States, had done their job with the federal government.
Italian officials could not be blamed for insufficient diligence or lack of initiative.
34
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The lack of successful results was not their fault. Prinetti agreed with Fava that
the “blood price” could not be considered as a substitute for real justice; he also
agreed with Fava’s suggestion not to request it. However, he did not think that it
was right to order the victims’ relatives not to accept it, should the U.S.
government offer it to them. Therefore, he was not going to submit a request for
an indemnity, but neither would he force the victims’ relatives to refuse it. 35
The Italian demand for a federal law to deal with cases of mob violence
against foreign-born nationals found some favor in American public opinion,
except in the southern states. The Tribune of New York, for example, maintained
that more than monetary reimbursement should be given in order to right wrongs
and compensate relatives for the loss of their loved ones. In addition, the
newspaper praised the Italian government for its patience toward the U.S.
government in several instances of violence perpetrated against persons of
Italian origin. Furthermore, The Tribune criticized the ineptitude of the U.S.
government as well as of the U.S. Congress, which both justified their
inadequacy as a constitutional flaw rather than a lack of good will. According to
the newspaper, the lack of power of the federal authorities could not be ascribed
to the laws, but to the negligence of American legislators in using the powers
conferred on them. The U.S. Constitution allowed full powers to the federal
government in all cases related to foreign treaties and foreign affairs, but
Congress had never acted in order to confer on the federal courts any jurisdiction
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in cases regarding violation of treaties concerning the rights of foreign-born
individuals. 36
Another New York newspaper, the Evening Star, emphasized that the
contention between Washington and Rome could not be resolved by simply
awarding an indemnity to the relatives of the lynched Italians. The Italian
government, the newspaper pointed out, was not seeking the blood price. In fact,
to demand monetary compensation would be equal to pricing a cadaver. The
blood price would seem to calculate in dollars and cents the value of the blood of
an Italian citizen. The decision to accept money as compensation for the loss of a
dear person should be solely the concern of close relatives rather than the
responsibility of the Italian government. According to the Evening Star, “Such
types of indemnities are destined to the relatives, not to the Italian government,
which understands the issue to be much more complex than a matter of money
compensation. The Italian government did not really seek the blood price.” 37
One year later, on December 13, 1902, Congress convened. Secretary of
State John Hay sent a sympathetic note to President Theodore Roosevelt,
reporting the facts of Erwin and the prospect of granting an indemnity to the
families. John Hay did not write about the responsibilities of the local authorities,
nor anyone else’s responsibilities for that matter, let alone the constitutional
conflict between federal and state governments in regard to a lynching
perpetrated “by an armed crowd.” He also stated that, in spite of the cooperation
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of Governor Longino of Mississippi with the federal authorities, all efforts to
uncover the guilty parties had proved fruitless. Therefore, Hay proposed to grant
an indemnity, as had already occurred for the victims of Walsenburg, Hahnville,
and Tallulah. He pointed out, however, that such an indemnity should “be
considered as an act of grace and without reference to the question of the liability
of the United States.” 38 Indeed, the formula was the same as those contained in
previous presidential messages in similar circumstances: granting of the blood
price without admitting any government responsibilities.
As the U.S. Congress gathered on 15 December 1902 to listen to the
address of President Theodore Roosevelt, Ambassador Edmondo Mayor de
Planches sent a note to Secretary of State John Hay stating that the Italian
government would leave it up to the United States to provide reparations
according to its best judgment without the Italian embassy’s appearing to be
involved. 39 It was in March 1903 when finally the United States granted an
indemnity of $5,000 as reparation for the victims of Erwin. 40
The granting of an indemnity, however, did not suffice to quiet all the
polemics that were still going on in Italy about the lynchings and the violence
toward Italians in the United States and the lack of communication and
cooperation between Rome and Washington. In the Italian Parliament, several
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representatives participated in the debate. For instance, on April 28, 1903,
Representative Cirmeni delivered a speech in which he asked Foreign Minister
Prinetti questions about the indemnity for the victims of Erwin, Mississippi. The
Foreign Minister’s assistant Baccelli responded on May 7, 1903, saying that, in
spite of two years having gone by and the continuous, loud protests by the Italian
government, he did not consider the contention to be solved yet. 41
The New York Times reported this discussion that had taken place in the
Italian Parliament. The article stated that the Italian government was not involved
at all with the acceptance of the indemnity because it could not or would not
admit to the “blood price,” nor could it force the parties involved to refuse it. The
article also reported that two proposals in Congress for federal jurisdiction in
cases of mob violence against aliens had not been approved because the states
were jealous of their autonomy. In addition, since the number of lynched Italians
was relatively small, Southern Representatives in Congress argued that there
was insufficient reason to transfer jurisdiction from state governments to the
federal government. 42
The Herald of New York, in its edition of May 8, 1903, also provided
coverage of the discussion in the Italian Parliament. The article said that the
lynched Italians were turning in their graves, clamoring for revenge and shouting
cries of shame for the cowardly Italian officials who accepted the “blood price.”
On this side of the Atlantic, the U.S. Treasury already had a receipt signed by the
41
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Italian ambassador, accepting on the part of the Serio family the “blood price” of
$5,000. It was an infamy, said the newspaper, to accept such a small
compensation for the lives of two Italians in a premeditated crime. American
courts granted much larger sums to American families whose relatives had been
killed in a train accident or an explosion. Families of victims of a lynching should
receive a much bigger compensation. According to the newspaper, Italian
officials, including Ambassador Mayor, were naïve in their understanding of
American customs and traditions; they failed to understand the common practice
of lynching. 43
In the Herald article, one could find no optimism that there might be a
solution in the near future. The article stated that the American government
would never modify its laws in order to include rights for foreign-born citizens, nor
would the American people renounce their inclination for lynching Italians. The
article also proposed to dismiss Minister Prinetti, who had attempted to appease
the very angry ambassador Fava. Prinetti had admitted that the Italian Foreign
Ministry had to overlook the news received from Washington that the lynching
had been ruled to be “by the will of God” and that the government would have
protected immigrants but not with excessive vigor. It would have been much
more sensible and appropriate to summon Prinetti to be tried in a court of law for
ordering a subordinate to negotiate an indemnity. 44 The incident in Erwin,
Mississippi, would end with the usual “blood price” solution, with a lack of
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punishment of the guilty party, and with pessimism about any future improvement
in the treatment of foreign-born citizens in the United States.
In 1901, besides the Erwin episode, there was another lynching of an
Italian individual, this one in Ashdown, Arkansas. According to the reconstruction
of the events by Carlo Papini, consular regent in New Orleans, Giuseppe
Buzzotta, originally from Castelvetrano, was killed by a mob of American workers
on August 21, 1901. As Papini noted, the very first difficulty he had to face was to
counter the official version of the event as it had been reported by the local
authorities, which claimed that Buzzotta had provoked the incident. Papini also
noted the difficulty of finding any witnesses willing to testify. At first, the Italians
seemed to be willing to speak, but then they were intimidated and refused to act
as witnesses, so frightened that they would withdraw their depositions. As in
other cases, Italians seemed to be willing to testify in front of Italian officials,
proclaiming their patriotism; afterwards, however, because of external pressures,
they would back down and refuse to testify in a court of law or in front of the
grand jury. 45
One month after the Arkansas lynching, it was still not possible to obtain
accurate information concerning what had happened. In fact, Italian Ambassador
Mayor wrote to Foreign Minister Prinetti that he had not been able to ascertain
whether Ashdown had been a common case of murder or a lynching by a mob,
as some believed it to be. Ambassador Mayor also expressed his desire to talk to
Secretary of State Hay about this and other cases of blood and violence; whether
45
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or not they were lynchings, these were cases in which Italian nationals had not
been protected by either their country of origin or the local authorities, protection
to which they were entitled, based not only on existing treaties but also on
common human rights. 46
Once more the trial had not been a fair one, but a real farce. In spite of the
initial testimonies by Italians, the judge had ruled that what happened at
Ashdown was a case of involuntary or unintentional murder rather than a
lynching. Mayor, however, wrote that after the trial, many issues still remained
open and unanswered, especially because there were Italian witnesses who
could demonstrate, through their testimony, that there had been an intention to
murder. Such witnesses, however, had been ignored, or their depositions differed
from the original ones that had been obtained at the consulate before the trial
took place. 47
The Italian press in the United States was indignant. It focused on the
climate of job competition among various ethnic groups at Ashdown, Arkansas.
The Tribune of New York reported how the Italian worker had been killed.
According to the article, the Kansas City Southern Railroad employed several
Italians; in fact, as in many other places throughout the United States, Italians
were in great demand because they worked hard and were considered more
productive than Irish drunkards or lazy blacks. The newspaper attributed
responsibility for the Ashdown murder to an armed mob of approximately 100
“indigenous” laborers. These local workers were armed with modern rifles with
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which they had terrorized the harmless Italians and then had killed Buzzotta. The
article also lamented the lack of justice and mentioned that, as in the case of
Erwin, Mississippi, the guilty parties were likely to remain unpunished and never
be brought to justice. Furthermore, the article denounced the lack of protection
by representatives of the Italian government. 48 The Italian community in the
United States, the newspaper maintained, was still waiting for an energetic
response on the part of Italian authorities, their ambassadors and consuls.
Otherwise, it was absolutely useless and unnecessary to spend huge sums of
money on the upkeep of embassies and consulates. More severe comments
stated that once more, Italians in the United States had been treated inhumanely
and unjustly. “How long,” the newspaper asked, “will our name and flesh be
object of such ferocious violence by the scam of American society protected by
the connivance of local authorities and by the certainty of being able to go free
and unpunished?” 49 The tone of the article was pessimistic about any future
improvements in the treatment of Italian nationals in the United States.
Pessimism also describes the feelings of Gino Speranza, an Italian
American who had dedicated his life to bettering the condition of Italian
immigrants in the United States. Born in Connecticut on April 23, 1872, he had
spent his childhood in Verona, Italy. Returning to the United States, he graduated
from the City College of New York, received a law degree from the New York
University Law School, and was admitted to the Bar in 1896. Because of his
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interest in Italian immigration and protection of Italian immigrants in the United
States, Speranza became legal counselor to the Italian consulate in New York. A
prolific writer, his interest in Italian immigrants became the focus of much of his
writings. His efforts included the founding of the Society for the Protection of
Italian Immigrants and his work for the Investigation Bureau for Italian
Immigrants, which was established in 1906 by the Italian government to protect
the rights of Italians in America. 50
Concerned about treatment of Italian workers in West Virginia, the Office
of the Commissioner General of Emigration in Rome tasked Speranza, then
Secretary of the New York Association of Italian Immigrants, to conduct an
inquiry about Italian workers in that state. In May 1903, Speranza prepared a
report that indicated Italian laborers in West Virginia were harassed and
mistreated. Ironically, shortly after Speranza had completed his report, a lynching
of Italians occurred in Davis, West Virginia. 51
Speranza’s report contained a vivid description of the mistreatment
endured by Italian laborers in Davis. They had been subjected to intimidation,
brutal terrorism, unscrupulous recruiting by Italian bosses, and abuse by
shopkeepers in the area. They were basically kept as prisoners in the camp
where they worked. Armed men had been hired to prevent workers from
attempting to quit, and of course, to intimidate the workers as well. They were
kept in a sort of desert in almost complete isolation. To complicate matters
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further, many laborers had joined labor unions. Union members and nonmembers were equal in numbers, thus making it harder to cope with the difficult
working conditions and inevitably creating conflict and resentment. Because the
Italians did not want to join the labor union, they were looked upon as traitors and
not very well liked. 52
The episode of Davis, West Virginia, was controversial. It occurred in a
climate of job competition and ethnic rivalry. It was not a true lynching but,
according to Ambassador Mayor, it did have “some of the characteristics of a
lynching.” 53 It happened during the night on May 29, 1903. A whole case of
dynamite exploded by the entrance of a house where 37 Italians were sleeping.
The consequences were dramatic. One individual died immediately; another was
injured and taken to the hospital, where he died a few days later. The attack,
according to news received by the embassy, had been plotted in order to
intimidate the Italians and force them to leave Davis. 54
In a letter to the Italian embassy, Speranza commented on the event and
stated that it would be very difficult to find the guilty parties. According to
Speranza, the main reason why the guilty party would likely go unpunished was
primarily economic, given the high cost of legal proceedings. 55 Indeed, in West
Virginia, it would be almost impossible to convict leaders of a lynch mob.
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Speranza made an accurate list of necessary expenses, including lawyers,
investigators to find witnesses, detectives, and newspapers. Moreover, Speranza
emphasized that there was no way, other than the courts, to condemn a
lyncher. 56 Ambassador Mayor was even more pessimistic. He wrote to Foreign
Minister Prinetti: “It is good that I repeat it, in order to avoid any illusions about
what one can obtain from the courts and the judiciary in the United States.” 57
Ambassador Mayor undertook diplomatic action with the governor of West
Virginia so that an investigation would be conducted in order to find the guilty
parties and bring them to justice. The ambassador took similar steps with the
State Department in the hope that the federal government might contact the
governor and local authorities in West Virginia. Like Speranza, Ambassador
Mayor was pessimistic about obtaining an indemnity and bringing the
perpetrators to justice. As Ambassador Mayor wrote, it would probably be rather
naïve to hope that the killers could be found and that an indemnity could be
obtained from them. It was likely that the guilty parties would remain unknown,
but even if they were found, they would probably be poor workers unable to pay
an indemnity. Furthermore, Mayor noted that, for the time being, the issue of an
indemnity was unpopular in Italy as could be seen from the accusations by
Senator Fava against Foreign Minister Prinetti in the case of the facts of Erwin,
Mississippi. Mayor further wrote that even though an action by the Italian
embassy with the U.S. government might be successful, it would not quiet down
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the ongoing debate in Parliament that the “blood price” was a humiliation and
unsatisfactory reparation for the violence. 58
Italians would continue to be harassed and mistreated in the following
decades. Besides lynchings, cases of peonage--the forced detention of workers-were rather common, especially in the South. Italians were often victims of such
ignominious practice. In 1908, the Italian envoy responsible for Italian
immigration in New Orleans, Count Gerolamo Moroni, was sent to the New
Orleans consulate in order to conduct an investigation concerning lynchings of
Italian citizens in the South. Moroni’s writings shed light on some of these cases
and added to an understanding of the discrimination to which Italians were
subjected. 59
That very climate of ethnic hatred and discrimination was at the root of the
lynching that occurred in Tampa, Florida in 1910. As Moroni stated in his report,
the lynchings or attempted lynchings of Italians were due to an economic
downturn provoked by a reduction in jobs and wages that had provoked nativeborn American workers to resent and to fight competition by foreign-born
workers. Furthermore, ethnic hatred and deep dislike of the foreign-born,
especially among low-class Americans, fueled resentment and aggressive
behavior. 60
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Another good source of information is a report prepared by John
Savarese, consular agent at Tampa, who, in March of 1908, sent to Rome his
response to a series of questions that the Italian Foreign Ministry passed to all
consulates in the United States. The data gathered by Savarese provides a good
picture of the Italian community in Tampa, amounting to 1,600 families, with
about 6,000 to 7,000 Italians, originating mainly in Sicily or Campania. Twothirds of the Italians in the Tampa area were employed in the cigar-making
industry, but there were also peasants, fishermen, and barbers. 61
The writings of Fara Forni and Luigi Villari, two Italian representatives who
travelled in Florida in the early 1900s, also shed some light on the working
conditions of Italians employed in the Florida cigar industry. According to their
report, Tampa was the most important Italian community in Florida, including
about 7,000 Italians, most originally from the Sicilian towns of Palermo, Girgenti,
and Piana dei Greci; a few were from the Naples area. The majority worked in
one of the 33 cigar factories, utilizing tobacco imported from the island of Cuba.
The job, according to Forni and Villari, was not easy to learn. The training lasted
from six to eight months, but it took at least three years for a laborer to become
fully competent. During the training period, workers were not paid well; actually
workers who wanted to be employed full time often had to pay an entrance fee in
order to be hired. A great number of Sicilian women were employed in the cigar
factories; they had acquired a good reputation as reliable workers. According to
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the report, some of these immigrant Sicilian women earned as much as $25.00
per week, while average workers earned $16.00 or $18.00 weekly. 62
It fell to Vice Consul Gerolamo Moroni of the New Orleans consulate to
investigate the lynching of two Italians, Angelo Albano and Costanzo Ficarotta,
on the night of 20 September 1910 in Tampa, Florida. Moroni conducted a
serious inquiry and produced a thorough report that is not only informative, but
also credible.
According to Moroni, the city of Tampa had a population of 50,000,
including black and white Americans, Hispanics, Cubans, and Italians. The Italian
community living in Tampa had the worst reputation in the whole country
because it contained numerous common delinquents as well as mafia members.
In addition, a long strike in the cigar industry had further fueled anti-Italian
sentiment in the city. The main reasons for the lynching, according to Moroni,
were a number of episodes of wrongdoing that had remained unpunished
because of a lack of witnesses as well as the three-month long strike that had
severely damaged the cigar industry in Tampa. Those factors set the stage
eventually leading to the lynching of Italians in Tampa. 63
Moroni described the activities of the “Black Hand” within the Italian
community, which operated undisturbed because of the connivance of prominent
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individuals in the Tampa community. Such “prominents,” according to Moroni,
were the plague of all Italian communities in America. In Tampa, the “prominents”
had formed a committee of public safety in order to eradicate the “Black Hand.”
Soon, the members of the committee of public safety created a system of “outlaw
police,” who operated with arrogance shortly after the violence; such arrogance
increased, thus bringing further dishonor upon the Italian community in Tampa.
The committee imposed payments on the Italians based on their individual
incomes and sent anonymous letters of threats and intimidation. Needless to say,
the local authorities did nothing because the threats concerned Italians and their
internal illegal affairs. 64
According to Moroni, unlawful acts committed by Italians usually remained
unpunished because of the unwillingness of people to testify against individuals
of the same ethnic group. However, also at fault were the police because they
too were corrupt men appointed by county voters for a period of four years and,
therefore, unwilling to upset local sensibilities, he maintained. 65
Moroni also criticized the judiciary system and the impotence of the police
in front of lawyers who, when they were well paid, became capable of obtaining
impunity for the defendants. Unpunished delinquents, continuous wrongdoing,
and, lastly, the long strike culminated in popular indignation and a lynching. In
fact, it became easy to exploit the climate of indignation for those who wanted the
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cigar makers’ strike to fail. “The businessmen and cigar manufacturers in Tampa
took the opportunity to crush the strike.” 66
However, there were several legitimate reasons to strike, the primary one
being the horrible conditions under which laborers were forced to work in cigar
factories. Moroni denounced how polluted the work environment was in cigar
factories. “The laborers who work in cigar factories,” he wrote, “are often ill with
tuberculosis as they work in a very hot environment that is impregnated with
nicotine.” 67 The most serious factor in escalating the conflict between
management and labor was the refusal on the part of factory owners to increase
wages, thus leading to a strike and shutting down of the factory. 68
Since he was an aristocrat (like most diplomatic representatives), Moroni
was not inclined to justify the strikers nor the union leaders who were mainly
responsible for the outbreak of the strike. In fact, he deemed the International
Union of Cigar Makers, a branch of the American Federation of Labor,
responsible for the whole controversy. According to Moroni, union leaders sought
only to increase union membership rather than to right wrongs; nor were they
interested in protecting the rights of the laborers. They were after the interests of
the union. In fact, union leaders understood that between 10,000 and 13,000
well-paid workers did not belong to the union. Hence, it was in the interest of the
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union itself to get workers involved and lure them to join the union so that it could
generate good monthly income through soaring membership. 69
Moroni also accused the union leaders of being responsible for the
economic downturn that had set in as a direct consequence of the long strike
they had promoted. An economic crisis also meant a social crisis in a city where
the cigar industry was the main source of employment. As Moroni wrote in his
report, the three-month-long strike had taken a heavy toll reducing income
considerably in the city of Tampa, with most of the population suffering
tremendously. Business and trade had come to a halt, and anti-immigrant
sentiment was at an all-time high. The overall atmosphere was so electrified that
it could explode at any time. 70
According to Moroni, there were 6,000 or 9,000 strikers in all, for many
cigar workers had left for Havana, Key West, New Orleans, or Sanford before the
strike had started to work in other factories. As often occurs during strikes,
relations among workers quickly deteriorated. The strikers, Moroni wrote, had
shifted from peaceful protest to forbidding their fellow workers to leave town, to
harassing newly hired workers considered “scabs,” and even to throwing stones
at trains. Ultimately, strike leaders had attempted to murder Joe Cosio,
nicknamed “Spagnolo,” mistakenly thinking him to be his brother, who was Vice
President of the Manufacturers’ Association. 71
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Vice Consul Moroni in his report about the events described in detail the
unfolding of popular rage that eventually led to the lynching. He recalled the
attempted murder of J.F. Easterling, accountant of the Bustillo Brothers & Diaz
cigar factory. The attempt originated with Easterling’s shooting in the air at the
very beginning of the strike in that factory. Furthermore, in order to counterattack,
Easterling had hired some new workers or “scabs.” Shortly after, two Italians
were accused of the murder attempt against Easterling, based on testimonies of
doubtful reliability. The witnesses indicated that Costanzo Ficarotta and Angelo
Albano had been present, Moroni wrote, but there was not enough evidence nor
were there reliable witnesses to establish that the two were guilty of attempted
murder. Furthermore, Moroni wrote that, in the Italian community, there were
actual rumors that a Cuban citizen who had moved to New York was the one
who had shot Easterling. However, the reluctance of Italians to testify, Moroni
maintained, presented the greatest obstacle to his conduct of a serious and
effective inquiry. In fact, no Italian in the community had been willing to name the
Cuban who allegedly fired on Easterling. 72
Although the two Italians probably had not fired upon Easterling, for many,
no proof was necessary of their guilt. In fact, Ficarotta was a killer by trade and
could have been paid to shoot or to stir up matters. Albano might have been
present, but only coincidentally, as he was going around the block on his bicycle.

72

ASDMAE, Ibid.

144
Moroni had reason to believe that Deputy Sheriff Keaggin had fabricated the
evidence against Ficarotta and Albano simply because they were Italian. 73
Undoubtedly, the mob had acted with the connivance of local authorities,
who had done nothing to stop it, thus becoming accomplices to the violence.
These details, Moroni maintained, were clear indicators that the mob had not
acted spontaneously, but that the lynching had been carefully planned. The two
Italians were arrested and taken to jail. They were surprised to be taken into
custody, but they were not worried. However, Moroni bitterly commented that it
was not possible to find any reliable witness who would speak freely and who
would not be scared and intimidated. Furthermore, even statements released by
the American authorities could not be considered reliable. In fact, the statements
by Deputy Sheriff Ewans were out and out lies. Even the testimony by a
firefighter, Bryan, could not be taken into consideration as he was one of the
lynchers. 74
Moroni also indicated in his report a series of factors that led him to
believe that the police were involved in the lynching. On the night of September
20, 1910, a group of 20 or 25 people speaking perfect English took the two
Italians from the jail. The men involved were beyond any doubt English-speaking
Americans and not Italians who wanted to get rid of dangerous delinquents, as
the local authorities insinuated. The Sheriff Robert Jackson fired only a few shots
in the air in a half-hearted attempt to break up the mob. Furthermore, the police
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faked an attempt to follow the group, and then passed by the site of the lynching
without seeing anything. Only several hours later, at 23:30, did they “casually”
discover the bodies of the two unfortunate Italians. Moroni reiterated that a
lynching usually is an act committed by citizens with the support and connivance
of the local police. One had only to examine carefully all lynchings in the United
States up to that date to reach that same conclusion. 75 Moroni ironically
lamented that Italians were naïve, that they were not yet familiar with the tradition
and practice of lynching, but that some day in the near future they would
probably learn it from the “civilized” Americans. 76
That the episode occurred so quickly was further proof that the lynching
had been planned and that the site had been chosen in advance, Moroni bitterly
commented. The two Italians had been hanged back to back, and a pipe had
been placed in Ficarotta’s mouth. On Albano’s body, the mob had placed a sign
written in English as a warning to seven other Italians that the same could
happen to them. According to Moroni, the seven Italians listed on the warning
sign were naturalized American citizens who, soon after the lynching, received
letters of intimidation and a notice of eviction. Moroni indicated that five of the
seven individuals had police records, but there was no evidence that they had
participated in the strike. In fact, only two Italians had been involved in the strike,
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Giovanni Vaccaro and Angelo Leto, and they had already left for New York. They
were not in Tampa on the day when Easterling was shot. 77
Moroni also reported that public opinion in Tampa was overwhelmingly on
the side of the lynchers, as could be seen in the local press. The vice consul
mentioned an article published in the Tampa Tribune that declared that the
people of Tampa had shown with the lynching that they would not tolerate
homicides committed because of human greed and that the two Italians were
victims of public indignation. 78
Moroni asserted that the main causes of the lynching episode were the
interests of the cigar industry, the damages provoked by the long strike, and the
need for a lesson that would end the strike and restore order. According to
Moroni’s report, once the industrialists, the merchants, and the police realized
that the strike was going to have disastrous consequences, they understood that
threats and intimidation of the strikers were about to shift to real attempts on their
lives. Consequently, the “prominents” decided, with the connivance of the
authorities, that a lesson was needed to intimidate the masses, and they
conveniently found “victims” in the two Italians. Indeed, the two Italians were the
right people. Ficarotta especially was hated and deemed dangerous; his death
would be considered a relief for the community. Albano was not a delinquent but
was a friend of Ficarotta. He had never violated the law, but he was cheering for
the strikers. Albano did not realize that, not being an American, his obvious
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sympathy for the strikers and friendship with the much-hated Ficarotta was
dangerous. 79
According to Vice Consul Moroni, there was no possibility of finding the
lynchers and bringing them to justice. There was no evidence against the citizens
of West Tampa; Italians did not want to testify, and Americans would not
incriminate themselves in the plot they had conceived in order to get rid of two
dangerous individuals and, at the same time, to intimidate the strikers. Moroni
was also convinced of the connivance of the authorities in the lynching. Beyond
any doubt, the police had been involved both in the plotting and in the unfolding
of the violence. There was no evidence, however, to substantiate his strong
allegations. Even without evidence, data, and witnesses, Moroni maintained that
the police knew what was about to happen yet took no measures in order to
protect the two Italians. In fact, the police handed the two unfortunate Italians to
the lynchers as if it was not their duty to protect the Italians’ lives. Furthermore, it
was clear that no steps were taken even to attempt to identify the guilty parties. 80
Soon after the lynching of Albano and Ficarotta on the night of September
20, Consul Carlo Papini of New Orleans telegraphed the Italian Ambassador in
Washington, Montagliari, that he feared more violence and that the Italian
community wanted to hold a “mass meeting.” The ambassador’s reply showed
that he was more worried about the possibility of more violence than about the
violence that had already happened. Ambassador Montagliari urged Papini to act
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with calm dignity and caution, to discourage any protest or demonstration, and to
send honorary Vice Consul Moroni from New Orleans to West Tampa to conduct
an inquiry. The embassy, on the other hand, would appeal to the State
Department as well as to the governor of Florida to provide protection and to
conduct an investigation to detect the guilty parties and bring them to justice.
Florida Governor Albert W. Gilchrist replied that the two Italians had already
obtained U.S. citizenship and that an investigation “concerning last night’s
unfortunate occurrence” was already in progress. 81
In writing to the Italian Foreign Minister, Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano,
Ambassador Montagliari expressed serious concern about the safety of the
Italian community in West Tampa. He wrote that the episode of West Tampa was
very serious, the most serious one since the incident in Erwin, Mississippi in
1901. The ambassador was also very upset because local newspapers indicated
that some Italian citizens might have been directly involved in the lynching. 82
According to Ambassador Montagliari, the Italian community residing in
West Tampa was divided. It contained both good and evil elements including
several members of the Mafia. Yet the city had a reputation for tranquility and
order. The Italian community was rather large, consisting primarily of Sicilians. In
this community, as in many other communities in the United States, there were
only a few Italians who had been able to reach comfortable and respectable
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positions. Unfortunately, some Italians in the West Tampa community were
unreliable and made a living off their fellow Italians through blackmail. 83
In the fall of 1909, Tampa had seen the ruthless murder of two Italians by
fellow Italians. That episode, the ambassador maintained, was linked to the
lynching of Ficarotta and Albano on September 20 as well as to the recent strike
at the Bustillo Brothers and Diaz cigar factory. Unfortunately, the practice of
lynching blacks and whites alike was common in Florida as well as in other
southern states, Ambassador Montagliari commented. 84
The Italian embassy, however, could not take any initiative until the
nationality of Ficarotta and Albano had been ascertained. Were they Italian or
American citizens? On 23 September 1910, a letter from the ambassador to
Foreign Minister San Giuliano informed the latter that while Ficarotta had indeed
obtained American citizenship, Angelo Albano was still a legal Italian.
Furthermore, some newspapers had published articles that questioned whether
Italians had committed the lynching. The Italian ambassador also sent a note to
the U.S. State Department, on the same date, in which he protested that the local
authorities had failed to take all necessary measures to protect the two
individuals while they were being detained. The two Italians were suspected only
of having injured an accountant of the Bustillo & Diaz cigar factory. Instead of
defending the two unfortunate individuals who had been handcuffed, authorities
abandoned them without even attempting to halt the premeditated lynching.
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Indeed, the ambassador pointed out the irresponsibility of the local authorities in
letting things happen. As he put it, “Not only did they fail to prevent the lynching,
but also to employ any energy in trying to stop the unfortunate event.” 85
Furthermore, Ambassador Montagliari informed Foreign Minister San
Giuliano he had sent Moroni to Tampa to conduct an investigation. Moroni had
reported that the situation in Tampa was calm and tranquil, but that the
authorities had been reluctant in looking for the guilty parties. Even more
humiliating, Moroni indicated in his report, was that photographs of the lynching
were being sold in Tampa. Moroni had protested such a humiliation and had
urged the mayor of Tampa to forbid the sale of the photographs. Moroni had
also reported that the two lynched individuals did not enjoy a good reputation in
the community. They both had reputations as unreliable individuals who often
resorted to extortion and blackmail. 86
The Italian community in Tampa had protested vigorously about this
episode of violence against Italians. Montagliari informed the foreign minister that
Italian newspapers had printed fiery articles about the event. Moreover, on a
daily basis the embassy continued to receive protests from different associations
or private individuals, denouncing the violence and accusing local authorities of
not having taken any measures to prevent it. 87
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Moroni’s report put a rapid end to the sale of the photos. The Tampa Daily
Times published an article on 27 September 1910, titled “The Governor Stops
Sales of Lynching Pictures,” indicating that because of the protests of the Italian
vice-consul, the Florida governor had issued the order to Sheriff Robert A.
Jackson. Instead, on 28 September 1910, The Tampa Morning Tribune revealed
that one of the two recently killed Italians, Angelo Albano, had committed perjury
in swearing that he was an American citizen born in New Orleans. In truth,
Albano still held Italian citizenship and an Italian passport and had registered
illegally to participate in 1909 elections in Florida.
Having received all appropriate documentation proving that one of the two
lynched individuals was of Italian nationality, Ambassador Montagliari sent a note
to U.S. Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, informing him that Angelo Albano
was born in Italy, not in New Orleans, as the Florida authorities had maintained.
The ambassador also requested that the guilty parties be sought and, at the
same time, he denounced the dubious conduct of the authorities in Tampa.
Although the Italian ambassador had no intention of accusing the Florida
authorities of being accomplices in the lynching, he was aware that said
authorities had not even attempted to look for those who had committed the
lynching of September 20, nor did they show any intention of punishing the guilty
parties, had they been found. 88
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Montagliari sent a copy of his letter to Secretary of State Knox to Marquis
San Giuliano, together with a report in which the ambassador informed the
foreign minister of his meeting with U.S. Undersecretary of State Adee. As
Montagliari reported, Adee was inclined to believe that the Tampa authorities
were at fault and that the ambassador’s allegations were credible. Furthermore,
Montagliari added that Adee had expressed a clear intention to ask the Attorney
General to conduct a federal inquiry concerning the lynching that had occurred in
Tampa and determine whether the local authorities had failed to make an effort
to locate the guilty parties. According to Ambassador Montagliari, based also on
the report prepared by Vice Consul Moroni, the Tampa police did not intend to
find the guilty parties and bring them to justice; rather, the Tampa authorities had
wanted to get rid of Ficarotta as a persona non grata anyway, as well as of his
friend Angelo Albano. Hence the violence turned out to be the perfect opportunity
to eliminate dangerous and unwelcome individuals in the community. 89
However, having ascertained that one of the victims was indeed foreignborn, the federal authorities had the right to act directly, even though the local
authorities might not agree with any federal interference in what they deemed to
be the state government’s jurisdiction. Indeed, the Florida authorities continued
to claim that the two victims were American citizens and that, therefore, it was up
to state authorities to decide how to deal with the event.
Unsurprisingly, when it was released, the verdict by the grand jury stated
that no individuals guilty of the macabre hanging had been found. In New
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Orleans, Consul Carlo Papini wrote to Ambassador Cusani Confalonieri that it
was likely that whoever had committed the crime would go unpunished. Papini
commented that he had never expected any individuals to be found guilty and
punished; he had expected some individuals to be tried as suspects and then
freed for lack of evidence or witnesses. That the authorities had declared it
impossible to find any guilty individuals for the lynching, Papini stated, was an
enormous humiliation for Italy and the Italians. 90
Consul Papini also blamed John Savarese, the Italian consular agent at
Tampa, for the humiliating consequences of the Tampa lynching. Papini, in
concurrence with Moroni, sent his strong accusations of Savarese’s failures to
the Italian ambassador in Washington, Cusani Confalonieri. In turn, the
ambassador endorsed the allegations and wrote to Italian Foreign Minister San
Giuliano. Papini had accused Savarese of absenteeism and lack of interest in
uncovering the truth. Count Moroni was outraged pointing out that Savarese
enjoyed a position of preeminence among the Tampa elite. Because of
Savarese’s status, he probably had many chances to get to the facts; however,
he did not want to jeopardize his own position and, at the time of Count Moroni’s
inquiry, had failed to play an active role, thus playing into the hands of the local
authorities, who had a vested interest in seeing Moroni’s inquiry fail. 91
The Tampa events--long economic recession, a seven-month strike in the
cigar industry, a lynching and macabre hanging of two Italians--had major
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consequences. Besides the national and international repercussions of the
Tampa lynching of 1910, one major consequence was a considerable drop in
Italian immigration to Florida. In a report of 1911, Vice Consul Moroni at New
Orleans wrote that Italians residing in Florida in 1908 amounted to 7,000 to
8,000; during the cigar industry strike, many of those Italians left Florida and
returned to Italy or went to work somewhere else in the United States. By 1911,
the number of Italians living and working in Florida had shrunk to about 5,000. 92
As for the Italian community in Tampa--about 4,000 out of a total
population of 45,000--its living conditions worsened considerably. Before the
strike, Moroni wrote, several Italians were doing well; however, many had been
forced to dig into their savings or borrow money in order to survive during the
seven months that the strike dragged on. Moroni, however, was optimistic about
the future and hoped that conditions would eventually return to normal and that
the cigar industry would flourish again. Although less numerous, Italian laborers
were still employed in the Tampa cigar industry after the strike. As Moroni wrote,
“The majority of Italian workers are employed in the manufacture of cigars; they
are about 3,000 while before 1908 they were approximately 6,000 of 13,000
workers.” 93
Ambassador Cusani really did not want to submit a request for an
indemnity to the U.S. State Department; rather he preferred to wait for Secretary
of State Knox to propose a settlement for the incident. In fact, Cusani sent Knox
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a copy of the letter that former Secretary of State Blaine had sent to Imperiali,
chargé d’affairs at the Italian embassy in Washington, following the New Orleans
lynching of 1891. In that letter, Blaine had proposed to Imperiali that the Italian
government accept an indemnity from the federal government. Cusani wrote to
Foreign Minister San Giuliano that he hoped for a settlement similar to the one
after the New Orleans lynching. 94
Cusani, however, was less militant and less combative than former
Ambassador Fava. He claimed that, after the episode of Tampa, the position of
the Italian embassy was much weaker than it had been in the aftermath of the
New Orleans episode. In New Orleans, the guilt of the police had been
demonstrated. It was much more difficult to prove responsibility by the Tampa
authorities. 95
About two months after the Tampa incident, on 3 November 1910, a
Mexican was lynched in Texas. Cusani considered contacting the Mexican
embassy in Washington, recognizing that the case had striking similarities to that
of Tampa. The victim was a Mexican citizen, Antonio Rodriguez, who had been
accused of having violated an American woman. Rodriguez was abducted,
beaten, and set on fire while still alive. “It is evident,” he maintained, “that our
countries [Mexico and Italy] have common interest in these two cases.” 96
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Without wavering, the U.S. State Department refused to admit any
responsibility in the events of Tampa. Moreover, Secretary of State Knox
compared the Tampa episode not to the Texas incident but to another act of
violence in Catania, Sicily, involving two American sailors. Puzzled, Cusani wrote
to Foreign Minister San Giuliano that, on the one hand, the U.S. State
Department seemed inclined to propose a settlement for the violence at Tampa;
on the other hand, it countered those negotiations by comparing what occurred in
Tampa with what happened in Catania on 24 October 1909. Although Cusani
was aware that more information was really needed to evaluate both episodes
and to counter the federal government’s argument, he was convinced that the
two episodes of Tampa and Catania were totally different and that no real
connection between the two existed. While he had no doubt that the case of
Tampa was a lynching, the violence against the two American sailors in Catania
had been provoked by a fight. 97 Cusani was indeed persistent; his persistence
succeeded in keeping the two episodes separate.
Eventually, Cusani accepted once more the “blood price” as a settlement
of the violence. It did not really matter whether the state of Florida or the federal
government paid the indemnity. “It is of little or no importance,” he said, “which
authority pays the indemnity. But there is a possibility that the State Department
might hide behind a refusal by the State of Florida. In that case, they must be
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reminded that the indemnity for the New Orleans lynching was not paid by the
state of Louisiana, but by the federal government.” 98
It took longer than usual, however, to receive payment of the “blood price”
in the case of the lynching in Tampa, Florida. Not until two years later did
President Woodrow Wilson finally recommend that Congress vote in favor of an
indemnity of $6,000 for the lynching of Italian citizen Angelo Albano. As in all
previous cases, Wilson emphasized that the indemnity must be considered as
“an act of grace and without reference to the question of liability of the United
States.” Thus, the words used by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan on
24 June 1913 in recommending that Congress grant an indemnity did not
mention or imply any kind of responsibility or negligence on the part of the Florida
authorities. He mentioned, however, previous lynchings for which the “blood
price” had also been awarded--Walsenburg, Hahnville, Tallulah, and Erwin-stating that the Italian government had requested an indemnity of $6,000 for the
family of the victim in the Tampa incident. 99
In the U.S. Congress, a heated debate ensued concerning granting an
indemnity to an individual who had not even attempted to obtain American
citizenship. An indemnity would mean that Albano’s family would enjoy a
privilege that was usually denied to U.S. citizens. Reporting about the debate to
Foreign Minister San Giuliano, Cusani noted that the main issue he had expected
the U.S. Congress to discuss was the amount of the indemnity to be awarded
98
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rather than whether to grant it; that issue had not been addressed. Cusani noted
that the sum awarded by the federal government for previous cases amounted to
approximately $2,000. However, he tried to take advantage of the delay in
granting the indemnity by arguing for the more substantial indemnity. Obviously
he was aware that there would be difficulties in obtaining a greater amount. 100
Eventually, the House of Representatives approved awarding the Albano family
an indemnity of $6,000. Cusani considered this amount a personal victory. He
was satisfied that, taking advantage of the delay, he had been able to triple the
indemnity to be awarded to the victim’s mother.
Ambassador Cusani contacted all Italian consuls in the United States,
urging them to notify other Italian officials in their jurisdictions. According to
Ambassador Cusani, Italians working and residing in the United States would
appreciate the outcome in the Albano case. Italians usually complained about
cases of lynching that, in general, were resolved with a humiliating indemnity and
failure to punish the murderers. Hearing of the Albano indemnity, they would stop
complaining about the weakness and shortcomings of the Italian embassy in
protecting Italian workers in the United States. 101
Wisely, Cusani did not praise the accomplishments of the embassy at
Washington, but the success of the Italian government in Rome. He urged the
Italian consuls in the U.S. to emphasize the role of the Italian government rather
than the accomplishments of the embassy. It would be more effective, Cusani
100
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maintained, for the Italian press in the United States to praise the energetic
action by the royal government without even mentioning the Italian embassy in
Washington. 102
Although no individuals were ever brought to justice for the murder of
Ficarotta and Albano, Ambassador Cusani emphasized that, in this particular
case, the Italian government had taken bold action and had succeeded in
obtaining a better indemnity for the family of the one victim who had kept Italian
citizenship, Angelo Albano. Nevertheless, no matter how Ambassador Cusani
interpreted the outcome of the lynching of Tampa, Florida, it was true that, once
more, the violence had resulted in the “blood price.” 103
Undoubtedly diplomacy had scored a victory, but so too had racism, racial
hatred, and dislike of the Italian race. Anti-Italian sentiment had produced
violence in Erwin, Ashdown, Davis, and Tampa. Anti-foreign sentiment always
seemed to filter through a specific stereotype when Italians were involved, for in
the eyes of Americans, they bore the mark of Cain. Especially in the South,
Italians always prompted images of violent murderers as well as mysterious
“Black Hand” societies. Were the Serios, father and son, guilty of doing well in
their fruit and vegetable business? Were they guilty of not leaving town after
being warned to do so by their neighbor, who was annoyed with their peripatetic
horse, or were they guilty of being friends with a fellow Italian man who lived with
a black woman? What about Angelo Buzzotta, who was killed by a mob of coworkers employed by the Kansas City Southern Railroad? Authorities were not
102
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able to ascertain the reasons for his death. Ethnic rivalry and economic
competition were probably the cause of the death of Italian workers who were
blown up while they were sleeping in Davis, West Virginia. Again ethnic hatred
and discrimination precipitated the lynching of Costanzo Ficarotta and Angelo
Albano in the midst of a long cigar-makers’ strike in Tampa, Florida. In that case,
too, frightening images of “Black Hand” and hidden knives led to the violence.
What might be the roots of so many episodes of ethnic hatred and
violence? Into the first decade of the twentieth century, a significant number of
southern and eastern European immigrants continued to pour into the United
States. The predominance of “new” over “old” immigration was now becoming
apparent to Americans in every part of the country. Their whiteness was often
called into question. According to Alabama Congressman Thomas Abercrombe,
“their color differed greatly from that of the Anglo-Saxon race.” 104
In the early twentieth century, southern and eastern Europeans went
westward to the Pacific Coast to work together with Mexicans and Asians for
railroad companies or in mills and fisheries. Italians and Portuguese were
successfully competing with the Japanese in intensive truck farming. At the same
time, a significant number of southern and eastern Europeans immigrated to the
South. Outside of New Orleans and adjacent areas, the South had seen hardly
any “new” immigrants prior to the very end of the nineteenth century. By the early
1900s, however, they had become so common that the number of southern and
eastern Europeans more than doubled between 1900 and 1910 and Italian
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farmhands and railroad workers became noticeable and visible. In 1910, the new
immigration constituted one percent of the white population in the South and 5.6
percent in the Pacific States. 105
The great tide from southern and eastern Europe was pouring into the
North; the whole area below the Mason and Dixon line had only half as many
new immigrants as did New York City. Native-born individuals in the South were
extraordinarily sensitive to complexion and caste and looked on the newcomers
as, in a way, in between the white and black races. The “in-between-ness” of the
newcomers was often pointed out as a disturbing factor that might disrupt the
order of things. The new foreigners did not seem to adapt to southern traditions
and values. In particular, the Italians’ willingness to associate with blacks seemed
to be quite disturbing; the Italians endangered the pattern of white supremacy
and the order of society. Italians often worked side by side with blacks on
Louisiana plantations or allowed blacks into their stores or even lived with black
women in their homes. In Louisiana, the whites tried to maintain the color line by
prohibiting Italian children from attending white schools. 106
According to John Higham, by the early twentieth century, the South was
becoming the nativist champion par excellence; its spokesmen were soon to be
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prominent in every anti-foreign movement. 107 Southern congressmen and
senators were soon to play a prominent role in opposing attempts in Congress to
pass a much-needed federal anti-lynching law to protect foreign-born nationals in
cases of mob violence in the United States. Constitutional doubts, states’ rights,
and strong convictions that aliens in the United States were guaranteed the same
rights of protection and the same degree of justice provided for American citizens
could not be overcome in Congress. Yet, throughout the unfolding of the
contention between Italy and the United States concerning protection of Italian
nationals on U.S. soil, Italian diplomats and politicians pursued a course of
prudence and moderation, and, with the exception of the New Orleans affair, they
made efforts not to disrupt relations between the two countries.
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CHAPTER VI
THE ITALIAN RESPONSE:
THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTION OF ALIENS AND RELATIONS BETWEEN
ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES
The numerous episodes of lynching of individuals of Italian origin that
occurred in the United States strained relations between the United States and
Italy. Relations between the two countries became more and more difficult,
opening the way to various and complex diplomatic incidents. In particular, the
1891 New Orleans lynching signaled the beginning of long and difficult years of
contention between Rome and Washington. Although the New Orleans lynching
was not an isolated event, and had been preceded by other episodes of virulent
violence and ethnic hatred, by the 1890s U.S. and Italian relations had become
exasperating and explosive. The New Orleans lynching stretched the Italian bent
toward diplomatic caution and pragmatism to its very limits.
The events of New Orleans soon attracted attention on the international
scene and provoked indignation because eleven individuals, who had been tried
in a court of law and acquitted, had been forcibly taken from the prison and
lynched with the obvious connivance of the police. The episode of New Orleans
went beyond the usual public outrage; it opened the door to a serious crisis in
American-Italian relations and provoked nationalistic fervor in the Italian
Parliament, culminating in the recall of the Italian ambassador to Rome. It
seemed that the winds of war were blowing, and the diplomacy reached a
serious point of friction. Furthermore, following the episode of New Orleans, for
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the first time the Italian embassy in Washington, instructed by the Foreign
Ministry in Rome, attempted to put pressure on the U.S. Congress, demanding
punishment of those involved in the attack.
The Italian Foreign Minister, Antonio di Rudinì, suggested to Ambassador
Francesco Saverio Fava that he appeal to U.S. Secretary of State James Blaine
(1889-1892) and demand reparations, i.e., that the guilty parties be brought to
justice and the U.S. government pay an indemnity to the victims’ families. The
foreign minister was blunt in demanding that Fava request “immediate and
energetic steps” to protect the endangered Italian colony, to punish the guilty
severely, and to be persistent in obtaining more than a simple letter stating regret
for the unfortunate facts of New Orleans. 1
A distinguished diplomat, Baron Fava served as ambassador to
Washington for 20 years, from 1881 to 1901. He began his diplomatic career
under the Bourbons and then continued serving as ambassador under the Savoy
dynasty after the unification of Italy. Prior to serving as ambassador to the United
States, he had served in Brazil and Rumania. The greatest challenge of his entire
diplomatic career was the “New Orleans affair.” 2
Fava undertook the task with cautious determination. Following
instructions, he brought the affair to the attention of Secretary of State Blaine,
who telegraphed the Governor of Louisiana, Francis T. Nicholls. Blaine stated
that the treaty between the United States and Italy guaranteed to the subjects of
1
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the latter “the most constant protection and security for their persons and
property and that President Benjamin Harrison hoped the governor would
cooperate with him in maintaining the obligations of the United States toward the
Italian subjects in his state so that further violence might be prevented. 3
The Italian government claimed that the U.S. federal government failed to
comply with the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation mutually agreed upon on 26
February 1871. The treaty contained a reciprocity clause providing for mutual
protection of foreign-born citizens as well as equal treatment of foreign-born and
native-born individuals residing in different states of the Union. Based on the
treaty, then, foreign-born individuals were not entitled to any special treatment or
privilege compared to native-born individuals. Both foreign-born and native-born
were entitled to equal protection under the law. However, with the New Orleans
lynching of 1891, it became apparent that the individual states of the Union
enjoyed autonomy in various areas of government, including the judiciary. Such
autonomy was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and the federal government
could not undermine it. This factor implied a fundamental conflict between the
right of the single states to manage their own affairs and handle the judiciary
autonomously and the responsibility of the federal government to comply with
international treaties that guaranteed the right of foreign-born citizens to receive
mutual protection as provided by the reciprocity clause. 4
3

FRUS 1891, Correspondence in Relation to the Killing of Prisoners in New Orleans, Telegram, Blaine to
Governor Nicholls, March 15, 1891; Telegram Governor Nicholls to Blaine, March 16, 1891, FRUS, 52nd
Cong, 1st sess., 658.

4

ASDMAE, Trattati e Convenzioni fra il Regno d’Italia e i governi esteri, vol. IV (1 January 1870 to 1
January 1873), Rome, 1874, 144-155; United States-Italy, Treaty of Commerce and Navigation (February
26, 1871) in Malloy’s Treaties, 1:969.

166
Not only did the Italian government ask for official reassurance by the
United States that the guilty parties would be brought to trial, but also that it
would recognize the principle that an indemnity was due to the relatives of the
victims. However, the U.S. government refused to promise any reparations. An
intense correspondence went on between the two governments. Blaine stated
that whether or not there was a violation of the treaty was a question that
President Benjamin Harrison, with sufficient facts submitted to him, would take
into consideration. The position taken by the federal government was that if, after
proper investigation, a case was established for relief to be granted to the
families of the Italian subjects who had lost their lives by lawless violence, it
would be submitted for the consideration of Congress. 5
Relations between Rome and Washington continued to deteriorate
because of the federal government’s reluctance to reply to Rome’s demands.
Foreign Minister Rudinì, who at the time served also as Prime Minister, was
determined to hold a hard-line position. In fact, almost daily he had to endure
strong attacks from members of Parliament accusing him of weakness in dealing
with the United States concerning the New Orleans lynching. Furthermore, Italian
public opinion became more and more “impatient,” and rightly so. Rudinì was
also subjected to pressure and criticism from the Italian press. For example, the
newspaper La Riforma compared him with his predecessor, Francesco Crispi,
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claiming that the latter was a much stronger leader while serving both as Prime
and Foreign Ministers during his tenure. 6
Although he was always scrupulous in implementing the policies
suggested by Rudinì, Ambassador Fava tended to be more moderate and more
“diplomatic” than his direct superior. Fava favored a more moderate approach so
that the federal government would have time to deal with the embarrassing case
of New Orleans without having to face pressure from the Italian government as
well. Fava’s attitude, however, led Rudinì to deem the ambassador more
supportive of Blaine’s attitude than of Rome’s demands. Rudinì wrote in a
telegram to Fava, “I am sorry that you are now a defender of the U.S. federal
government.” 7 A whole controversy began unfolding and eventually, on 31
March 1891, the Italian ambassador was recalled and diplomatic relations with
the United States were broken off.
The American press discussed the contention between the Italian and
American governments in a nationalistic manner, not only arguing against the
attempts by a foreign government to interfere with the laws and institutions of the
United States, but also emphasizing cultural and language barriers between
representatives of both countries. The Herald of New York, for example,
emphasized the misunderstandings between Secretary of State Blaine and
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Ambassador Fava and also communications problems between Fava and
Rudinì. 8
A few days after the breaking of diplomatic relations, The Philadelphia
Inquirer published an anti-Italian cartoon. The cartoon ridiculed several prominent
Italian government officials such as Foreign Minister Rudinì, Ambassador Fava,
and even King Umberto I. In the cartoon, Rudinì was portrayed as an itinerant
musician, King Umberto I as a street vendor of peanuts, and Fava as a monkey
holding the plate for coin collection. Next to the mentioned cartoon, another one
showed King Umberto and Rudinì, clearly offended, sharpening their knives (a
reference to the Italian Mafia), implying that Italy was preparing for a conflict with
Uncle Sam. Furthermore, an article published in the same newspaper reported
that the king of Italy was offended because of a cartoon that ridiculed his majesty
and the dignity of Italy, and Italian blood was boiling hot.

9

Minister Rudinì had “the most painful impression” concerning the
deplorable status of relations between Italy and the United States, the
deterioration of relations between the two countries, and the cold, detached
attitude of Secretary of State Blaine concerning the “legitimate Italian demands of
bringing the guilty parties to justice.” 10 Rudinì was aware that Blaine was correct
in demanding that violation of existing treaties must be ascertained before the
federal government could consider the granting of indemnities to the victims’
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families. The foreign minister, however, did not even try to conceal his
disappointment. He wrote, “It is repugnant to us to even think that, in his mind,
the violation of treaties must be demonstrated. Italian citizens acquitted by an
American jury were kept in jail with a pretense and murdered by a lynching mob,
and no preemptive measures were undertaken to provide for their defense. What
other evidence did the federal government need to understand that a treaty
sanctioning mutual protection of citizens had been violated?”

11

According to

Rudinì, the Italian government had acted fairly. It was now up to the federal
government to unravel its own tangled relationship with the member states of the
Union. “It is time to end the unfortunate controversy,” the foreign minister
maintained. “Public opinion, always sovereign judge, will point out the rightful
solution to this problem. We have already asserted our rights and we will
continue to assert them. On the other hand, the federal government must
consider whether it might be convenient to depart from the single states of the
Union, which are not responsible in matters of foreign policy, so that the federal
government may honor foreign treaties.” 12
The diplomatic controversy surrounding the New Orleans lynching also
strained relations between Rudinì and the American Ambassador to Rome,
Albert G. Porter. The foreign minister and the ambassador held a meeting to
discuss the New Orleans affair, which turned out to be a heated exchange of
very diverse opinions concerning what needed to be done on the part of each
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government. As Rudinì wrote to the Italian embassy in Washington, “According
to Porter, Secretary of State Blaine deems that foreign-born residents in the
United States are not to be considered a privileged category.” 13 Furthermore,
Blaine believed that the treaties between the United States and Italy guaranteed
equal treatment of Italian and American citizens; therefore, Italian nationals
should not be treated any differently than American citizens. Rudinì, however,
maintained that such a statement was a mere abstraction and, in the case of
New Orleans, it implied that U.S. law allowed the murder of American citizens
while they were locked up in a state prison. 14
Porter told Rudinì that the American people were very disappointed in the
Italian government. American public opinion, he maintained, was “irritated” with
the tone of Italian diplomacy and all the pressure placed by the Italian
government on Washington without allowing enough time for discussion among
representatives of both countries. 15 Porter’s main argument was that American
laws did not allow the federal government to interfere in any way with the
government of the State of Louisiana. Italy therefore could not demand that the
federal government conduct any action contrary to the government’s own laws.
Rudinì, however, deemed it unacceptable that the federal government could
disassociate itself from any responsibility for actions by the governments of the
member states of the Union. Such lack of federal responsibility, according to
13
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Rudinì, was absurd. If that was the case, Rudinì maintained, the federal
government should not negotiate any foreign treaties.16
It was also true that Washington would consider any action by Rome
against the State of Louisiana as an act of hostility against the government of the
United States, not as an action against one single state. In his report to the Italian
embassy concerning his encounter with Porter, Rudinì emphasized just that.
Porter had told him that the federal government would consider an act of hostility
against Louisiana as a declaration of war against the United States. While
admitting to some flaws in American institutions, Porter argued that tradition and
customs in the United States did not allow changes unless such flaws were
officially proved. Although Porter had repeatedly stated that American public
opinion was “irritated” with pressure by the Italian government, Rudinì wrote in
his report to the embassy that the Italian government had pursued a moderate
and conciliatory approach. In fact, Italian authorities had agreed to recall Consul
Corte from New Orleans. Considered to be overzealous and “persona non grata,”
Corte was “sacrificed” to show that the government of Italy favored conciliation
rather than confrontation. Rudinì wrote, “Our conciliatory spirit was such that
Consul Corte was recalled from New Orleans to explain his own behavior and to
clarify any doubts that he might not have been conciliatory enough in dealing with
the New Orleans crisis.” 17
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It fell upon Marquis Guglielmo Imperiali, chargé d’affairs at the Italian
embassy in Washington after Fava had been recalled, to reply to Rudinì’s report
concerning his meeting with Ambassador Porter in Rome. Imperiali disagreed
with some of Porter’s statements referring to the American public’s reactions to
the facts of New Orleans. According to Imperiali, Porter’s statements might mirror
the desires of American leaders, but were not realistic. Imperiali maintained that
American public opinion had accepted the facts of the New Orleans lynching
without being horrified by the way the massacre had occurred. According to
Imperiali, American public opinion tended to agree that the individuals massacred
at New Orleans on 14 March 1891 were a gang of thieves and assassins,
members of the Mafia, who had been terrorizing the city of New Orleans and
obstructing the course of justice; consequently, although protesting the means,
the majority approved the results, either publicly or deep down in their hearts. 18
Furthermore Imperiali described the actions of the federal government as
a “vast and permanent electoral agency” in that each decision always seemed to
be dictated by the number of votes that might be lost or gained at the next
election. Imperiali also emphasized that the American press had not reacted to
coverage of the facts of New Orleans by the foreign press. Imperiali wrote, “For
the majority of the American people the rest of the world does not even exist nor
is the U.S. government concerned about what happens on the other side of the
Atlantic.” 19
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Imperiali was a realist. He suggested that the Italian government should
attempt to obtain an indemnity for the victims’ families. However, he had
misgivings concerning any attempts by the federal government to intervene and
bring the guilty parties to justice. In fact, the U.S. Constitution did not allow the
federal government much room to maneuver and interfere with state
governments. To hope for any departure from tradition, according to Imperiali,
was not very realistic and, even if the President of the United States
recommended it, such a departure would provoke a very strong wave of
nationalism. Americanism would prevail and would turn against the executive
branch, which would be accused of listening to foreigners who had dared to
criticize the Constitution. 20
The line of division between the federal and state governments had
always been a fine one. Traditionally, the Republican Party favored a strong
federal government and curtailment of the autonomy of states’ powers. However,
according to Imperiali, it was unthinkable that the House of Representatives,
which in the next Congress would probably gain a Democratic majority, would
approve a measure that would be contrary to the fundamental principles of the
Democratic Party. Furthermore, the measure would take aim at the State of
Louisiana, which was Democratic, and New Orleans, its “citadel.”
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Washington and the subsequent recalling of Ambassador Porter to the United
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States, Imperiali emphasized the differences in strength and power between the
two countries. Although Italy was the offended party, considering its weaknesses,
Italy should be the one to take the first steps toward reconciliation. Since Italian
interests in the United States were much bigger than American interests in the
kingdom of Italy, Imperiali suggested that the Italian government should take the
initiative to restore diplomatic relations. 22 The American public always tended to
be nationalistic, as did the American press. For example, according to Imperiali,
the recalling of Ambassador Fava had been interpreted as a sign of arrogance
and as a menacing provocation. 23
Imperiali also reported what Secretary of State Blaine told Ambassador
Fava before he was recalled to Rome: “I do not acknowledge to anyone the right
to give orders to the American people.” 24 According to Imperiali, Blaine had told
Fava before his departure, ”I am not concerned about foreign opinion of the U.S.
institutions; I cannot change the U.S. Constitution nor can I violate it.” Such
words,” he wrote, “definitely expressed the way of thinking of the majority of the
American people concerning the U.S. Constitution.” 25 According to Imperiali,
Blaine was well aware that Fava was likely to repeat his own words verbatim,
which would be welcomed with great favor by an American public, which was
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affected with Americanism, thus showing how well the federal government
defended the rights and the dignity of the American people. 26
Like Ambassador Fava before him, chargé d’affairs Imperiali always tried
to moderate the bellicose Rudinì, explaining to him that Italy could not and should
not go to war with the United States. Therefore, the whole issue of restoration of
diplomatic relations should be presented in such a way that the federal
government could not do anything but accept it. Basically, Imperiali suggested
finding a way to end the diplomatic controversy that would be honorable for Italy.
Rudinì agreed but wanted to wait until Secretary of State Blaine showed a
willingness to reopen negotiations concerning the reparations issue. 27 Rudinì
hoped that the U.S. Congress might engage in a discussion concerning New
Orleans and that it might consider the granting of indemnities, thus ending the
whole diplomatic controversy. 28
Does the federal government have the power of jurisdiction in a case of
mob violence perpetrated against aliens? The question was presented directly to
the State Department in the case of New Orleans, and, at that time, a negative
answer was given. At the request of the Italian government that the federal
government conduct an investigation and institute criminal proceedings, the
matter was submitted to the Department of Justice for an opinion. The reply was

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid. From Italian Embassy at Washington to MAE, 25 August 1891

.
28

Ibid. From MAE to the Italian Embassy at Washington, 25 September 1891.

176
that in absence of federal legislation, the federal government had no power of
jurisdiction over such a case. 29
Were the Italians lynched in New Orleans entitled to protection by virtue of
the treaty made between the United States and Italy? According to Article III of
the treaty, the citizens of both contracting parties must receive the most constant
protection and security of their persons and property and enjoy the same rights
and privileges granted to natives. Hence, the Italian subjects had the right to
expect that the local authorities would protect them from acts of violence by a
mob and would keep them safe while they were held in custody. New Orleans,
however, showed that local or state authorities had been unable or unwilling to
give sufficient protection to the Italians while in custody. An examination of the
diplomatic correspondence shows that the demands of the Italian government
were two-fold: that the federal government bring the guilty parties to justice, and
that the federal government pay an indemnity to the heirs of the victims. The
Italian government was very insistent in its demands for reparation and, because
of failure to obtain a prompt compliance to this request, it withdrew its
ambassador, Baron Fava. Once an indemnity was paid and accepted by the
Italian government, diplomatic relations were resumed. Still the question of
responsibility remained unresolved. In view of the treaty provisions as well as the
rules of international law, the federal government was responsible for crimes
against foreigners and could not shift responsibility for those crimes to state
authorities so that punishment for acts of violence by a mob rested with a state.
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The federal government had no authority to punish the individuals who had
committed the crime. The absence of such a power was due to the failure of
Congress to enact appropriate legislation rather than from lack of a constitutional
provision. 30
The lynching at New Orleans and the demands of the Italian diplomatic
representatives prompted a movement in Congress to enact federal legislation
on mob violence. Undoubtedly President Benjamin Harrison contributed to
ending the controversy. In his annual message of December 9, 1891, the
President mentioned the New Orleans case. Harrison stated that the lynching of
Italian subjects by a mob of citizens in New Orleans was a deplorable incident,
but it did not originate in any general animosity toward the Italian people or in any
disrespect for the government of Italy. The fury of the mob was directed against
men who were supposed participants in the murder of a city official. The
President maintained that some proposals growing out of this incident were
worthy of Congress’s attention. He said that it would be appropriate for Congress
to make offenses against treaty rights cognizable in the federal courts, but this
action had not been taken and thus, federal officers and courts had no power to
intervene. In cases of international law, officers of a state charged with police and
judicial powers should be regarded as federal agents so as to make the
government responsible for their acts in those cases where the federal
government would have used its constitutional powers to define and punish
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crimes against treaty rights. 31 President Harrison’s proposal stemmed from
acknowledgement of failure by Congress to act and not from a want of inherent
power in the national government. 32
Following the President’s recommendation, Senator John Sherman
introduced a resolution instructing the Committee on Foreign Relations to draft a
bill to protect the treaty rights of aliens. Such a bill was introduced in the Senate
on March 1, 1892. The bill provided that “any act committed in any state or
territory in the United States and such foreign country and constituting a crime
under the laws of the state or territory shall constitute a like crime against the
United States and be cognizable in the federal courts.” 33 Basically, the bill
provided that where acts that were crimes under the laws of the states were
committed against aliens in violation of their treaty rights, the offenders should be
prosecuted in the federal courts, but that the statutes of the state should define
the crime, prescribe the punishment, and regulate the rules of evidence and
procedures. 34
Opponents of the bill, such as Senator George Gray of Delaware,
contended that, although the bill drew its authority from the treaty-making power,
treaties are subject to the same constitutional limitations as are laws and may not
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trespass into the field reserved to the states. In adopting state laws, there would
be an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power of the federal
government to the states. There would be different punishments for the same
crime in each of the forty-four states, based on the variations in state laws, which
seemed inequitable. Removal of cases to the federal courts would give aliens an
advantage over citizens. Opponents also objected to the bill’s contributing to a
considerable growth of federal jurisdiction over the large number of aliens
compared to state jurisdiction over citizens. Citizens would be subjected to
double standards for the same crime. Furthermore, the Constitution did not
contain any specific grants of such power to Congress. 35
Defenders of the bill, such as Senator John Morgan of Alabama and
Senator Frank Hiscock of New York, defended it on numerous grounds. First,
Congress has constitutional powers to pass laws to enforce treaties. Second, the
Constitution granted the federal government jurisdiction over cases involving
aliens. In addition, it had been a long established practice for Congress to adopt
state laws, even though they varied in specific contents; the subjecting of
persons to trial by both state and federal sovereignties for the same act could not
be considered double jeopardy. This bill was limited to those aliens claiming a
right under a treaty. The bringing of these prosecutions in federal courts was not
essentially different from the right of federal officers to remove suits brought
against them from the state to the federal courts. 36
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Several months passed, interest in the bill died down, and it never came to
a vote, even though President Benjamin Harrison, in his annual message to
Congress the following year, reiterated his view that federal anti-lynching law was
a much-needed remedy in order to bring under federal jurisdiction punishment of
parties guilty of offenses against treaty rights. 37
Congress did approve, however, a proposal to grant substantial
indemnities to the victims’ families even though the federal government quickly
denied any direct responsibility for the unfortunate incident. In a note dated April
12, 1892, Secretary of State Blaine informed Marquis Imperiali that the President
had instructed the Secretary to tender the amount of $24,330.90 to be equally
distributed to the families of the victims. Blaine stated that, while the injury was
not inflicted directly by the U.S. government and without reference to the
question of liability, it was the “solemn duty” as well as the “great pleasure” of the
federal government to pay a satisfactory indemnity. Blaine also expressed the
hope that all memory of the unhappy tragedy might be effaced. 38 Marquis
Imperiali accepted the indemnity; he stated that he did so “without prejudice to
the judicial steps which it may be proper for the parties to take” and that, by the
instructions of his government, diplomatic relations between Italy and the United
States were fully reestablished. 39
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Legal suits were brought by relatives of the individuals killed in the New
Orleans lynching to recover damages, but the court decided that the killing of a
human being by a mob allowed to congregate by the negligence of municipal
officers does not render the municipal corporation liable for damages in the
absence of a statute. The treaty between the United States and Italy then in force
guaranteed to the citizens of either nation in the territory “the most constant
protection and security for their persons and property.” The treaty also
guaranteed that “they [Italians] shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and
privileges as are or shall be granted to the natives on their submitting themselves
to the conditions imposed upon the natives.”

40

The court decided that this treaty

was applicable so far as it required that the rights of an Italian mother suing for
the death of her son should be determined as if she were a native citizen of the
United States. 41
It must be observed that in a note of April 14, 1892, to Imperiali, Secretary
of State Blaine clarified that indemnities had not been granted to the victims’
families by virtue of the treaty in force between the two countries. Private
individuals coming voluntarily to reside in the U.S. were protected by the same
laws as native-born citizens of the United States. Those individuals had, in fact,
the same advantages as citizens of the state in which they happened to reside. 42
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Throughout the diplomatic controversy engendered by the New Orleans
lynching, the U.S. government adopted a firm attitude concerning its
responsibility for prompt punishment of the guilty parties and reparations for
those Italian citizens not yet naturalized in America. The controversy was never
about the guilt or presumed guilt of the New Orleans Italian Mafia. It focused on
the failure of the United States either to provide adequate protection for Italian
subjects in its custody or to admit to this inadequacy. The U.S. government was
unable to offset the resistance of the Louisiana authorities, yet all government
officials--including President Harrison and Secretary of State Blaine--refused to
accept any national responsibility for the failures of law and order in Louisiana. 43
Because of its magnitude, the New Orleans affair created an important
precedent, leading to similar diplomatic controversies and similar reparations for
later lynchings. Its most important outcome, however, was the beginning of a
movement in Congress to pass a federal anti-lynching law to protect aliens from
mob violence.
Subsequently, the lynching of Italian subjects in Walsenburg, Colorado, in
1895 ended with the granting of indemnities to the victims’ families. On that
occasion, too, by an act of Congress of June 30, 1896, “out of humane
considerations and without reference to the question of liability therefor,”
Congress made an appropriation to the Italian government of $10,000 for
indemnity to the heirs of three subjects killed by a mob and two others seriously
injured in the State of Colorado. In this case the Italian consul at Denver,
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Giuseppe Cuneo, reported that, soon after the event, the local authorities had
tried to cooperate with his efforts to secure the prosecution of the offenders.
However, there had been delays in and difficulties with the proceedings because
the courts were not convened frequently in those remote and sparsely populated
areas. Ultimately, according to the consul, local authorities did not make any
effort to stop the mob from attacking the Italian prisoners while en route to the
jail, nor did the authorities try to prevent the mob from breaking into the jail.
Hence, they must be held responsible for the actual lynching. 44
Secretary of State Richard Olney (1895-1897) suggested to Ambassador
Fava that he submit a claim requesting an indemnity for the victims’ families,
leaving it up to the President’s benevolence to decide on the amount. Olney then
transmitted Fava’s request to President Glover Cleveland and stated that the
facts were without dispute and that no comment or argument could add to the
force of their appeal for the generous consideration of Congress. The only
question, according to Olney, would be the amount of the gratuity, which must
rest wholly in the discretion of Congress, “to whom it can hardly be necessary to
cite the statutes of many states of the Union fixing the maximum to be enacted in
the case of death caused by negligence at the sum of $5,000.” 45
President Cleveland, in a message to Congress on February 3, 1896,
urged a reasonable pecuniary provision for the families of those who had been
killed “without discussing the question of the liability of the United States for
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these results, either by reason of treaty obligations or under the general rules of
international law.”

46

Secretary of State Olney dealt also with the lynching of three Italians at
Hahnville, Lousiana: Lorenzo Salardino, Salvatore Arena, and Giuseppe
Venturella, who were held on a charge of homicide and were lynched in jail while
they were still in custody of the local authorities. In his correspondence with
Baron Fava, Olney stated that the lawless act was directed against the victims as
criminals. The act was not due to racial prejudice, for three other Italians who
were also kept in that jail were not harmed. 47
In denying any responsibility by the federal government for the murders,
Olney maintained that the three lynched men, by having taken part in political
affairs and having voted in elections, must be considered as having renounced
their legal status as subjects of the king of Italy. Salardino, Venturella, and Arena
had lived in Louisiana for several years and had voted in elections. The crime of
which they were accused was atrocious, and the attack on the jail was
unexpected, but its success could not be attributed to any negligence or
connivance on the part of the authorities. There was no reason to believe that the
outcome would have been different had the three individuals been born on U.S.
soil. According to Olney, they were not Italians temporarily residing in the United
States, and although a declaration of intention had been found for only one of
them, there were no doubts, Olney claimed, that the others had done likewise.
Otherwise, they would not have voted at elections. By qualifying and acting as
46
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voters, in accordance with the laws of the State of Louisiana, they had become
citizens of that state, eligible even to hold office. Hence, under these
circumstances, the U.S. government reserved its decisions as to whether the
Italian government had “any right or duty of reclamation.”

48

Furthermore, Secretary of State Olney declared that, in securing an
indemnity for injuries inflicted upon a citizen, the government that submits the
claim is the citizen’s agent. Olney contended that any legal defense that is good
against the citizen himself is equally good against his representative. In Olney’s
view, any individual who had participated in electing officers and making laws
must refrain from complaining about that government to another. “Although he
may not approve of a particular act of that body, he contributes to the power
which enables it to do any or all acts,” he maintained. 49
According to Olney, “the soundness of the position that an international
reclamation will not lie against a government when the beneficiary of the claim by
taking part in the organization and administration of that government has in effect
given his assent to its proceedings, seems to be supported by every
consideration of justice and equity.” 50 The wrongs done at Hahnville were to
persons who had abandoned Italian soil and had ceased to be part of the
Kingdom of Italy in that they had added nothing to its productive capacity or to its
military strength. Hence, the prestige and power of the Italian government could
48
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not be used on behalf of persons “whose fate and fortunes were at the time of
the infliction of the wrongs complained of no real concern in that government.” 51
In response, Baron Fava contended that the question at stake was the
application of the fundamental principle of law and justice: that the persons
accused were to be deemed innocent until found guilty by judicial process, and
that the apparent criminality of the persons murdered was unimportant. He
maintained that the evidence showed negligence on the part of the authorities in
protecting the prisoners and in prosecuting the lynchers. Also such proceedings
and failure to protect individuals while being held in custody could only
encourage similar outrages in the future. Fava pointed out that naturalization
could be granted only by federal law and that a mere declaration of intention did
not confer citizenship. 52 No matter what the laws of the State of Louisiana might
be and although the lynched individuals might have voted in state elections, they
were not citizens of the United States because they had not complied with the
provisions required by federal laws concerning the process of naturalization.
Fava stated that, since the Italians had not complied with the requirements of the
provisions on the subject of naturalization contained in the revised Statutes, they
were still Italian subjects. 53
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Baron Fava argued that the solution to the question could be found in the
treaty in force between the United States and Italy. He again presented the
request “that the guilty parties be sought and brought to justice; that steps must
be taken to prevent the repetition of such atrocious crimes, and that just and
adequate compensation must be made to the families of the victims.” 54
As for Secretary of State Olney’s contention that the Italian government
could not consider as its subjects those Italians who voted in the states of the
Union, Fava observed that the solution to this problem belonged solely to the
Italian legislators and to Italian law. “As a matter of fact, I can add that the
Federal government has always considered and still considers as citizens of the
United States, the numerous Americans who in Hawaii take a prominent part in
the political affairs, and vote openly at the elections of those islands.” 55
Olney, in his report to President William McKinley on December 7, 1896,
stated that evidence gathered through an investigation showed that the three
men lynched in Hahnville, Louisiana, had participated in the political affairs of this
country and that their case was different from the previous episodes of New
Orleans and Walsenburg for which indemnity was tendered to the relatives of the
victims as loyal subjects to Italy. 56 Olney said that, upon the assumption that the
unfortunate men were, as in the case of some of the victims of the previous
lynchings, Italian subjects, the government of Italy sought the mediation of the
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United States with the Louisiana state authorities to investigate the occurrence
and make provisions for the victims’ families. The State of Louisiana promptly
instituted an inquiry. Moreover, the Senate had appointed a trusted agent to
conduct an independent investigation. Based on its results, it appeared that local
authorities had taken all normal precautions for the safety of the prisoners and
that they could not be blamed for the outbreak of mob violence against the three
men accused of having murdered two esteemed citizens in the neighborhood. 57
Olney added that whether any obligation rested upon the federal
government under the circumstances--a matter that still remained to be
ascertained--the existence or absence of such an obligation could not diminish
the feelings of abhorrence with which all good citizens must view such brutal
acts. 58 The Hahnville controversy ended when Congress decided on an
appropriation of $6,000 that was made “out of humane consideration and without
liability thereof, to the Italian Government, as full indemnity to the heirs of three of
its subjects who were taken from jail and lynched in Louisiana in 1896.” 59
Likewise in the case of the lynching of five Italians at Tallulah, Louisiana
(July 21, 1899), the main focus of the contention between Washington and the
Italian representatives was whether the lynched individuals were Italian subjects
or naturalized Americans. Count Vinci, chargé d’affairs in Washington, wrote to
Secretary of State John Hay (1899-1901) about the event and demanded
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protection for any Italian subjects that might be in danger in Tallulah. Secretary
of State Hay telegraphed the Louisiana Governor, Murphy J. Foster, inquiring
whether the persons lynched were “Italian subjects or naturalized Americans.” 60
On August 9, 1899, Alvey Adee, Acting Secretary of State, sent a reply to
Count Vinci, stating that, based on evidence provided by Governor Murphy, the
lynched individuals had been naturalized. Adee included copies of naturalization
certificates from judicial records of the district court of Louisiana and the parish of
Madison.

61

However, the embassy made the point that, as the certificates of

naturalization did not expressly state that the persons mentioned in them had
previously made a declaration of intention, they must be considered only as first
papers or, if intended as final papers, must be considered as irregular and void. 62
The State Department, however, maintained that no recital of the declaration of
intention was necessary and that the papers were not defective in form as
certificates of naturalization. 63
On September 20, 1899, the Department of State advised the Italian
embassy that the grand jury had been unable to find an indictment on the facts
before it, and that the matter would be submitted anew to the grand jury at the
next term of court. As the report of the sheriff differed from the accounts
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previously received, it was stated that a special agent would be sent to make the
necessary investigations. 64
As these episodes of violence had continued in the 1890s-- the lynchings
of Italians in Walsenburg (1895), Hahnville (1896), and Tallulah (1899) -President William McKinley brought to Congress’s attention the need for federal
legislation concerning mob violence and the failure by the states to prevent it. In
his annual message on December 5, 1899, he pointed out that, in spite of efforts
by the federal government, the repeated inquests by the Louisiana grand jurors
had failed to return indictments against the authors of the violence. President
McKinley said, ”I renew the urgent recommendation that I made last year that the
Congress appropriately confer upon the federal courts’ jurisdiction in this class of
international cases where the ultimate responsibility of the federal government
may be involved. I invite action upon the bills to accomplish this which were
introduced in the Senate and the House. It is incumbent upon us to remedy the
statutory omission which had led and may again lead to such untoward result. I
have pointed out the necessity and precedent for legislation of this character. Its
enactment is a simple measure of provisory justice toward the nations with which
we as a sovereign make equal treaties requiring reciprocal observance.” 65 It is
interesting to note that President McKinley’s statement indicates that with respect
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to the mob violence at Tallulah, Louisiana, there had been a denial of justice that
could well be complained of by the Italian government. 66
The subsequent investigation by the agent of the Department of Justice
into the Tallulah lynchings revealed that, in reality, two of the lynched individuals
had not been naturalized. Hence by the act of March 3, 1901, Congress
appropriated the sum of $4,000 to be paid “out of humane considerations,
without reference to the liability thereof, to the Italian Government as full
indemnity to the heirs of Joseph (Giuseppe) Difatta and John (Giovanni) Cirano,
Italian citizens lynched at Tallulah, on July 20, 1899.” 67
When two Italian nationals were lynched at Erwin, Mississippi on July 10,
1901, the Italian ambassador in Washington, Francesco Carignani, submitted a
similar claim to the one made to the State Department in 1891 by Ambassador
Fava. The lynching in Erwin had been committed under the cover of darkness,
and neither the coroner’s inquest nor the investigation by the grand jury was able
to discover the identity of the guilty parties. Once more the Italian government
declared the lynching in Erwin, Mississippi and the failure of the local authorities
to prosecute and punish the perpetrators to be a “denial of justice, a flagrant
violation of contractual conventions, and a grave offense to every human and
civil sentiment.”

68

66

Watson, “Need of Federal Legislation,” 577.

67

FRUS, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1900, 715-731.

68

FRUS, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1901, 283, 285, 287, 289, 292, 293, 297-299.

192
In his correspondence with Secretary of State John Hay, Carignani
protested against the failure to bring the guilty parties to justice. The Italian
ambassador described the U.S. failure to confer jurisdiction in such cases on the
federal courts in order to make the federal government directly responsible (as
recommended by President McKinley) as “a denial of justice, a flagrant violation
of contractual conventions, and a grave offense to every human and civil
sentiment.”

69

Until such power was conferred, the Italian government would

have reason to complain of violation of the treaties and would not cease to
denounce “the systematic impunity enjoyed by crime and to hold the federal
government responsible thereof.” 70
The Department of State transmitted Carignani’s protest to the
Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives, which had under
consideration the recommendation of the President that an indemnity should be
tendered to the families of the victims and that legislation should be enacted
conferring upon the federal courts original jurisdiction of offenses against aliens.
The sum of $5,000 was appropriated by Congress, using the usual formula, “out
of humane consideration, without reference to the question of liability thereof to
the Italian Government.” 71
In the Italian Parliament a heated debate occurred, with several deputies
accusing the government of weakness and blaming it for accepting the “blood
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price.” Deputies complained that, as in earlier cases, once more there was no
attempt by the federal government to intervene and bring the assassins to
justice. Such an attitude could only encourage Americans to continue with
lynchings of foreign-born individuals as they could be sure to go unpunished. 72
After Erwin, Ambassador Francesco Carignani proposed to Foreign Minister Luigi
Prinetti not only to submit a formal protest to the federal government, but also to
threaten that the treaty of 26 February 1871 would be considered null and void. 73
However, there was no follow-up to Carignani’s proposal. Instead, a more
realistic attitude prevailed, leading to moderation, acceptance of an indemnity,
and continuous effort to maintain good relations between Washington and Rome.
In spite of such efforts on the part of officials of both countries to maintain
good relations, the question of the relationship between federal and state
governments, the lack of federal jurisdiction in cases of mob violence against
aliens, and the difficulties in conducting investigations after an episode of
violence often caused embarrassment for both countries’ representatives. Italian
consuls indicated refusal to testify as the main factor in obstructing any attempt
to bring the guilty parties to justice in cases of mob violence. For example,
according to Consul Carlo Papini of New Orleans, “In general Italians are willing
to testify in front of the Italian representatives. However, because of shyness,
inconsistency, or external pressure, they completely alter their testimony or they
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even deny it when testifying in front of the grand jury or in a court of law.” 74 Nor
were there any other means to obtain testimonies from Italians in the area, such
as hiring a private detective or a secret agent. After the lynching at Erwin,
Mississippi, in 1901, the embassy reported that “private agencies or secret police
investigators refused to accept employment to conduct an inquiry. In fact, in the
South a lynching is not considered a crime, and so investigators run the risk of
being lynched themselves.” 75
In only a few cases of mob violence in the United States where the person
lynched was an alien were the state authorities able to secure indictments. In the
words of President McKinley, “Local justice is too often helpless to punish the
offenders.” 76 Had the federal government had power by virtue of a federal law to
assume control in cases such as New Orleans, Walsenburg, Hahnville, Tallulah,
Erwin, or Tampa, it could be assumed that convictions of the guilty parties might
have been obtained. The court would have been free from any compulsion by
friends in the community. An investigation could be conducted without fear of
retaliation, a trial would be conducted in an orderly manner, witnesses would be
properly protected, and the guilty or offending parties would be dealt with
severely. In particular, the New Orleans case showed that a local grand jury was
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unable to bring an indictment. 77 If a federal court had had jurisdiction in that
case, a federal grand jury would have conducted an investigation. The United
States district attorney would have done his utmost to investigate and to bring the
guilty parties to justice. The federal district attorney, like the judge of the court,
would have been appointed by the President of the United States; therefore, his
continuation in office would not have depended on the vote of the local
community at an incoming election. He would have been free to perform his
duties according to the Constitution and the laws of the United States. 78
For over a decade, Congress’s interest in the lynching problem focused
mainly on the issue of protection of aliens in their treaty rights. For this purpose,
bills were introduced in the Senate in 1893 and 1899 and in the House in 1900,
1902, 1903, 1905, and 1907. 79 In spite of frequent presidential
recommendations, however, no action was taken until 1908.
On May 26, 1902, Senator Jacob Gallinger of New Hampshire (18911918) had introduced a resolution in regard to lynchings that directed the
Judiciary Committee to investigate the subject of lynching and report whether
there was any remedy for the evil. Gallinger said that lynchings had taken place
in the North as well as in the South. He read a list of lynchings tabulated by
states that showed only a few had taken place in northern states, while some
southern states had long records in a single year. He also called attention to the
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fact that no lynchings had taken place in New England. In fact, the table that he
submitted excluded the entire East and nearly all the West. 80
Gallinger proposed that the Judiciary Committee should take the matter
into consideration with a view to giving the country information on the numerous
lynchings that had occurred. He said, “If we are powerless to do anything except
under the operation of State laws, it is desirable that this fact should be made
known to the public. I have been receiving letters on the subject ever since I
entered the Senate, and it will be a relief to me personally, as I doubt not it will be
to all Senators, to be able to answer these questions.” 81 Gallinger also said that
the lynchings had increased in brutality as well as in number. A newspaper
clipping of an account of a recent lynching and burning of a black man in Texas
was sent to the desk to be read. Senator Gallinger stated that history did not
furnish “a more fiendish instance of mob wrath and that Fox’s Book of Martyrs
was tame in comparison.”

82

Senator Gallinger wanted a resolution to be

considered at once, but Senator Baley of Texas promptly reacted against it,
saying that he was not going to be drawn into a sectional controversy. Although
Gallinger denied any intention to provoke any such controversy, Bailey’s
objection prevented the consideration of the resolution that Gallinger had
proposed. 83 Senator Gallinger’s resolution of 1902 for an investigation of
lynching met the usual fate: it was laid on the table.
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In 1908, the House passed a bill recommended by the Department of
State. It differed from the earlier bill in that it provided that “if two or more persons
conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any alien in his free exercise of
any right secured to him under any treaty of the United States, or because of his
having so exercised the same, they shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.” 84 The bill passed only by the
deciding vote of the Speaker, even though less doubt of its constitutionality was
expressed compared to the earlier bill of 1892. In the Senate, it was referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary, and there it died. 85 The proponents of the bill
introduced similar measures in 1909, 1915, 1917, 1919, and 1920, but no action
was taken.
Finally, the bill introduced by Representative Leonidas C. Dyer of Missouri
in 1918 proposed to protect citizens of the United States against lynching in
default of protection by the states; it also included a clause for the protection of
aliens, adopting the form suggested in 1892. 86 Ever since the Dyer bill, the
protection of aliens has been combined with general anti-lynching proposals. 87
In its final form, the bill defined a mob as an assemblage of three or more
persons acting in concert for the purpose of depriving any person of his life or
doing him injury without authority of law, as a punishment for or to prevent some
actual or supposed public offense. It declared that any state that failed,
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neglected, or refused to provide protection for any person within its jurisdiction
against such a mob should be deemed to have denied to such a person the
equal protection of the law. The bill further provided that any state or municipal
officer who had the authority to protect such person and who failed, neglected, or
refused to protect him or apprehend and prosecute those participating in such a
mob should be guilty of a felony and so punished. Finally, the bill provided that
those who had participated in lynchings might be tried in the federal district court
according to the laws of the state; it made the county in which the person was
lynched or in which he was seized liable to forfeit $10,000 to be recovered by the
United States through its courts for the use of the family or of the victim of mob
action. The bill incorporated the provision regarding the treaty rights of aliens. 88
Opposition to the Dyer bill was very strong, based on the grounds that it
was unconstitutional. Opponents of the bill declared that it was an
unconstitutional invasion of the reserved powers of the states guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Others, though, pointed out that, in a long line of cases
involving the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court had held it to apply as
a prohibition on state action, not on the action of individuals. Furthermore, when
sheriffs acting as individuals failed to afford protection to prisoners, they violated
duties imposed by state laws and so could not be considered agents of the state.
Therefore, even though lynchings involved denying equal protection to the
victims it was not the state that had acted. The states’ failure to punish any crime
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would amount to a denial of equal protection of the law, which was not the sense
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 89
Those in favor of the bill emphasized the necessity of federal legislation to
punish the crime of lynching and pointed out how rarely any effective action was
taken to punish lynchers. They stressed the urgency of such need and the
necessity for the national government to make its resources available in order to
prevent and punish mob violence. Emphasizing the barbarity of lynchings, their
injustice, and the degradation of those who participate in such acts of violence,
the proponents of the bill asked for its passage on humanitarian grounds and as
a protection against mob rule and anarchy. 90
On constitutional grounds, however, the supporters of the bill had more
difficulty. They cited some of the same cases interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment to point out that a state may deny equal protection of the law by
administrative and judicial acts as well as by legislation and that, when a state
did so, the federal government may pass corrective legislation. They also
claimed that the failure of a state to protect persons within its jurisdiction may be
considered equal to a denial of protection. Furthermore, the failure of a sheriff to
protect persons from mob violence, a violation of his statutory duties, was still to
be considered the act of the state. Also the penalty on the county was a fine and
not a tax, and so it was not forbidden by the rule regarding taxation of
government instrumentalities. Since the United States may sue a state, it may
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sue a subdivision of a state and enforce upon it the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.

91

In 1922, after intense debate, the Dyer bill passed the House of
Representatives by a vote of 231 to 119 opposed. Most of the opponents of the
bill were Southern Democrats. Then the bill was withdrawn from consideration by
the Senate, and it died. Since the failure of the Dyer bill, there have been other
attempts to pass anti-lynching federal laws in Congress, but none have been
successful. Measures introduced in the 1920s and in 1933 were referred to the
Judiciary Committee in the House of Representatives and a measure introduced
in the Senate in 1925 had a similar fate. 92
Undoubtedly constitutional issues, states’ rights, and sectional prejudices
were serious obstacles to the enactment of a federal anti-lynching law. Indeed,
states’ rights was the main obstacle to passage of a federal anti-lynching law in
cases of mob violence against native-born citizens. The matter became more
complicated in cases of mob violence against aliens in that failure to protect
aliens on U.S. soil may be considered a breach of treaties negotiated with foreign
countries. The main objection raised to the enactment of federal law providing for
the punishment of crimes against aliens in violation of the guarantees of treaties
was that it granted to an alien a better right than it granted to a citizen of the
United States. Such an objection was based upon the theory that when an alien
received the protection of a state law, the same as a citizen, then the guarantee
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of the treaty is fulfilled and there is no breach on the part of the federal
government in respect to any rule of international law. This concept, however, is
based on a false standard. In fact, it may very well be that the state law and the
local tribunals enforcing the law may be adequate to protect a citizen fully and to
ensure justice and yet be inadequate to protect and render justice in case of an
alien. 93
All the cases of lynchings of Italians in the United States that have been
included in this study illustrate this concept. In each episode--and especially in
the case of New Orleans in 1891--race feelings made it very difficult for the local
authorities to be free from prejudice and accord the same degree of justice that
was usually accorded to U.S. citizens. When authorities did not render to aliens
the same degree of justice that was usually accorded to citizens, then it could be
maintained that those who have been denied justice may demand an indemnity
as compensation for the government’s failure to meet international obligations to
provide mutual protection. 94
The whole question, then, was not simply one of the rights of citizens vs.
aliens. When there was a failure to secure the same protection to the alien and
the citizen, the question became one of international law on account of the failure
of the government to fulfill a treaty obligation that guaranteed to an alien the
same right of protection and the same degree of justice provided for a citizen. In
cases of failure to provide such protection, the government could not shield itself
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from responsibility by claiming that the alien was awarded the same benefit of the
local or state laws and also the right to trial in the same courts as a citizen. The
government cannot do so because the standard of justice cannot be determined
by one of the states of the Union. Rather, in legal theory, the standard is set by
the family of nations. If any country’s system of law does not conform to that
standard, no other country can be compelled to accept it as a satisfactory
measure of treatment of its citizens. 95
In cases of mob violence against aliens the federal government at first
took the position that there was no liability on its part; that protection to aliens
residing within the states must be under the jurisdiction of local authorities; and
that in paying indemnities for acts of mob violence, payment was made as an act
of charity while liability was denied. This attitude placed the United States in an
embarrassing position with Italian representatives who claimed that treaties
mutually agreed upon were not respected and Italian nationals who worked and
resided in the United States, in cases of mob violence, were not accorded the
same protection and the same justice as native-born Americans. In 1891,
however, the federal government changed its attitude. Since the New Orleans
incident, the federal government no longer denied liability and, in cases where an
indemnity was paid, such payment was made “without respect to the question of
liability.” This change of attitude could be interpreted as a realization that the
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federal government could no longer deny responsibility on account of a failure to
enact legislation that would enable it to fulfill its treaty obligations. 96
To a certain extent, the U.S. Constitution affords an alien a different
degree of protection or the benefit of a different law than is accorded a citizen. In
certain civil cases, the alien may resort to federal courts while the citizen is not
granted that same privilege. 97 If that right is accorded in civil cases, it would
seem logical to accord that same right in a criminal case and thereby to give the
federal government the power to carry out its obligations. Proposals submitted to
the U.S. Congress from 1892 to 1922 for a federal anti-lynching law, including
provisions regarding protection of aliens from mob violence, originated from
acknowledgment that, to a certain extent, it might be necessary to afford to an
alien a different degree of protection than is accorded to a citizen. The episodes
of mob violence and anti-Italian sentiment included in the present study illustrate
the need for such an anti-lynching law, the inadequacy of local authorities to
protect the alien while in custody, and the inability to secure convictions in a local
court of law. The enactment of an anti-lynching federal law would have resulted
in greater guarantees that alleged lynchers be brought to justice and would have
placed the federal government in a better position to fulfill its international treaty
obligations. 98 However, racial prejudice, ethnic hatreds, and constitutional doubts
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could not be easily overcome and did not allow the enactment of a federal antilynching law.
Undoubtedly, of all Italian representatives who were involved in the
contention between the United States and Italy concerning protection of Italian
nationals on U.S. soil, Baron Fava was the most actively involved in efforts to
solve the crisis and push toward passage of a federal anti-lynching law in order
to fulfill treaty obligations of mutual protection. Once he returned to Italy, Fava,
serving as Senator, continued indefatigably to be involved in cases of lynchings
of Italians in the United States, addressing both legal and political aspects of the
question. In 1902, during the controversy caused by the murders in Erwin,
Mississippi, he wrote an essay in which he pointed out the constitutional issue as
well as the legal aspects of the controversy, that is whether the Congress of the
United States was able to “defer to federal courts cases of lynchings of foreignborn nationals and whether such federal courts existed in all the states of the
Union.” 99 Although American experts in jurisprudence argued that such federal
courts did not exist, to counter such statements, Fava emphasized that the
Supreme Court of the United States was located in Washington, D.C., and there
were also nine federal courts, usually referred to as “circuit courts,” whose
judiciary powers extended to the whole territory of the United States. Each one of
the circuit courts depended directly on one of the nine Supreme Court justices in
Washington, D.C., with each one of them having jurisdiction over several states
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concerning illicit acts violating the laws of the federal Union. 100 “As for the alleged
impossibility by the U.S. Congress to defer to federal courts, established in the
various states of the Union, jurisdiction over lynching of foreign-born, Fava
maintained, it could be implied de facto.“ 101
With regard to the right of the U.S. Congress to defer such jurisdiction to
the federal judiciary, Fava mentioned in the same essay that the issue was
addressed by Senator Joseph B. Foraker, proponent of a bill “to provide for the
punishment of violations of treaty rights of aliens.” Foraker’s report, submitted to
the U.S. Senate on 14 February 1900, was unanimously approved by the
senatorial committee, thus implying approval of de facto federal jurisdiction over
lynchings of aliens. 102
Fava also emphasized that Foraker’s proposal had been prompted by
Fava’s own actions, persistence, integrity, and commitment to right wrongs. Fava
stated that, in his appeal to the foreign minister on 20 December 1901, he
reminded the Italian Senate that the proposed bill was the fruit of amicable
negotiations that he had started back in 1899, soon after the lynching at Tallulah,
Louisiana; such negotiations were conducted during the tenure of President
McKinley, first, and then had been carried on by committee chairs in both Houses
of Congress. 103
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Furthermore, Fava maintained that foreign treaties, once ratified by the
U.S. Senate, became ipso iure laws of the federal Union. Fava continued by
saying that a great number of American statesmen such as Webster, Evarts, and
Blaine were definitely against any of the modifications of federal laws that the
Italian government demanded. These American experts argued that protection of
foreign-born nationals was based upon the doctrine of ”the perfect equality of
treatment of foreign-born and American-born citizens residing in the various
States of the Union.” However, Fava also pointed out that these American
statesmen and legislators developed their thinking at a time when lynchings were
not so common, that is before it became apparent that local prejudice totally
nullified the role of the courts. After numerous cases of lynching remained
unpunished and unresolved, it was clear that the federal government should take
away from state courts the jurisdiction over cases of violence against aliens.” 104
Fava praised the bill as a noble initiative that would legalize the concept that any
crime committed in a State of the Union against a foreign-born must be
considered a federal offense and therefore must be tried in a federal court of law
rather than according to the law of that same state in which the crime had
occurred. Such an achievement “would equally satisfy the local judicial rights of
each State of the Union.” 105
Fava praised the bill proposed by Senator Foraker, arguing that it was
drafted in a serious way, emphasizing those principles and concepts desired by
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the Italian government. Fava was optimistic that Congress would pass the bill.
After all, the issue concerned not only the lynchings of Italians in America, but
also violence and ethnic hatred against any aliens living and working in the
United States. Hence, to assert and clarify the responsibility of the federal
government in cases concerning foreign-born nationals in the United States
ultimately would benefit all individuals of different ethnic backgrounds residing on
U.S. soil. Eventually, they would be grateful to the Italian government that took
the first step toward such long overdue reform. 106
Fava was optimistic about the future. He wrote that a temporary halt to
debate in the U.S. Congress over the proposal did not mean that eventually it
would not be considered as the foundation of new negotiations, especially
because of the recent events in Erwin, Mississippi. 107 Fava concluded his essay
by saying that no one else had done as much as he had to bring to the fore the
issue that crimes against foreign-born should be under the jurisdiction of the
federal government. He was confident that eventually the controversy would be
solved in a satisfactory manner in the interest of both Italy and the United States.
It would be beneficial to both countries that Italian nationals, who worked very
hard with their own hands contributing to the wealth of the great republic of the
United States, could obtain protection of their rights. 108
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In spite of Fava’s optimistic expectations, however, the enactment of a
federal anti-lynching law could not occur, even though such a law would have
placed the federal government in a better position to fulfill its international treaty
obligations. Constitutional doubts, states’ rights, and strong convictions that
aliens who worked and resided in the United States were already guaranteed the
same rights of protection and the same degree of justice provided for U.S.
citizens could not be easily overcome in Congress. Yet, throughout the unfolding
of the contention between Italy and the United States concerning protection of
Italian nationals on U.S. soil, Italian diplomats and politicians adopted an attitude
of prudence and moderation, and, with the exception of the New Orleans affair,
they made efforts not to disrupt relations between the two countries. Despite the
lack of basic human rights protection as required in international treaties, Italian
governments continued to allow emigration to the United States. Such an attitude
of prudence and moderation may have been prompted by an awareness of the
relative powerlessness of the Italian government in moving the United States to
protect immigrants from lynching as required in international treaties. Moreover,
prudence, moderation, and acceptance of humiliating blood money demonstrate
that Italian policymakers valued emigration to the United States both as a social
“safety valve” and as a source of foreign currency and accumulation of capital.
These two concerns were powerful enough incentives to keep emigration going,
despite of the racism, discrimination, and violence that so many Italian nationals
experienced in the United States. Italian governments protested vigorously and
took blood money, but did not employ the ultimate sanction of cutting off the labor
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supply when the U.S. Congress failed to act. Besides respect for the great
republic of the United States and acknowledgement of the relative
powerlessness of the Italian government, the attitudes of prudence, moderation,
and acceptance of the “blood price” demonstrate that Italian governments
needed the emigration as much or even more than did American employers.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
By the late 1800s, the United States was the great magnet for Italian
emigrants. The United States represented the land of opportunities as well as the
fragility of the American dream for Italian emigrants. In fact, Italian laborers were
valued as industrious and reliable, but they were also stereotyped as
subversives, anarchists, and trouble-makers. Although American employers
valued Italian immigrants as a source of cheap labor, American workers resented
them, as Italian workers were always willing to accept jobs for lower wages.
Moreover, both American employers and workers looked down on Italian laborers
as an inferior race. It is not surprising, then, that Italian immigrants were often
subjected to discrimination, racism, and violence. In fact, numerous episodes of
violence and even lynchings of Italians occurred in the United States in the late
1800s and early 1900s--a period when strong, deep-seated anti-foreign
sentiment pervaded American society. In most cases, the perpetrators of the
violence were not found or brought to justice by the local authorities. Italian
diplomats and politicians protested vigorously the failure of the U.S. government
to protect Italian nationals residing and working on U.S. soil in accordance with
their treaty rights. In general, however, Italian representatives chose a course of
prudence and moderation and--except for the New Orleans lynching, which
provoked a serious diplomatic crisis and national pride in the Italian Parliament,
culminating in Rome’s recall of its ambassador--they made efforts to maintain
good relations between Rome and Washington.
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The inhabitants of the Italian peninsula and its nearest large islands have
been one of the most migratory peoples on earth. From shortly after the
completion of unification in 1871 until the onset of World War II, about twenty
million people left Italy to find their livelihood elsewhere. Of these, almost half
migrated to Europe, one-third went to South and North America, and smaller
groups went to Australia and Africa. Italy was a poor and relatively overpopulated
country, lacking sufficient resources for all its children, a fact that political
unification could not change or quickly solve, despite rhetorical promises and the
good intentions of Italian policy-makers. Individuals had moved frequently in the
previous centuries, but the modern “great migration” assumed epic proportions.
The post-unification exodus began as a temporary, seasonal migration to other
regions of the Italian peninsula or other countries in Europe, but then it
developed into a flood of Italian individuals leaving the homeland to find outlets in
distant lands.
The magnitude of the migratory phenomenon engendered passionate
debates in the Italian Parliament over the effects and consequences of the
exodus on Italian society, economy, and politics. Should emigration be
spontaneous, or should it be state-directed? This issue provoked a decadeslong debate between advocates of laissez-faire--that is, spontaneous emigration
to the Americas--and proponents of imperialism to Africa. In Italy, members of
government expressed contrasting opinions concerning emigration; however,
whether optimistic toward emigration or opposed to it, with time the Italian ruling
class acknowledged the need to regulate emigration and especially to protect the
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emigrant. Indeed, laws to protect the emigrant were needed as economic
distress, agrarian crises, and heavy taxation prompted Italian laborers to leave
the homeland and find work elsewhere.
The debate concerning emigration involved expressions of different
political and economic ideologies present in Italy from the completion of the
country’s unification through the following decades. The development of opinion
concerning the emigration question can be divided into three periods. During the
first phase (1868-1888), in general politicians deplored emigration and sought to
curb it. During the second phase (1888-1919), they deemed it a necessary evil,
tried to look at its advantages as a safety valve, and sought to protect the
emigrant. Finally, during the third phase (1919-1927), Italian policy-makers
continued attempts to protect the emigrant and increased state control.
During the first phase, as early as in the 1860s, the debate focused on the
deplorable aspects of emigration and described its evil consequences for Italian
society and economy. During the 1880s, however, official opposition to
emigration subsided, and the debate shifted from whether it should be permitted
to how it should be directed or regulated. Should there be laissez-faire, or should
there be state control? Should Italians be allowed to establish free communities
in the Americas, or should the government sponsor the settlement of colonies in
Africa? Divisions ensued between those advocating peaceful establishment of
free communities in the Americas and those who advocated imperial conquest in
Africa. 1
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The debate resulted in passage of the first important law regulating
emigration on December 30, 1888, sponsored by Prime Minister Francesco
Crispi. The 1888 law aimed at ensuring public order and regulating the activities
of shipping companies, agents, and subagents, all of whom had to obtain
licenses from the Ministry of the Interior in order to operate. It gave Italian
authorities the ability to control emigration in order to suppress illegal activities.
Crispi’s law was the first step toward acknowledgement that the government
should be responsible for the emigrant. However, it was unclear whether the
promoter of the law deemed emigration good or evil for Italian society. 2 In
addition, as the emigrants’ remittances were dispatched back to Italy, it became
apparent that the emigrants’ sacrifices and savings were beneficial for the Italian
economy, and thus, defense of emigration became popular. 3
During the second phase of the political debate over emigration (18881919), a true landmark in Italian emigration policy was the Law of 1901, passed
during the tenure of Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti. The 1901 law was based on
the principle that the emigrant is a citizen and must be protected by the
government. The law presumed that the emigrants, by the very fact of their
social condition and character, could fall easy prey to agents, subagents, and
recruiters. Emigrants were shy, ignorant, and credulous and could easily be
defrauded and cheated. However, they were citizens and, as citizens, they
deserved the government’s protection. The law transferred responsibility for the
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emigrants from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior to the Foreign Ministry.
To the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the law gave power to suspend emigration to
any place where life, liberty, and property of the emigrants might be at risk. 4
The most distinctive creation of the law was the Office of the
Commissioner General of Emigration (CGE), reporting to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The Commissioner General was a member of the Emigration Council, a
broadly representative body of twelve individuals who met at least twice a year to
discuss questions concerning all matters of interest for the well being of the
emigrant. The law required every carrier to pay a tax of eight lira on every ticket
sold; this tax and all license fees were credited to an Emigration Fund that was
established for the benefit of the emigrant and administered by a Parliamentary
Committee. No expenditure was allowed from this fund unless clearly for the
exclusive advantage of the emigrant. 5 In matters concerning emigration, not only
was the commissioner a focal point for all public protective institutions, but he
also had an important relationship with private institutions. Through publication of
the Bollettino dell’ Emigrazione, the CGE offered useful information for the
emigrant and anyone involved with emigration.
In general, scholars of Italian emigration history have praised the 1901 law
as an epoch-making law and a true milestone in the development of government
policy aimed at protecting the emigrant from cruel exploitation by profiteers. The
law signaled the beginning of a more dynamic phase in Italian emigration policy

4

Foerster, The Italian Emigration of Our Times, 478.

5

Ibid., 479.

215
and, although it was modified over the years, its fundamental structure and the
principles upon which it had been established remained unaltered. 6
One important final revision of the 1901 law occurred after World War I
with passage of a comprehensive law aimed at reorganizing all existing laws
regarding emigration. The reason for passage of this comprehensive law, or
Testo Unico, was that the role of the office of the CGE had expanded during
wartime beyond its original competencies. It became responsible for assisting
emigrants who wanted to return home to enlist in the Italian army, for taking care
of mobilization, for maintaining relations with Italian consulates abroad, and for
providing necessary documentation to the police for the issuing of passports. 7
The third phase of Italian emigration policy (1919-1927) covered the
period from the aftermath of World War I through the initial stage of the
establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Italy. The rise of Benito Mussolini to
power brought changes to Italy and to official emigration policy based on fascist
ideology and the regime’s tendency to regulate and control all aspects of life.
Mussolini claimed that Italy was a country of super-abundant energy and chose
to call emigrants “Italians abroad.” He emphasized the need to control the
emigration flux and especially to make emigration temporary and not permanent.
He also wanted to project a positive image of Italy and Italians abroad, to raise
the general esteem of Italian workers abroad, as well as to enhance the value of
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Italiannes, Italian culture, traditions, and values. 8 Hence, Mussolini made several
changes in the government’s emigration policy. One important initial step was
abolishing the CGE and replacing it with the General Bureau of Italians Abroad, a
more political organ that could be better controlled as well as more easily linked
with the Fasci all’Estero (Fascist clubs abroad), a network of fascist clubs outside
of Italy that provided assistance to Italian nationals abroad. At the same time, a
consular network was increased with the infusion of men faithful to the regime. 9
Mussolini hoped to spread fascist ideology and, at the same time, to
improve the image of Italians abroad through this network of fascist clubs and
consulates. Besides establishing Fasci in Europe, the fascist regime looked at
North America, with its large Italian community, as fertile soil for the preservation
of italianità as well as for the spread of fascism. Fascist clubs sprang up in
America; at the same time, old Italo-American societies were transformed into
Fasci shortly after Mussolini’s rise to power. The United States was given prime
attention in this goal of preserving Italian culture as well as in spreading fascist
doctrine. 10
Mussolini’s vision of emigration and emigrants clashed with the growing
protectionist and anti-immigration legislation being enacted in many countries.
Among them was the United States, which in 1921 and 1924 enacted laws that
established a quota system and effectively closed its borders to many emigrants.
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The Immigration Act of 1921 and the Johnson Act of 1924 curtailed immigration
from southern and eastern Europe--the so-called “new immigration.” Fearful
nativists pointed to the new arrivals’ degenerate character, racial characteristics,
and innate tendencies toward crime.
The legislation of the 1920s was the result of decades-long, deeply rooted
anti-immigrant sentiment accompanied by a resurgence of nativism. Anti-Italian
sentiment was particularly strong for though Italians were viewed as industrious,
hard-working individuals, they were also seen as dangerous subversives who
were often prone to trouble-making. This contradictory image of the Italian
immigrant rooted in both deep racism and economic conflict produced numerous
lynchings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In most cases, the
guilty parties were never found and the violence went unpunished by the local
authorities.
Anti-immigrant sentiment always filtered through a specific ethnic
stereotype when Italians were involved, for in American eyes, they always bore
the mark of Cain. They suggested the Mafia, the stiletto, the deed of impassioned
violence. In fact, every time a single Italian laborer resorted to his knife, the
American press emphasized the disposition to assassinate as an innate
characteristic of this impulsive race. The stereotype conditioned every major
outburst of anti-Italian sentiment in the late 1800s and early 1900s. 11
Time and time again, lynch mobs struck at Italians charged with murder or
suspected of being likely to commit murder. Economic competition, too, was
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often a major cause of outbreaks of racial violence. The numerous episodes of
lynching individuals of Italian origin that occurred during the 1890s and early
1900s strained relations between Italy and the United States. In fact, relations
between the two countries became more and more difficult, opening the way to
various and complex diplomatic incidents. In particular, the 1891 lynching at New
Orleans signaled the beginning of a period of strife between Italy and the United
States. The New Orleans lynching was not an isolated event. It had been
preceded by other episodes of racial violence in small towns such as Eureka,
Nevada; Vicksburg, Mississippi; and Louisville, Kentucky. However, the episode
at New Orleans was a ferocious example of anti-Italian sentiment and racism;
consequently, by the 1890s, U.S. and Italian relations had become contentious
and explosive.
The city of New Orleans was a haven for a large migratory population from
southern Italy. The city experienced the social problems of the urban North
colored by Southern folkways. When the chief of police was murdered,
everybody blamed the local Italian Mafia; over a hundred Italians were arrested
in an atmosphere of hysteria and taken to jail. Mayor Joseph Shakspeare issued
a public appeal to teach the Italians a lesson that they would not forget. The city
council appointed a citizens’ committee to suggest ways to deal with European
criminals and prevent them from immigrating into the city.
When some of the accused were tried, the allegedly bribed jury stunned
the city by refusing to convict. While officials stood idly by, a mob proceeded to
remedy the perceived failure of justice by lynching eleven Italians who had been
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acquitted just the day before. The lynching mob was made up of top members of
the city’s press, political, and business establishments. In the aftermath of the
lynchings, many of those who were members of the execution squad profited.
The victims had established themselves as rising businessmen along the docks.
After the lynching, those who had cried Mafia became wealthy by replacing the
Italian- American businessmen in the port city of New Orleans. Throughout the
country, their actions were generally condoned or even approved. Clearly, both
ethnic hatred and economic competition had played a major role in the unfolding
of the violence. 12
The Italian government asked for official reassurance from the United
States not only that the guilty parties would be brought to justice, but also that it
would recognize the principle that an indemnity was due to the relatives of the
victims. The federal government took the position that if, after proper
investigation, a case was established for relief to be granted to the families of the
Italian subjects who had lost their lives by lawless violence, it would be submitted
for the consideration of Congress.
Throughout the diplomatic controversy engendered by the New Orleans
lynching, the U.S. government claimed that there was no liability on its part for
acts of mob violence, that protection of aliens residing and working in the United
States must be under the jurisdiction of local authorities, and that criminal
prosecution for any acts of mob violence must also rest with the state authorities.
However, after the New Orleans incident, it was clear that the Louisiana
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authorities had been unable to extend sufficient protection to the Italians while in
custody.
The main outcome of the New Orleans episode was the beginning of a
movement in Congress for passage of a much-needed federal anti-lynching law
to transfer jurisdiction to the federal courts in cases of mob violence. A bill was
introduced in the Senate on March 1, 1892, proposing that, where acts that were
crimes under the laws of the states were committed against aliens in violation of
their treaty rights, the offenders should be prosecuted in the federal courts.
Heated debates in both houses followed. However, interest in the bill died, and it
never came to a vote.
For over a decade, the interest that Congress had in the lynching problem
focused on the issue of protecting treaty rights of aliens. However, in spite of
frequent presidential recommendations, not one proposal for a federal antilynching law introduced in the Senate or House succeeded. In 1902, a resolution
proposed by Senator Jacob Gallinger of New Hampshire would have directed the
Senate Judiciary Committee to investigate lynchings and report whether there
was any remedy for the evil. It was tabled. In 1908, the House passed a bill
recommended by the State Department. However, in the Senate, it was referred
to the Judiciary Committee, where it died.
An important step forward was made by Representative Leonidas C. Dyer
of Missouri in 1918; he proposed a bill to protect citizens of the United States
against lynching in default of protection by the states. The bill also included a
clause for the protection of aliens, adopting the form suggested in 1892. The
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Dyer bill failed to pass in Congress. From that time forward, though, the problem
of protecting aliens would be combined with general anti-lynching proposals.
Although such laws would have benefited all minorities and ethnic groups in the
United States, successive attempts in the 1920s and 1930s to pass muchneeded federal anti-lynching measures failed to pass in Congress because of
constitutional issues, states’ rights, and sectional prejudices.
Undoubtedly, states’ rights was the most serious obstacle to the
enactment of a federal anti-lynching law. The matter became even more complex
in cases of mob violence against aliens. In fact, the main objection in Congress
to passage of a federal anti-lynching law conferring jurisdiction on the federal
courts and providing for punishment of perpetrators of crimes against aliens in
violation of international treaties was that such law would grant an alien more
extensive rights than those awarded a citizen. Yet, as most episodes of violence
included in this study illustrate, the federal government was often in an
embarrassing position because, time after time, cases of violence against Italian
nationals showed that state laws and local authorities were not able to afford
aliens the same protection that was extended to native-born citizens. The
government could not claim that citizens and aliens were awarded the same
protection of the law, the same benefits, and the same rights under the laws of
the states in which they resided. Racial animosity made it very difficult for the
local authorities to be free from prejudice and to grant the same degree of justice
allowed to a native-born citizen. In cases of failure to secure the same protection
to the alien and to the citizen, then the question became one of international law
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based on the failure by the government to fulfill its international treaties
obligations.
The episodes of mob violence included in this study illustrate that there
was a need for an anti-lynching law, and that local authorities were unable to
protect an alien while in custody, or to secure convictions in local courts of law.
The enactment of a federal anti-lynching law would have resulted in a greater
likelihood that alleged lynchers would be punished for their crimes and would
have placed the federal government in a better position to fulfill its treaty
obligations. The federal government always claimed that there was no liability on
its part for acts of mob violence and that protection of aliens must rest with state
authorities. Contradictorily, it always granted indemnities to the victims’ families.
Although the indemnities were awarded “out of humane considerations and
without liability thereof,” it could be argued that the government’s payment of
indemnities implied admission of failure to comply with existing treaties
obligations.
In Italy, from the liberal government to the fascist government, Italian
policy-makers succeeded in regulating emigration, enacting laws to protect the
emigrant from cruel exploitation by profiteers, and acknowledging the Italian
government’s responsibility to protect the emigrant. However, neither the liberal
nor the fascist governments succeeded in affording protection to the emigrant
abroad.
Did relations between Italy and the United States change because of the
episodes of mob violence and anti-Italian sentiment in the late 1800s and early
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1900s? An analysis of available documents reveals that, in general, Italian
diplomats serving in the United States from the 1870s to the 1920s tried to
maintain good relations between Rome and Washington. Even in the one
exception, when the facts of New Orleans culminated in Rome’s recalling its
ambassador, Baron Fava, one could argue that the Italian government tried to
maintain a course of prudence and moderation. In fact, after payment of
indemnities to the victims’ families, relations were restored and Fava returned to
the United States.
How did relations between Italy and the United States change after the
rise of the Fascist dictatorship in Italy? Undoubtedly, Mussolini brought changes
to Italy as well as to Italian domestic, foreign, and emigration policies. These
changes were consistent with the regime’s ideology, its tendency to centralize
control, and the Duce’s claim that Italy was a country of superabundant energy
rather than a country whose citizens were forced to leave because of a lack of
sufficient resources. 13
One important change in Mussolini’s foreign policy was the initiative to
spread fascist ideology as well as Italian culture through a network of fascist
clubs both in Europe and in the United States. Because of the large Italian
community that had settled in North America, Mussolini and his associates
looked at the United States as an ideal environment to preserve Italiannes, to
spread fascist ideology, and to better the overall image of Italy in both the Italian
and American communities. Hence, the United States was given primary
13
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attention as fertile soil for the implementation of Mussolini’s main goals in foreign
policy. Mussolini largely ignored Italian diplomats of the fascist era such as
Ambassador Gelasio Caetani, who advised him to be cautious and warned him
that attempts to spread fascist ideology would hurt rather than help the Italian
image in America. 14
Italian Fascism in the United States made serious attempts to increase its
political influence and resorted to subversive political activities to expand
Blackshirt influence. At the same time, Italian-American Fascists attempted to
attract to Mussolini ordinary Italian Americans who supported the United States,
but who also championed fascist Italy in any matters that would not clash with
allegiance to the United States. Fascist Italy considered the support of Italian
American lobbyists to be essential in gaining Washington’s approval for Rome’s
foreign policy.
Eventually, Mussolini’s “March on America” failed when the Blackshirt
leadership found that the political strength of the United States was formidable
and that the majority of Americans, including Italian Americans, resisted efforts
by the Blackshirts to advance their ideas and organization. Moreover, efforts by
Blackshirt leaders in America to create a movement failed because their political
ideas differed little from traditional American beliefs. Italian Fascism in the United
States appeared as a “junior partner” of Americanism rather than a clear political
alternative. Italian American fascism evidences a serious but failed attempt by a
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foreign power to subvert the loyalty of American citizens. 15 In fact, rather than
succeeding in protecting the emigrants, Mussolini sought to exploit them and
thereby put them at greater risk of violence and reprisals. The Fascist clubs were
essentially political exploitation of a valuable minority population.
While attempting to spread fascism, to preserve Italiannes, as well as to
disrupt Italian Americans’ allegiance to the United States, the fascist government
strove to maintain as many legal and political ties as possible with Italian
emigrants. The regime insisted that emigration must be temporary and not
permanent. It also insisted on the emigrant’s obligation to do military service in
Italy. For the Fascist regime, the Fasci abroad were an integral part of its
emigration policy. Yet, in spite of good intentions, nationalistic fervor, and
bombastic rhetoric, the problem of protecting Italian nationals abroad remained
unresolved.
During the fascist era, Italian representatives in the United States did not
have to deal with any lynchings of Italian nationals. However, they did have to
deal with restrictive immigration laws enacted in the1920s to curtail the immigrant
influx into the United States, laws that were deemed discriminatory and unfair.
The Fascist government could do little except protest the laws. For example, on
January 24, 1922, Italian Ambassador Rolando Ricci wrote a letter to Secretary
of State Charles Evans Hughes (1921-1923). In it, Ricci observed that, since the
results of the 1920 census had already been published, the establishment of
quotas based on the 1910 census would openly discriminate against peoples of
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different nationalities, a course that would violate existing treaties providing
“equality of rights and of treatment.” 16
Furthermore, Ambassador Ricci pointed out that Italy would be particularly
affected by such decision of Congress, as its greatest flood of emigration to the
United States occurred between 1910 and 1914. Ricci also suggested that
passports should be the only element for determining the nationality of aliens and
their assignment to a quota, that is, the quota of the nation that had granted the
passport. (In one incident, Italian citizens of Rhodes were denied entrance to the
United States because they had been assigned to the exhausted quota of
Greece). Making passports the only basis upon which to assign quotas, Ricci
maintained, would avoid confusion, discrimination, and unnecessary hardships.
Such a system would be legal, sound, and politically indisputable. Moreover,
according to Ricci, the passport requirement would permit a nation to take
responsibility for strict adherence to its quota and to protect its own citizens while
observing American law. 17
On May 18, 1922, Secretary of State Hughes wrote to Ricci that the
Immigration Act of 1921 did not violate the treaty of 1871, nor did restrictions
appear to be discriminatory against Italy or any other country. 18 Hughes stated
that restrictions imposed by the law were of a general character. Hughes added
that copies of Ricci’s notes would be sent to the Chairman of the Committee on
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Immigration of the United States Senate and the Chairman of the Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization of the United States House of Representatives. 19
Needless to say, the Italian protest about immigration restrictions did not result in
any changes of the law. It must be observed that, in this attempt to obtain
changes in U.S. immigration laws, Mussolini was as impotent as the liberals who
preceded him.
However, as immigration to the United States subsided, so did antiimmigrant feelings, xenophobia, and violence against aliens. Lynchings of
Italians in the United States had been a manifestation of anti-immigrant
sentiment deeply rooted in racism during a time when southern and eastern
Europeans were considered a menace to American society. Lynching was a tool
to maintain control over the labor force and to ensure the prestige and
supremacy of the native-born over the foreign-born, who were frightening with
their strange ways, traditions, habits, religions, and cultures. Moreover the
Italians’ whiteness was often called into question; their “in-between-ness” was
often considered a disturbing factor disruptive to the order of things. Hence, mob
violence against Italians may be seen as an attempt to protect society from an
“inassimilable” group that constituted a threat to white racial unity.
In recent years, scholars have produced numerous important studies on
white mob violence against African Americans. Historians, sociologists, and
literary critics have proposed a host of explanations for the widespread brutality
that resulted in the deaths of thousands of individuals in the South, West, and
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Midwest between 1880 and 1930. No single explanation has dominated.
Lynching was about economics; it was about racism; it was about ethnic hatred,
social repercussions, cultural meanings, and preservation of the order of things.
The lynching of white ethnics, nonetheless, remains a relatively neglected
subject. Although a minor phenomenon in comparison to black suffering, the
stories of the lynching of Italians in the United States need to be told. The brutal
shooting of the charcoal burners in Eureka, Nevada; the Villarosa hanging in
Vicksburg, Mississippi; the lynching of the Cravassos brothers in Kentucky; the
ferocious lynching of the eleven Italians in New Orleans; the episode of
Walsenburg, Colorado; the lynching of Salardino, Arena, and Venturella in
Hahnville, Louisiana; the lynching of the Difattas in Tallulah; the brutal shooting
of the Serios in Erwin, Mississippi; and the gruesome hanging of Ficarotta and
Albano in Tampa, Florida--all are emblematic of the racism and discrimination
that Italians endured in the late 1800s and early 1900s. These men were
strangers in the land who were pursuing the American dream but who found
violent deaths in the supposed land of opportunity. These stories represent a
chapter in the history of Italian Americans that has largely been ignored.
The movement that started in the U.S. Congress for passage of a muchneeded federal anti-lynching law to protect aliens from mob violence may very
well be considered the beginning of the civil rights movement in the United
States. Moreover, since protection of the treaty rights of aliens was involved, that
movement may also be seen as an initial step toward consideration of protection
of aliens in foreign countries in international law.
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However, all these episodes illustrate the relative powerlessness of the
Italian government to extract vigorous enforcement of agreed-upon protection for
aliens in international treaties. In the end, Italian governments--from the liberals
through the fascists--though they failed to obtain real federal protection for their
citizens, persisted in allowing emigration to the United States. This pragmatism
says something important about the value that Italy placed on the continued
emigration to the United States. The emigrant children of Italy were valued as a
social “safety valve” and as a source of capital accumulation through their
savings sent home. Those advantages overpowered concerns for human rights
in the calculation of Italian policy. Italian emigrants were put at risk.
Even in the absence of adequate anti-lynching laws, not only did the
liberal governments decline to cut off emigration, but Mussolini’s government
objected to American-imposed quotas and restrictions. The liberal governments
protested the racism, discrimination, and violence, but accepted humiliating
indemnities for the victims’ families. The governments chose not to employ the
ultimate sanction of cutting off the labor supply. Moreover, despite the bluster of
the Mussolini era, the Fascists were no more able to affect U.S. law than were
their predecessors. In fact, Mussolini’s promotion of Fascism put Italian
emigrants at greater risk of violence and retribution in the absence of federal antilynching laws. Still further, Mussolini so desired the emigration to continue that
he protested restrictive U.S. immigration quotas even though there had been no
progress in protecting Italian nationals from discrimination.
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Although Italian policymakers protested vigorously the lack of protection or
unfair quotas--and even recalled the Italian ambassador after the New Orleans
incident in an upsurge of nationalistic fervor--in the end they accepted humiliation
and even violence as the fate of many of their citizens and as a necessary
sacrifice to keep Italian economic matters from becoming worse. Ultimately, from
the liberals to the Fascists, Italian officialdom, in continuing the migration trade,
chose prudence, moderation, and pragmatism over the human rights of Italian
emigrants.
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